Now that a few days have passed since a Nigerian attempted to set off an explosive device ( I won’t call it a bomb because it wasn’t) on Northwest Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, I’ll make a few final comments on the reactions to this event. 

 

The response by the TSA (and other security organizations in other countries), once again, seems mostly aimed as a placebo rather than an in-depth examination on how airline security should be handled.  

 

For instance, this time, airlines are supposed to keep people ignorant of where they are.  For long haul, international flights, I can only imagine how the airlines are dealing with their moving map displays.   I’d bet that at least in most cases, they’re simply turning off the in-flight entertainment systems.    But keeping people ignorant of where they doesn’t stop a damn thing.  You see, there are these things called windows on airliners.  If someone wants to attempt to blow up an airplane near its destination or just near a population center, it remains quite easy to to figure out a good time.  Furthermore, do we really believe that ignorance of location will be any kind of deterrent for a terrorist act?

 

Second, everyone now must remain seated in the last hour of a flight.  Mmm, OK, so, what prevents a terrorist from organizing their device a half hour before that restricted period?  And despite that rules against nominally having something that would conceal such an assembly, why are we to believe that having such cover is absolutely necessary.   This does absolutely nothing to improve security or provide a deterrent to a determined terrorist wanting to explode a device on aircraft. 

 

Third, you’re no longer allowed to have something covering your lap or in your lap.  No blankets, pillows, laptops, etc.   The idea being that no one can conceal the assembly of a device.  Well, what about large coats, sweaters, etc. that a terrorist might wear?  Again, this rule is absurd and does nothing to increase security or provide a deterrent to a terrorist determined to do something on an aircraft.

 

People are also undergoing more rigorous searches and at multiple points.  On the surface, this may provide a small increased measure of security.  But the main problem here is the woeful understaffing of security points particularly in the United States.  At some point, this heightened security will have to be reduced because of a lack of staff to sustain it. 

 

I’m not a security expert and I didn’t sleep at a Holiday Inn yesterday.  However, it would seem to me that we are not addressing the correct positions for better, more extensive security measures.    Surely we could do a much better job of coordinating secondary security against people who are on a list of people of interest?   We have had 8 years to find a system of vetting people scheduled to fly who are on such lists.  We also possess the technology to create a near real-time system for such checks.

 

Second, it would appear that one weakness that has been exacerbated by airlines’ new policies of charging for checked luggage is that a much larger percentage of people are trying to carry-on items capable of carrying liquids and gels (and other substances) that could be assembled into an explosive device.  The fewer of these items that have to be scrutinized during the primary security check, the more time and attention can be paid to those items.  Sadly, I feel the airlines will fight this approach tooth and nail given the revenue streams they are earning from the checked baggage fees.

 

We need to look long and hard at the staff employed to perform security checks.  As a traveler who has flown since 2 years old (more than 40 years), I cannot discern that the quality of staff doing these security checks (at least in the United States) has really improved at all.  Even after the events of September 11th, 2001.   I’d far rather pay a $5 or $10 fee for improved security and see a dramatic improvement in the quality of security both in staff as well as servicing the number of people having to go through security.  It’s a fee I could pay in good conscience and sense real value from.

 

I also wonder if we couldn’t do a much better job of closing gaps in security at airports when it comes to airline and other service staff at those locations.  All too often, I myself see these gaps as I walk through an airport.   Background checks at hiring and occasionally afterwards are important, yes.  However, I’ve observed no great increase in security at the non-public points of entry into airport infrastructure. 

 

Finally, it is time we realized that there is some inherent risk involved in traveling by aircraft no matter what.  Airplanes are (and have been) popular targets for terrorist attacks because, by definition, success results in horrific results.   However, as inherent that risk is, let’s also realize that the probabilities for being on an airliner attacked are so small that they are nearly insignificant. 

 

Terrorists are not lined up by the thousands just looking for an opportunity.  In fact, terrorists willing to (almost) certainly kill themselves in an attack are very few in number and rather hard to coordinate.  Yes, they exist and they will continue to exist and should be considered the risk that they are.   However, the notion that armies of terrorists are ready to board aircraft and create multi-airliner havoc is rather silly.   Fly in peace because you are probably *more* likely to experience a non-terrorist event on an airliner than anything else. 

 

It is time that governments get their act together on real security  and its time for airlines to cooperate with each other and governments rather than act against those measures that may impede their ability to earn yet another dollar.   It is against our interests to have private contractors provide security at $10 / hr.  What we want (and need) is trained law enforcement officers performing this role.  What we want ( and need) is real security measures designed to address the issue before a terrorist passes that security line and which provides a real deterrent in the form of detection.

 

Update 01:  It would appