As an experiment today, I decided to go through the process of booking a flight and estimating the cost of the ticket and fees that might be associated with that trip.  To be fair and give a reasonable representation, I’m going to assume that I’ll enjoy a couple of beverages (but not liquor or beer since I don’t drink on flights as a general rule) and that I’ll be hungry.  To make it interesting, I chose to fly from DFW (where I live) to EWR (Newark Liberty International Airport and where my brother lives) and I’m going to choose 2 airlines for comparison.

 

To start, I visited American Airlines’ website because AA is, after all, the dominant carrier in my home town and most likely to offer a variety of flights that are non-stop.  A reasonable person seeks out non-stop first, right?

 

I found a flight leaving on a Friday morning and a flight returning on a Monday morning so that I could visit for the weekend.  After entering my preferred criteria, AA shows me a set of flights that, to my surprise, are labeled as being $164.00.  I’m feeling good suddenly.  I chose the outbound flight and it then asks me to select a return flight.  Hmm, there is that same fare so I choose an early morning return for the same price.  It felt like my roundtrip fare was $164 the way it was presented even though I actually know better from my own extensive experience.  The presentation gets one’s hopes up I suspect.

 

It wasn’t.  It was $164 each way for total of $328 and that, my friends, was as super saver fare.  The standard Economy saver fare (still not the full economy fare and therefore still subject to some restrictions) was $876 each way for a total of $1752. 

 

Now, my super saver economy fare was to also be taxed $21.00 for fees levied by various governments.  Now I’m up to $349.00.  Mind you, that’s what it has cost to simply book the flight and let me note that if I want a paper ticket (which would be unreasonable today but wasn’t just 8 years ago), I would pay an additional $25 and I would only have that option *if* I lived in a country where paper ticketing was required such as a Latin American nation.  Yes, they’ll let you pay $25 to receive a ticket if you live in a country where e-ticketing isn’t permitted. 

 

Now, since I’m flying to visit my brother, I plan to bring him a few things and since we tend to go out and enjoy ourselves, I’ll be taking my larger suitcase and need to check that bag.  The first checked bag fee is $15.  In some respects people have been seeing that as almost reasonable.  How reasonable does it look when you realize that you pay that fee EACH WAY?  Yup.  $30 for roundtrip baggage check of my bag.  If I were traveling with two bags to be checked (unreasonable), it would cost a total of $80 each way to transport two bags (and they still have to be under 50lbs each.)

 

So, just to plan, I’ll need to find out what my food and beverage costs will be for this trip.  I’ll be wanting a couple of soft drinks or cups of juice each way and it turns out that on AA, this will be complimentary for me.  GREAT! 

 

Both of my flights will be morning departures and it would be nice to eat a meal enroute so that I don’t empty my brother’s cupboard or force him to stop at a Nathan’s as soon as I get there.  It doesn’t have to be a big meal or a hot meal, just a good sandwich or something similar for a breakfast item.  Checking AA, I find that I have these options for my morning flights:

Snacks for $3.00

• 4oz of mixed nuts
• A 4oz MegaCookie (i’ll be choosing this.)

 

Snacks for $4.00

• Cheese and crackers (not for breakfast!)

 

Breakfast Sandwiches for $6.00 each.

• Breakfast Bagel Sandwich
  Enjoy a plain bagel topped with slices of roasted turkey breast and mild muenster cheese. This sandwich is served with a side of Hellman’s® mayonnaise and dijonnaise mustard.
• Club Croissant Sandwich
  Savor a freshly baked croissant topped with thinly sliced roasted turkey breast and aged cheddar cheese, garnished with crisp green leaf lettuce. Hellman’s® mayonnaise served on the side.

 

Neither of those sandwiches are very appealing but let’s assume I’m hungry enough to get one.  My meal costs each way will be $9.00 for a total of $18.00 roundtrip.  But, hey, I get a free Coca Cola right?

 

So, to take this trip on American Airlines, it will cost me $397 and that doesn’t seem too bad all in all.  However, let’s say my brother and I have just too good of a time and I want to return a day later.   That would cost me a whopping $150 change fee *and* the difference in fares.  Since it would be a morning flight, it’s safe to assume that I’ll be paying full economy fare and that would mean a one day change would cost me $1137. 

 

Now, let’s take a look at taking a different airline.  Since I have done this trip once before on Airtran, I’ve chosen them as my economy option.  It will require me to connect through Atlanta but my departure and arrival times are actually quite close to the non-stop AA flights so I’m happy enough with that.

 

First, I discover that my travel fare options include a super saver fare for $164 each way or a total of $370 roundtrip with taxes.  The taxes and fees for this choice were a stunning $43.00 higher.  Not a good start.  There is some good news though.  Airtran will let me check that first bag for free so I save $30 and find myself at this point with a total cost savings of $9.00 over AA right now.

 

But I will be hungry so let’s check out the options on Airtran.   Hmmm, no food except a complimentary snack of pretzels (which I only know from experience as it is not shown on their website.).  I’ll have to buy some food at an airport and I think that if we assume that I’ll purchase something resembling breakfast at McDonald’s, I’ll probably pay about $4.50 for a couple of sausage biscuits or breakfast burritos (and I’ll enjoy them more too just from my own experience.)  Let’s call my food charges an additional $10 just to be safe. 

 

My all in price on Airtran will be $380 vs AA’s price of $397 for a savings of $17.00 overall.  Now, which would I actually choose?  That’s tough to say.  Airtran offers XM satellite radio which I like a lot but I do own a MP3 player and I would very likely bring it along anyway so that doesn’t compel me towards Airtran.  I do prefer Airtran’s seating, particularly on their 737’s which use a Recaro seat that is a great deal more comfortable than AA’s economy seat.  That *might* compel me to choose Airtran. 

 

However, Airtran also offes a business class upgrade at the gate for pretty cheap prices per segment.  Assuming I could get it for 2 of the 4 segments, it would only cost me $69 each segment or a total of $138.  That is compelling.  In my experience, you need only arrive about 1.25 hours before your departure time and you can usually get these seats.  Flying Business Class gets me a nice seat and that is it though.  For a man like me at 6’1″ with long legs and weighing 275lbs, it’s nice to be a bit more comfortable and I would probably take that upgrade for two flight segments.  So, I would pay $518 total to fly travel an extra hour but be comfortable.  You might choose otherwise. 

 

My point here is that cheap economy fares are pretty much the same no matter what the airline.  At least on trunk routes.  It might be possible to save a dollar here and there but more often it isn’t.  Airtran’s approach strikes me as more honest in that while I do pay the same base fare, I don’t pay for the first bag checked (reasonable) and I do have some upgrade opportunities to a better seat.  I don’t get food but, then again, do I really want food from the airline?  In the real world I do not.  I’ll happily buy a burger or a breakfast at the airport because the food is not only cheaper but a bit more appetizing. 

 

Just for the record, I planned a similar trip from DFW to PDX (Portland, where my mother lives) for the same dates on both AA and Southwest Airlines.  Using the same criteria, here are the all in prices:

 

American Airlines:  $527 (including $21.00 in taxes and fees) for the ticket and a grand total of $575.00 (checked bag fees and meal prices included).

 

Southwest Airlines:  $469.00 (including $76.94 in taxes and fees) for the ticket and a grand total of . . . wait for it. . . $469.00.  Southwest has no baggage fees and they do not offer food.  Would I take SWA?  Nope.  Because it requires me to fly from DAL (Love Field) to ABQ (Albuquerque) and then to SLC (Salt Lake City) where I changes planes and fly on to Portland.  That’s a whipping and it’s just worth it to fly on AA’s decrepit MD-83 for only 3.5 hours to get there. 

In general, low cost carriers such as Southwest and Airtran are providing a slightly lower fare than the legacy carriers.  The difference in fares are mere dollars but that is because we examined economy super saver fares.  Want to know why those airlines soundly trounce legacy carriers?  Take a look at their business class fares.

 

DFW to EWR

AA:  $2902.00 all in.  Since it is business class, there will be no baggage fees and a decent meal will be provided. 

 

Airtran:  $1070.00 but since we’ll still have to buy a meal, let’s call it $1100.00 even. 

 

That is a savings of over $1800.  And it is the biggest reason why airlines such as American Airlines are doing everything possible to hold on to their valued frequent flier.  Sure, Airtran takes about 1.25 hours longer but if I’m running a business, my guys will be flying Airtran because with a savings of $1800, I don’t mind if they lose 2.5 hours of productivity. 

 

This is the real reason airlines such as American and United resent low cost carriers.   Low cost carriers set the price for the “fill” of the aircraft.  Which is the revenue they would not earn if they didn’t sell a seat at a discount price.  In addition, low cost carriers such as Airtran, Jet Blue and Frontier (and to a lesser extent, Southwest) are now competing for those business class passengers at prices legacy carriers can’t come close to. 

 

 

Filed under: Airline Service by ajax
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The Dallas Morning News had This Story this morning.  It seems that Continental Airlines has found itself unable to resist charging a fee ($15) for the first piece of luggage to be checked.  It was encouraging to me that they had resisted this up to now and it is disappointing to see them join the band wagon.  No doubt the argument is that they are leaving money on the table by not charging this fee.  This also changes my mind some on the idea that someone will break away from this pattern among the legacy carriers.  These fees may be around for a lot longer than I originally thought.

 

 

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The USA Today Aviation Blog, Today In The Sky, reported on who operates the worst 30 late flights of the last month.  They are:

 

July’s 30 most-chronically delayed flights
1. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5292 (Minneapolis/St. Paul to New York JFK; late 100% of the time by an average of 134 minutes)
2. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5614 (Charlotte to JFK; 100%; 121 minutes)
3. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5491 (Albany to JFK; 100%; 97 minutes)
4. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5739 (JFK to Pittsburgh; 96.8%; 83 minutes)
5. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5440 (Washington Dulles to JFK; 96.8%; 83 minutes)
6. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5610 (BWI to JFK; 96.3%; 115 minutes)
7. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5588 (Norfolk to JFK; 96.2%; 132 minutes)
8. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5496 (Philadelphia to Boston; 95.5%; 83 minutes)
9. Delta affiliate Pinnacle 2021 (Charlotte to Atlanta; 94.7%; 97 minutes)
10. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5287 (JFK to Minneapolis; 93.6%; 103 minutes)
11. JetBlue Flight 1076 (Richmond to JFK; 93.6%; 78 minutes)
12. JetBlue Flight 136 (Fort Myers to JFK; 93.6%; 76 minutes)
13. JetBlue Flight 1108 (Raleigh/Durham to JFK; 93.3%; 111 minutes)
14. JetBlue Flight 1056 (Pittsburgh to JFK; 93.3%; 92 minutes)
15. Continental affiliate ExpressJet Flight 2412 (Providence to Newark; 93.3%; 69 minutes)
16. JetBlue Flight 160 (Denver to JFK; 93.3%; 58 minutes)
17. AirTran Flight 311 (Milwaukee to New York LaGuardia; 93.3%; 56 minutes)
18. American affiliate American Eagle Flight 4783 (Washington National to Boston; 92.6%; 72 minutes)
19. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5640 (Raleigh/Durham to JFK; 92.3%; 98 minutes)
20. JetBlue Flight 160 (JFK to Dulles; 92.3%; 73 minutes)
21. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5438 (Tampa to LaGuardia; 92.3%; 62 minutes)
22. United affiliate Mesa Flight 7297 (Chicago O’Hare to Allentown; 92.3%; 59 minutes)
23. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5678 (LaGuardia to Jacksonville, Fla.; 92.3%; 53 minutes)
24. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5592 (Richmond to JFK; 92%; 80 minutes)
25. American Flight 1629 (Miami to San Juan; 91.3%; 92 minutes)
26. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5741 (O’Hare to Cincinnati; 90.9%; 103 minutes)
27. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5366 (Detroit to JFK; 90.9%; 86 minutes)
28. Delta affiliate Atlantic Southeast 4358 (Atlanta to JFK; 90.9%; 84 minutes)
29. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5496 (Boston to Bangor; 90.9%; 72 minutes)
30. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5515 (Detroit to Cincinnati; 90.9%; 68 minutes)

 

22 of those 30 flights involve travel to or from the New York City area and of those, 16 were to JFK airport.  A little more scrutiny reveals that 15 of the 16 involving JFK were flights operated as commuter flights using regional jets.  One would be tempted to simply associate most of the problem with Comair (Delta’s regional affiliate flying many of those chronically late flights) but if it was just Comair’s operations, they would have fantastically late flights for other city pairs as well. 

 

I’m sure a pattern is revealing itself here.

 

First, airports in the New York City area and JFK Airport in particular cannot accomodate the flights unless it is a perfect day.  Since those airports are subject to severe weather both in the summer and winter, a fair number of those flights simply never take off or arrive on time.  Ever.  If there is one minor disruption at a peak flying hour, schedules for most airlines at those airports are shattered.

 

Second, because those flights are regional jets flown mostly by legacy airline “connector” airlines, they take low priority when it comes to dispatching.  If Delta has 25 mainline aircraft scheduled into the airport and another 20 regional jets, then it will give priority to dispatching those mainline aircraft first for the simple reason that there are more passengers on those airplanes.  Regional jets are carrying generally less than 60 passengers on those aircraft and by letting those aircraft arrive late in favor of mainline airplanes, they disrupt the fewest passengers.

 

However, doesn’t it seem a bit deceptive to have flights scheduled for a route that is 100% late?  Wouldn’t it seem deceptive to schedule flights that cannot arrive at least 60% on time with late being no more than 45 minutes at the worst?  Of course it does.  Airlines ask for and get performance guarantees when they buy aircraft.  A new airplane generally has to be within 2 or 3% of the guarantee or airlines receive performance penalty payments and sometimes negotiate their way out of the purchase contracts.  If Boeing delivered an airplane that was 100% over its fuel burn, they would be out of business.  If they delivered an airplane that was 10% over its fuel burn they would be out of business. 

 

The public puts up with this because it is pretty hard to find out just how reliable a flight is when booking a seat.  It can be done but I just did it on a hypothetical flight from DFW to ORD (Chicago) and it took me more than 12 minutes to check out the statistics on just 3 flights.  If those first 3 revealed themselves to be too late on average, I would have spent more time identifying one that wasn’t too late and that did have a seat at the price I wanted to pay.  Selling services that perform that badly would constitute fraud in many other service sectors. 

 

What if airlines had to publish their dispatch reliability and schedule reliabiilty along with a fare?  It would sure make the consumer approach his purchases differently, wouldn’t it?  After all, how willing are you to pay for a full fare economy seat if you know that the flight you are purchasing it on runs 100% late and by as much as 130 minutes?  You probably wouldn’t buy the ticket at almost any price if you are business traveler because those travelers need some predictability and reliability in their schedules.  Likewise, wouldn’t you be willing to pay an extra $20 or $30 to take a different flight at a similar time that *does* have a good track record?

 

One way to evaluate your prospects for a particular trip is to look at which airlines serve that city pair and what their actual performance is for that route.  FlightStats.Com is a good website for this information but don’t be afraid to insist your business travel agent ensure you are on a flight with good dispatch reliability and on time statistics.  It is cheaper to pay $50 more for a good flight than to risk your entire schedule on a flight that has a 100% chance of making you miss a connection and blow an entire business day. 

 

The greater the transparency in the airline industry, the better the service will be.   If we required a variety of statistics be published by airlines in their flight listings, I would be willing to bet there would be a wholesale change in consumer behavior towards those airlines.  Good for good airlines and bad for bad airlines.  Shouldn’t it always be that way?

 

Update:  I’m told by a frequent flyer who flies Continental most often that Continental *does* publish their performance stats on their website when booking a ticket.  To a degree, that is unsurprising since Continental Airlines is one of the very few airlines that has consistently followed a policy of measuring their performance with very real metrics.  A policy that started with Gordon Bethune and has been continued by Larry Kellner.  Well done.

 

Filed under: Airline News, Airline Service, Airports by ajax
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American Airlines, in a rare move smacking of smart, began flying from Dallas Love Field to Chicago O’Hare (Midway would have been better) using their American Eagle subsidiary and the Embraer ERJ-145 aircraft.  The Wright Amendment allows this flight because it uses an aircraft with less than 56 seats. 

 

There are 6 daily flights each way and at very convenient times too.  This is smart because they can price the seats for these flights so they make money and, at the same time, build some customer loyalty for the flights while Southwest Airlines waits until 2014 to fly the same route.  The Dallas business traveler potentially saves an hour or more in total travel time for the same economy price he or she would pay flying from DFW. 

 

By using their 2 gates at Love Field (Dallas’s secondary airport) for these flights instead of competing directly with Southwest on flights to places like Austin and St. Louis, American Eagle Airlines will begin to get traction with the Love Field business commuter for once.  It would not surprise me at all if they introduced their CRJ-700 aircraft on this route with a few first class seats to reduce seating to the Wright Amendment limits.  The CRJ-700 or even the CRJ-900 could be uniquely well suited to this city pair in that could provide first class and/or economy plus seating for a price many would pay.

 

 

Filed under: Airline Service, Airports by ajax
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How do you regulate airlines?  You don’t.

 

You regulate the airports instead.  Rather than constrain airlines by route awards and fare regulation, the better model is regulate airports and we already have an agency that is well suited to the job.

 

Major airports, including those secondary airports in major cities, should be regulated by the regular auction of slots.   By auctioning these slots twice a year, airlines would be forced to consider the value of flying into an airport against the costs imposed on them by infrastructure and resources.  Currently, most large airports in the United States that suffer from congestion do so because of unlimited slot availability or overly high slot allocations per hour.  By setting hourly caps and making those slots available at a price, airlines will have to align their operations according to the value of operating a flight into the airport and the value of monopolizing those same resources would be greatly reduced.

 

What this means is that airlines who have to pay a high price for a slot at an airport such as JFK will be more likely to use that slot for an airplane carrying a larger number of passengers rather than wasting the slot on a regional jet carrying very few.  This would have the effect of shifting those regional jet flights to times of the day when airport use is relatively light.  Critics of such a plan (including airlines) would decry it as a loss of service for people in smaller communities and as interfering government regulation against free enterprise.

 

Nonsense.  Airlines should remain free to operate routes of their choice but they should only be permitted to use public facilities (and that is, in fact, what an airport is) in a way that benefits the whole rather than just their network.  Passengers from Binghamton, NY may have to realize that because they offer so few passengers, it may be necessary to fly at different times of the day and experience some longer connection times because there is no economic argument for them to experience the same service levels (or frequencies) as someone who lives in a major metropolitan airport.

 

By auctioning slots a couple of times a year, you force an airline to weigh the opportunity costs of operating flights into an area on a regular basis.  If Airline A cannot make a revenue argument for flying from Syracuse, NY to JFK at 5:00pm in the evening, then they won’t buy the slot for that route.  If, on the other hand, they can make the revenue argument for 3:00pm, they will.  

 

In addition, it will force more competition upon the airlines for serving such airports because Airline B may be willing to pay more for a slot as a function of having lower operating costs and the airline who manages their costs will be rewarded with greater revenue rather than Airline A who has held on to slots under the current “use them or lose them” regime in place at capacity constrained airports. 

 

Put another way, if Airline A, a legacy carrier, cannot justify bringing 10 regional jets into an airport such as JFK at 5pm in the evening, and Airline B and C can justify bringing in 5 mainline aircraft each into the airport at the same time, the greater whole is better served.  Rather than enjoying those slots as a monopoly, the airlines are forced to regularly evaluate the economics and cannot engage in predatory pricing to deny other airlines opportunities. 

 

The follow on effect of such regulation is that the patterns of demand on airport infrastructure would smooth out some which means airlines and airline facility labor demands would also smooth out resulting in greater productivity on a unit basis.  Airlines would have less incentive to “sit” on gates they’ve leased for peak demands and the barriers to entering a crowded market would be lessened.  If American Airlines has the same number of flights into JFK but they come in more spread out over 24 hours, they need fewer gates and airlines have no incentive to hold those gates for their exclusive use if they cost them money without producing revenue.

 

Does it favor trunk route flying at peak times?  Yes and it should.  An airport like JFK (or ATL or DFW or ORD) should see predominatly high capacity aircraft arriving and departing at those times.  It is more efficient for both the passenger as well as the airline.  It should not be possible for an airline to fly a regional jet between two major cities during the day because of the opportunity cost of doing so.  Right now, airlines are using low capacity regional jets to boost frequency on hub routes and the incremental cost of those passengers makes it more expensive for passengers flying that same route on mailine aircraft. 

 

If the FAA auctioned such slots at airports, they would have a revenue source for additioning staffing at peak times and an incentive for redesigning airways and air traffic control to boost slots at airports. 

 

It would also have the effect of providing a dis-incentive to people who want to fly a corporate jet into a busy hub airport at a peak time.  Such jets offer maximum inefficient use of airport infrastructure at the worst times.  Currently, landing fees offer no disincentive for such aircraft who want to use the airways (modern corporate jets fly at the same altitudes as commercial traffic) and airports (these jets are light and pay small landing fees presently).   The greater good is not served when 4 business people  travel from Cleveland to NYC in a Falcon business jet at 8am on a Monday.  Those people should be traveling on a Continental 737 or 757 to NYC.

 

Likewise, major airlines will have an incentive to right-size their fleets to their routes.   A major carrier will no longer be able to justify “holding” a lot by operating a larger aircraft on a route than necessary because the cost of that slot (presently almost non-existent) will rise to a point that requires a business justification for operating the right aircraft for the right route.  Put another way, a legacy carrier might operate a larger MD-80 on a peak time route, at times, that enjoys only a 50% load capacity just to “hold” that slot for better times.  Under an auction model, that airline can only justify the right aircraft for the right route at the right time and no more.  That legacy carrier might find it of far greater benefit to operate the same route with a Embraer 190 that enjoys a 90% load factor and 30% lower operating costs. 

 

If anything, this pattern of regulation serves to boost competition and efficient use of facilities which, in the end, does benefit the consumer *and* the taxpayer. 

Filed under: Airline Fleets, Airline Service, Airports by ajax
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In the late 1990’s, I worked in a general contractor partnership with two other men.  We reached a particularly bad period where despite all our efforts, our clients weren’t giving us business.  After almost 2 months of giving ourselves $200 paychecks every other week, it was clear that it was time to do something else. 

 

Our particular situation seemed to be based on our costs.  Things like sheetrock and doors had been rising in costs to the point where it became necessary to raise our prices to support the work we did.  There were other competitors, one man shops with a pickup for an office, who were undercutting our bids just enough to win the business.  We faced a choice of lowering our prices to win the business and not have any money or to stand firm and not win the business.  Or so we thought.

 

One of my partners and I were motorcyclists and decided to take a ride during this period that lasted 18 hours.  At one point, we were taking a breather alongside a very quiet road and began talking about our business troubles.  We realized a couple of things that changed our game.  First, the people that were undercutting our business were formerly from larger construction companies setting out on their own.  They were winning on price, not quality and dependability.  Second, we had an operation that had grown some and no longer fit well with some of our clients. 

 

The next business day, we renewed our effort to check in with clients on a regular basis and continued to bid every job available.  By doing this, we began to underline our ability to a project better and for a reasonable price.  We also began to go out and seek new clients who better fit into our business.  This meant asking for the business and delivering exactly what we promised on each job.  The result was that old customers that continued to fit our model came back and we gained new customers who were looking for a company that performed.

 

This should sound remarkably familiar to those who follow the airline industry.  There has been a cycle of attempts to enter the industry by people thought they had a game changing business plan and some were successful while others haven’t been.  Jet Blue brought a new LCC model based on the Southwest turnaround and fleet efficiency but that was also focused on a higher level of comfort and service.  They introduced two types of fleets to right size their routes but stuck with only two in order to benefit from economies of scale. 

 

Skybus came about based on the single fleet, pay for everything model that Ryanair of Ireland built.  They promised rock bottom fares and engineered a plan to accomodate that by flying to secondary cities and airports that offered lower operational costs.  Skybus failed partly because of rising fuel costs but also from a failure to recognize that distances in the US make it much more inconvenient to fly into those secondary cities. 

 

Airlines who identify their niche and develop a plan for it are more likely to survive.  You cannot be all things to all people in this business because that means you have to compete against every other airline at the lowest common denominator.    Why would American Airlines wish to compete against Allegiant Airlines when doing so puts them at a competitive disadvantage?  Allegiant is based on a business model that addresses low frequency, leisure travel combined with ancillary revenue derived from charging for every convenience.  Their labor costs are low and their fleet capital costs are low.   American Airlines isn’t built to compete for that business.

 

Continental Airlines is an excellent example of a company serving the people that fit their niche.  It doesn’t operate a low cost airline, it operates a high frequency, high service system that serves business travelers.  They understand that maintaining a modern fleet with modern conveniences is important to that customer.  They fly where their customers want to go and worry a lot less about being all things to all people when it comes to destinations. 

 

Southwest Airlines has found itself evolving over these past several years.  Often identified with the first time flier in the past, business travelers have realized that Southwest Airlines offers something that many don’t:  dependability.  When they fly Southwest, they know that there is a very high degree of probability that they’ll be able to get to their destination on time and, often, closer to their needs in a particular city.   While Southwest still offers a very low fare compared to its customers and still attracts those first time fliers, they’ve also begun to serve the needs of the business traveler by remodeling their gate areas to offers business conveniences such as laptop power ports.  They are in the process of testing in flight internet connections for the business traveler as well. 

 

In contrast, you have United Airlines who has pursued the “be all to everyone” philosophy and it shows.  With a huge network to leisure destinations, they get soundly beat by other airlines who compete on price.  Their national and international business traveler destinations are served by older, unrefurbished equipment and their service model denies the conveniences a business traveler expects such as meals, beverages and even charging for checking the first bag.  Notice that Continental hasn’t ignored the incremental revenue from such fees in general (they charge $25 for the 2nd bag checked) but they haven’t offended the business traveler with 1st bag checked fees either. 

 

American Airlines and United Airlines have pursued a strategy that offends or, at the least, disappoints their core customers.  Continental, on the other hand, recognizes that the opportunity cost of forgoing that 1st bag fee is paid back in customer loyalty when it comes to choosing Continental. 

 

The last thing the business or frequent flyer wants to hear is that the airline resents them and wants more.  Indeed, many have said publicly that if an airline wants more money, charge a higher fare but don’t insult them by charging for a bottle of Ozarka water on a flight.  It strikes such people as petty and money grubbing.   At the same time, these travelers don’t need to be singled out as the ones to carry the burden of paying for a flight.   Don’t charge exorbitant business fares simply because the company is paying for it rather than traveler.  These business travelers are smart people and generally the ones traveling are some of the smartest.  They will begin to recognize that the fare to travel somewhere on business becomes inefficient at a certain point.

 

I suspect that it is time for airlines to begin eliminating some perks in the business class cabin as well.  Often the business cabin is occupied by many travelers who purchased full fare economy class tickets and used their frequent flier status to upgrade into that seat.  Airlines will have to begin to find ways to differentiate their service and charge accordingly.  Perhaps a full fare economy ticket should be upgradeable to an Economy Plus seat rather than a business class seat. 

 

Service is important to the frequent flier but what is that “service” that is most important?  Is it a hot meal?  A business class seat?  A friendly flight attendant?  No doubt each of those things has some importantance but I’d argue that the primary measure of service is whether or not you can dependanbly transport your customer from point A to point B on time.   That is, after all, what the airline is contracting to do.  Deliver that and the customers bags as well, and you’ll likely win their hearts and minds.

 

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A number of airlines have been asking for permission to delay the start of flights to China from the United States.  The Dallas Morning News reported that American Airlines now has filed for such permission on their Chicago-Beijing route authority. Both US Airways and United Airlines have also asked for the same thing on their recent route authorities.

 

US Airways lacks the aircraft type for making the trip from Philadelphia and United Airlines, who does have the equipment, simply doesn’t want to fly to their new destination in the current economic climate.  These kind of routes cost a tremendous amount of money to operate and without some certainty that they’ll make money, the risk doesn’t seem worth it right now.  To the winners of these authorities at least.

 

The airline industry has played the “save us” card on these routes by making the argument that just because their economic situation changed, they should be given a second or third chance to find a more convenient time to operate these routes.  Yes, the entire industry has experienced a lot of challenges and, yes, the cost of fuel is certainly the biggest. 

 

However, we are not without other airlines who I suspect would be happy to operate these routes.  Why wait for an airline to decide its ready to fly them when we can identify other airlines that are willing to fly them right now.  I suspect that both Delta and Continental Airlines would give serious consideration to even removing equipment from a different route in order to be able to fly these routes.  Northwest, who already operates a large number of Asian routes, might well be tickled to death to offer more service.

 

It is time to go back to a “use it or lose it” model.  Giving airlines 2nd and 3rd chances only removes the incentive to figure out how to operate in today’s climate.  An airline should have no more than 12 months to operate a route authority from the date it is awarded.  If it cannot or will not, then its time to seek other “bids” for these routes.   When you deny such routes to Delta (who asked for ATL-Beijing) and give the to American Airlines (who wanted DFW-Beijing but ultimately asked for and got Chicago-Beijing) who then asks to defer their operation, you are putting Delta at a competitive disadvantage and American Airlines gains. 

 

Let the airlines who can and will operate these routes, have the routes.  Don’t permit large legacy airlines operating in fear the opportunity to “sit” on the routes and prevent that economic growth to someone else. 

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India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has announced plans to build yet another 70 to 90 seat Indian regional jet.  While we don’t have details on its configuration yet, it will likely be powered by a version of the Pratt & Whitney GTF engine (Geared Turbo Fan) and with that seating configuration, I expect a 2 x 2 seating configuration.

 

But does the world need yet another regional jet in that configuration?  Probably not.  Right now Embraer and Bombardier are both offering highly efficient regional jets in that seating configuration and Embraer’s family ranges from 70 to 110 seats and offers cross cockpit compatibility.  Bombardier of Canada has the CRJ700/900 at present and is close to flying its prototype CRJ1000.  Russia’s Sukhoi is hard at work producing their Sukhoi Super Jet, another regional jet in yet the same configuration as all the others.  China’s AVIC I is producing the ARJ21-900, a 5 across regional jet for China’s growing routes.  If you thought I was done, I’m not.  Japan’s Mitsubishi is also producing a very similar regional jet using the new Pratt & Whitney GTF.

 

While both Bombardier and Embraer have enormous backlogs for their aircraft, they also have a very credible track record in building aircraft.  They also have families of aircraft that allow airlines to right size their fleets to routes while at the same time keeping maintenance costs reasonable.  I question whether Mitsubishi, AVIC I or Sukhoi can offer airlines the same capability for some time to come.  I also question whether these airplanes offer the right economics for many airlines.

 

A similar turbo prop aircraft can offer similar seating, comfort and travel times for less than half the operating cost on stage length of 400 nm or less.  I continue to believe that there will be a shift to aircraft that offer both the operating economies and capital costs that make such routes go from marginal to profitable.  Indeed, many mainline legacy airlines have contracts with pilots that are far less restrictive when it comes to seating capacities on such aircraft.  For instance, American Airlines has contracts in place that disallow American Eagle (and other commuter airlines serving American Airlines) from flying these new, higher capacity jets.

 

Continental Airlines showed us the way to a new profitability when they introduced the Bombardier / De Haviland Q400 on routes in the northeast.  Horizon Airlines confirmed their future by choosing to eliminate their CRJ aircraft and older Dash 8-200 aircraft and now they are being replaced with new, modern Q400 airplanes. 

 

The world doesn’t need another new regional jet no matter who built it.  It needs high capacity turbo-props and 110 to 140 seat mainline aircraft.

 

 

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Virgin Atlantic reported a $50million (USD) increase in profits for their just completed financial year.  Given the financial circumstances for all airlines, it impresses me to no end that they have managed to not only make a profit but increase it against rising fuel costs.  To me, this points to service being the prime key to financial success.  Say what you want about Virgin Atlantic (and many people do), they do have a well deserved reputation for being a good, consistent service product.  Look at any airline that doesn’t have this key element and you’ll find them fighting for their lives.

 

Airlines such as VA, Southwest Airlines, Singapore Airlines (as well as many others) are concentrating on their service and meeting the expectations of customers and it shows.

 

 

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I saw this video  from Delta Airlines on the RunwayGirl Blog this morning.  This has to be one of the best safety demo videos I’ve ever seen.  Notice the visual cues shown for each part of the video.  The perspectives shown are from a passenger’s view and seem to make the location, purpose or use of various safety items a lot easier to identify.

 

And the cute flight attendant doesn’t hurt. 

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V Australia, a new subsidiary international airline of Virgin Blue is due to start new routes from Sydney to Los Angeles in December of 2008. They will be using new build Boeing 777-300ER aircraft configured in an economy, premium economy and business class setup. Many question the viability of successfully flying that route against the likes of QANTAS, Air New Zealand and United Airlines but I have a feeling these guys are approaching this route with more right sized equipment.

 

QANTAS and United Airlines both use 747-400 aircraft that typically have 343 and 374 seats respectively. V Australia’s 777-300 aircraft will have about 300 seats in their mix. However, V Australia will fly the most fuel efficient aircraft in its class and offer a brand new cabin whereas the QANTAS and United aircraft are older, less fuel efficient. In addition, with the coming fracturing of the US-Australia market, the 777 and 787 will fly those routes with lower seat costs and higher load factors than the 747 can offer.

 

QANTAS will be placing the A380 on that same route in the near future and while its seat costs will match the 777, the real question is whether or not they can fill the aircraft. The QANTAS A380 has 450 seats to fill every flight. The V Australia only has to fill 300. Allowing for similar departures and seat demands, the 777 makes money a lot earlier in the game.

 

Convetional wisdom is against V Australia and the 777. I remember that the only airline to participate in the design of the 777 and not buy it was QANTAS. There is a reason why the 777-300ER and 777-200ER have the range and efficiency that they have today. It was designed for those US-Australia routes. If V Australia keeps a good schedule and are able to manage their fuel costs well, they’ll likely succeed. Those routes could use a more economy minded competitor.

 

Here is the new V Australia 777 on the Microvolt / Paine Field website.

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The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel (newspaper of my birthplace), has this report on Midwest Airlines being late in paying over $1million in gate fees.  Midwest is on my death watch list and this news doesn’t improve their standing at all.  The story mentions that they are contemplating bankruptcy and I should mention that because of changes in the US bankruptcy law, bankruptcy isn’t an easy choice to make anymore.  Those changes in the law are, in part, what drove both Northwest Airlines and Delta Airlines to file bankruptcy in September 2005 on the same day.

 

Updates to the bankruptcy code now make it more difficult for an airline to file bankruptcy, continue flying and weather debt and fare wars.   Until October of 2005, most airlines used chapter 11 bankruptcy to essentially buy time when competitive pressures put them at a severe disadvantage.   However, Midwest has likely been weighing the chances of obtaining DIP financing (Debtor in Possession) and given their high labor costs, vastly reduced network and fleet, most would not view this as a healthy choice for investment.  In addition to high labor costs, the airline is headquartered and based in Milwaukee, a city known for strong union influence. 

 

Northwest’s 47% stake in Midwest also makes the airline an unattractive target for a merger to other airlines.  It is possible that Northwest will be ordered to divest itself of its holdings as a condition of approving its merger with Delta but it is not in their interest to do so one day earlier than mandated.  By holding onto Midwest, they make Milwaukee a kind of “fortress airport” that rebuffs other airlines attempts to enter the market such as Airtran.

 

If Midwest were to go into bankruptcy, it would be very difficult for them to make a case for proceeding alone.  They would have to look for a buyer and while Airtran could be interested, they have already begun to establish Milwaukee as a focus city and other than some assets (namely the B717 aircraft), I’m not sure what else they have to gain by buying Midwest now. 

 

 To survive, Midwest Airlines would have to enter into Chapter 11, break its labor agreements and obtain enough financing to purchase new (to them) long range aircraft that would support its original network all the while fighting off Northwest, Airtran and any other airline that smells blood.  That’s a tall order for any management team in this industry.

 

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It would be easy to see my two previous posts as anti-union but, in fact, I’m really just anti-stupid and anti-selfish. The primary issue I have with most airline unions is that they have leadership that stands for election on the basis of “getting more” no matter what the present airline industry climate is. The best strategy, presently, for that leadership to remain in power is to promise and fight for short term gains.

 

I firmly believe that both airline management and airline unions would be far better served by contracts that span a far longer term (7 to 10 years). These contracts would fall into term periods that would most likely contain both up and down cycles in the business. Management is better served by having long term, predictable costs to plan for and union leadership would be able to make a better argument for the well being of their membership in that each party recognizes that the long term success of the business supports the long term financial security of the employees.

 

Airlines suffer such exaggerated cycles because it is so difficult to diversify an airline company with other counter-cyclical businesses. The business strengths of an airline do not necessarily carry over to other industries. However, it is possible for an airline to perform a kind of business diversification for itself by diversifying its route and customer structure. Several airlines such as Delta, Continental and Northwest have recognized that by increasing the percentage of their business (and revenue) that derives from international travel tends to balance against their domestic business. Accordingly, they’ve worked hard to adding new, fuel efficient aircraft and flying new long haul routes to mitigate against domestic conditions that rarely align with the rest of the world.

 

This means the business model is changing and that requires a certain cooperation from airline employees. It means that pilots may have to fly longer trips but that can be balanced by requiring fewer trips over a certain period. It means that airlines likely need to measure this “balance” for their employees over a 90 day period instead of a traditional 30 day period. But that can benefit an airline employee as well. Having a route schedule planned for 90 days means that employee can make better personal decisions about their lives and how to accommodate their work.

 

Many of the work rules in place at large legacy airlines derive from the 1950’s and airline travel in the 1950’s was vastly different. Airline travel in the 1990’s is vastly different now too. Wiping the slate clean and negotiating a contract that provides for flexibility (on both sides), economic security (for both sides) and which addresses both the existing business model as well as the evolving one would be of huge benefit to both parties.

 

Unions mistake the need for increased productivity per dollar spent as a call to eliminate jobs in this industry. It isn’t. Increased productivity means being able to use a mechanic to work a variety of aircraft or being able to use a pilot for a variety of routes. It means re-arranging the job functions and duty times to provide for financial growth, not to simply eliminate jobs.

 

Many legacy airlines have let their employees down in one area in particular. Leadership. An airline is best served by a CEO who is, first and foremost, a leader. That CEO should no doubt be served by an executive team who excels at management but a leader “leads” all the employee groups with some common goal and with some harmony. In fact, many legacy airline unions often call for more “leadership” on behalf of their employees and I believe it is no hollow wish.

 

Find a successful airline, today or 30 years ago, and you’ll most often find an airline being run by a leader. American Airlines employees used to refer to former AA CEO Bob Crandall as a Son of a Bitch but they also acknowledged that he was *their* Son of a Bitch. Former Continental CEO, Gordon Bethune, did not architect Continental’s rise from the ashes of bankruptcy through financial management alone, he did it by working very hard at re-aligning the goals and interests of his employees with the airline’s long term success. He worked to make things both flexibile and financially rewarding.

 

It comes as no surprise that many United employees are badly demoralized and disillusioned with their leadership. That executive team has found ways to reward itself during bankruptcy, after bankruptcy and in spite of poor financial performance while tirelessly grinding away at the financial security of their own front line employees. Shareholders would be wise to structure financial incentive packages that only reward and retain airline executives who deliver financial and service performance.

 

The Continental executive team has proven at least 3 times in the past 15 years that it can turn a profit while treating their employees humanely and their customers with great service. The same is true of Southwest Airlines (who I note does have some of the longest term union agreements in the industry.)

 

If an airline executive doesn’t wish to remain a CEO if he doesn’t get millions in financial incentives each year whether the airline performs good or bad, then he (or she) really isn’t the best choice to lead the airline. Airlines are a business whose success can only be measured over a fairly long duration of years. Indeed, if you look at the financial results of legacy airlines just this year, there is no argument for ever investing in the business.

 

The airline employee is the front line service delivery mechanism for an airline. It isn’t the plane, it’s the people staffing the airline that provide that discriminator for choosing one airline over another. No airline in the US can afford to discriminate on price alone anymore. Southwest, a low cost leader, recognized that a few years ago and now has begun offering a more differentiated service product that is more attractive to the business traveler. It is critically important for airline management to get over itself with this idea that airline employees are commodity. They aren’t. They are the prime service provider for customers and customers really do notice and differentiate on that experience more than anything other discriminator (aircraft choice, etc.)

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The Today In The Sky Blog has this report today.  Northwest Airlines unions apparently took exception to management directly asking workers what kind of work environment they would prefer in the upcoming Delta / Northwest merger.

 

The ability of unions to shoot themselves in the foot in this industry boggles the mind.  This union reaction clearly spells stormy weather for Delta in the post-merger organization too.  Between this story and my last post, it becomes clear that union leadership at Northwest is aligned with no one, including their membership, other than themselves and maintaining their current power.  That is not the purpose of a union now or in the past. 

 

Reactions like this only serve to set up a battle line between the union and the airline and today’s airlines cannot afford such conflict if they are to concentrate on succeeding.  It is, first and foremost, in the interests of the union for the airline to make a profit for when they do, they better further their argument for better pay and work conditions.  It isn’t in the airlines best interest to simply cave into craven demands underlined with childish behavior.

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The Fort Worth Star Telegram blog, Sky Talk, reports that the union staff of the Allied Pilots Association will be doing informational picketing of their offices today.  The union, representing the support staff of the pilots and managers of the APA, says they have been working without a contract for over 400 days now.

 

 Update (10:25am CDT):  The Dallas Morning News now carries this story on its blog.

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United just announced a new Buy on Board food program for both their domestic and international flights.  You can read all about it here.

 

The basic summary is that snacks will be eliminated on domestic flights in favor of selling Buy on Board food in economy.  In domestic business class, beverages remain complimentary but now they will charge for food.  In addition, meal service on international coach service will, on many trans-atlantic flights, be reduced to Buy on Board as well.  Best of all, Buy on Board prices will be going up too.

 

What’s more, flight attendant staffing will be reduced to FAA minimums on such flights. 

 

So, United Airlines is reducing service in business class (coach already gets FAA minimums), reducing or eliminating more food service and charging more for their Buy on Board product while having fewer fight attendants available to sell the over-priced product.  This stunning and bold new move has earned United 1st place on my death watch because any airline stupid enough to do such things to their service product and particularly to their business class customer deserves to be out of business by Christmas. 

 

I’d say this was too painful to watch but it isn’t.  I’m going out to buy popcorn for this one.

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The Dallas Morning News Airline Biz Blog has This Story today.  I’m certain there are a number of reasons why airline traffic will be down for labor day but I’m equally certain that airlines are starting to feel the effects of far higher prices when it comes to travel demands. 

 

If this is true, LCC carriers such as Southwest and Airtran are probably grearing up to add even more capacity in existing and new markets.  These carriers can offer low prices on a sustained basis in addition to a basic service level that doesn’t quite show contempt for the consumer.  Legacy airlines such as American Airlines, United and DeltaNorthwest has cut service, introduced a number of new fees and raised fares considerably so far this year.  There isn’t nearly as compelling a case for travel on a legacy carrier as there once was. 

 

In fact, I’m  not sure what the argument is for traveling on a legacy carrier unless you seek a business class accomodation (available on Airtran, however) or a highly convenient direct flight.  Even the basic frequent flier no longer enjoys many of the privileges accorded to him or her in the past.  Fees for redeeming frequent flier miles are now designed to “buy” the ticket and the seats available for frequent flier redeemers is more reduced than ever before. 

 

At this point, a traveler has about the same or better experience on one of the low cost carriers, sometimes enjoys *better* amenities (Hello Jet Blue, Airtran and Frontier) on newer airplanes all for a fare that is, at the least, competitive with any legacy carrier. 

 

Many airlines have already begun their capacity reductions and they probably total about 5% in their markets.  So, we have a 5% reduction in travel demand matching a 5% reduction capacity which means there is about the same amount of people (per seat) chasing a low fare as before.   That means that air fares won’t go up anymore and some airlines will likely begin to look at attracting customers by reducing or eliminating these new fees going into the fall/winter season.  My prediction is that one or more legacy carriers will eliminate or reduce the first checked bag fee for travel sometime in November and December.

 

 

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United Airlines, an airline that has offered spotty-at-best service for more than 10 years, seems to have the 9 lives of a cat to most people.  Unfortunately, of all the legacy airlines, it is the one that should have melted away some time ago.   It emerged from bankruptcy in 2006 after spending 3 years and over $300 million reorganizaing itself to operate in a world with $50 / barrel oil without a realistic plan to deal with contingencies.

 

The problem is, oil was already at $60 / barrel when it started fresh.  Since 2006, United has been the one airline that always manages to arrive to the party in rumpled clothes and only a $5 bill to pay the door charge.   Those rumpled clothes are an aging fleet (although all of the truly old Boeing 737s are now being withdrawn from service to cut capacity) of aircraft that do not match the interior quality or service level of most of its competitors. 

 

The management team, most importantly CEO Glenn Tilton, has spent more than 2 years maneuvering to merge this airline with another and, yet, has been rebuffed by all potential candidates such as Continental, Delta and US Airways.  Indeed, they took a particularly condescending attitude towards US Airways’ offer to explore mergers when Glenn Tilton implied that he and his team would remain in place and “mentor” the US Airways management team including Doug Parker. 

 

Say what you will about US Airways but it isn’t the company we knew in the 90’s or even 3 years ago.  Doug Parker and team are really America West and they’ve been better at executing to plan than virtually any other management team at a legacy airline.  If anything, Mr. Tilton would be well served by Mr. Parker’s mentorship. 

 

Now the marriage dance in airline mergers is essentially over.  Delta and Northwest are walking down the aisle, Continental has chosen to stand alone (wisely in my opinion) and American Airlines has decided to pursue trans-atlantic partnerships with British Airways and Iberia Airlines.  There is no one else left for United to pursue a merger of equals and they lack the cash and operating plan to purchase a smaller airline as well.  Indeed, Continental Airlines is joining the Star Alliance (of which United is a founding member) and that may benefit United but if they think they will remain the shining star in the US market for that alliance, they are sadly mistaken.

 

Continental’s management team is stable, smart and agile in this market.  They are uniformly the choice of airline among business travelers (and that is who pays the bills) and possess a young, modern, harmonized fleet of aircraft that serve the routes efficiently.  Continental has hubs that will serve that alliance well in both NYC, Houston and Cleveland and offer Star Alliance members excellent codeshare options throughout the United States.

 

United Airlines has a fleet of 747s that are some of the oldest -400 models and by all passenger accounts they are in desperate need of refurbishment (unplanned for 3 years and not recognized for another 2 years while United showed its legs to potential suitors).  They possess a large 777 fleet which, on the surface, would imply some modernity there.  However, about half of that fleet are early model “A” market 777s powered by the less powerful and efficient Pratt & Whitney engines.  No lip gloss found there.  The other half are 777-200ER models that would at first glance appear to be more modern intercontinental aircraft.  They aren’t, really.  They’re what Boeing originally referred to as “B” market 777s and, once again, they are powered by the less reliable and efficient Pratt & Whitney PW4000 series engines.  I would point out that every other operator of this aircraft in the US is using the more powerful and efficient Rolls Royce Trent or GE90 engines (American Airlines, Delta Airlines and Continental Airlines.)

 

Their 767 fleet, a large one comprised of 767-300ER models, shows the same flaws as their 777 fleet.  While some were built as recently as 2001, they are all powered, once again, by the less fuel efficient Pratt & Whitney engines.  I’m sure a theme is beginning to reveal itself here. 

 

The same also remains true for their 757 fleet in that they are powered by the lesser Pratt & Whitney engines while other airlines are utilizing the real rocket of that type, the Rolls Royce RB211 powered 757 that, with winglets, is capable of ETOPS trans-atlantic operations.

 

Ignoring the soon to be gone 737 fleet (which is old and dingy but not powered by Pratt & Whitney for once), the remaining aircraft are various Airbus A320 types.  While they are not old by airline standard, most are more than 10 years old and some are approaching 15 year of age now. 

 

An old airplane is not an unsafe one but, in United’s case, it is an uncomfortable one.  While other airlines have paid attention to maintenance, comfort and even tuning engines, United has spent its time navigating bankruptcy and its management team has bet their golden parachutes on a merger.  With no other really suitable partners, they are now faced with operating an airline that by most standards, is not competitive.  What’s worse, they have lost 2 years time that could have been spent executing a service plan that might work.

 

If the cost pressures airlines are facing continue for another year, they (United) will be faced with another potential bankruptcy and, this time, it should be a liquidation.  There is no argument for this airline continuing its operations under the present regime nor is there an argument for it continuing to operate simply to support air transportation in the United States or abroad.  There are plenty of air carriers that can take up the slack and operate more coherently than United.   In fact, the only part of United ceasingly to exist that I find distasteful is that it potentially offers American Airlines an even greater lock on Chicago’s O’Hare airport.  Since I experience that kind of fortress here in the DFW area, I know just how expensive that can be for a consumer.

 

Successful airlines share a few qualities that I’ve noticed over the years.  They generally possess a young, fuel efficient and harmonized fleet.  They buy the airplanes configured for performance on a variety of routes.  They have leadership rather than just executive management.  They focus on a clean, comfortable flight experienced that is defined by the service provided by its employees.  Such an airline also carefully watches its money and nurtures its finances to avoid running cash short on the wrong day.  It takes care of its employees not by offering the best salaries but by offering a living wage, a hospitable workplace and with fair treatment in both hard times and good.

 

That is the antithesis of United Airlines and, so, they go on the Death Watch.

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In the 1970’s, Japan was experiencing fantastic economic growth and both ANA (All Nippon Airlines) and Japan Airlines needed more lift for their internal domestic routes.  They approached Boeing and inquired about using the 747 for these high cycle, short duration flights.  After investigating the possibilities, Boeing discovered that relatively minor changes (landing gear for instance), they could produce an aircraft that met their needs.

 

By eliminating 3 classes of service, galleys and other long range accomodations, the Boeing 747SR was born and able to carry as many as 525 passengers in this new domestic configuration.  Later, those same aircraft were replaced with 747-400 Domestics capable of carrying over 560 passengers.

 

That was the first 500+ passenger commercial aircraft but now the new Airbus A380 may be capable of carrying as many as 800 passengers in a similar domestic configuration.  There is some debate that such an airplane would be of use since the logistics of carrying an additional 300 passengers becomes almost unsolvable for existing airport configurations.  No doubt Airbus would happily build the airplane if there is, indeed, a market for it.

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In 1966, American Airlines released a set of specifications for a new kind of an airplane, an “air bus”.  This plane was to carry 250 to 300 people in a wide body configuration using two new, more powerful fan jets and it would be able to operate short to medium trunk routes such as Denver – Los Angeles or New York – Chicago.  Many enthusiasts will recognize that both McDonnel Douglas and Lockheed responded to this with the DC-10 and L1011 aircraft and both were to become rather legendary.

 

But while the DC-10 experienced great commercial success and the L1011 became the pilot’s airplane (reportedly one of the easiest planes to fly ever built), it was Airbus that got it right with their A300.  Both the DC-10 and L1011 were “compromise” aircraft in that they had 3, instead of two, engines to meet a specification that United Airlines issued:  the ability to take off with a full load from Denver’s mile high airport.

 

Airbus was originally formed between Aerospatiale and Deutch Aerospace with Spain’s CASA and England’s BAC joining later.  Their original aircraft utilized 2 GE CF-6 engines and had a range of about 1500 nm.  The A300 would later grow in both range and payload ultimately culminating in the A300-600R which was capable of carrying more than 260 passengers and a full cargo load for more than 4000 nautical miles.

 

At one point in the mid 1970’s, Airbus A300 sales were so bad that they had to just keep manufacturing airplanes in order to keep the assembly line open while betting that times would change and their aircraft might be adopted by others.  One landmark change in sales for Airbus was Eastern Airlines.  Frank Borman, President and CEO of Eastern, was searching for a replacement for Eastern’s Boeing 727-200 aircraft that would carry more passengers with better operating efficiencies on Eastern’s high density, East Coast routes. 

 

Borman, the former NASA astronaut, was a tough negotiator and ultimately got 4 Airbus A300s to try out for terms that amounted to the cost to operate the aircraft.  Eastern discovered that the aircraft was a huge moneymaker for those routes since it consumed 30% less fuel than the competing Lockheed L1011 that they also owned.

 

Ultimately, Boeing responded with the 767, also a twin engined aircraft, originally designed for much the same mission as the A300.  However, in many ways the two aircraft evolved to serve different missions.  The A300 thrived as a trunk airliner that could carry a massive amount of cargo easily (because its fuselage was designed to accomodate 2 side-by-side industry standard LD3 containers) and operate on high density routes with both speed and low seat costs.  While it was certified for ETOPS(Extended Twin Engine Operations over water or “Engines Turning Or Passengers Swimming) and was even ultimately used on over-water transatlantic routes, its specialty remained its original mission.

 

The Boeing 767 was built with a narrower fuselage that could not accomodate those same LD3 cargo containers two abreast but it did find its own mission in the transatlantic arena as it gained both range and capacity.  To use the similarly sized 767 on the same routes as the A300 was to set oneself up for failure.  The A300 was just too good at what it did.

 

American Airlines owns a number of A300 aircraft and while they were always used primarily for those same routes that Eastern once flew (NYC to Miami and the Caribbean), they also used the aircraft for transatlantic routes such as NYC to London. 

 

To date, there is no other better aircraft for that short to medium haul, high density mission that the A300 has served so perfectly.  Since many A300s are aging now, they are being withdrawn from service but there exists no true replacement for this marvel either.  Boeing 757/767 aircraft cannot carry either the same passengers or cargo efficiently and while the A330/340 aircraft use essentially the same fuselage, they only begin to show true efficiency on 4000nm or greater missions. 

 

In most markets where the A300 has been withdrawn, that capability has been replaced with greater frequency with airlines using B737-800/900 aircraft and A320/321 aircraft.  The Boeing 787 derivative 300 series does, at first glance, meet that mission profile carrying a great number of passengers (280 to 310) on routes as long as 3000 nm.  However, the only airlines to order the 787 are Japanese carriers ANA and Japan Airlines.   Many speculate that the 787-300, designed to replace the 767 and A300 on regional routes, will either have to grow in range (4500nm) or face being a Japan only aircraft.  Indeed, Boeing announced last year that the 787-300 won’t be certiied for use in the US although it could be done very easily should Boeing decide that there is a market in the US for such an airplane.

 

Sadly, Airbus does not have a new replacement on deck.  Their focus has been on the giant A380 and developing their new A350 series aircraft.  Sales of their A330 aircraft have been brisk still and Airbus will likely turn its focus to an A320 replacement aircraft once they have both time and resources. 

 

I have no doubt that Airbus will once more “get it right”.

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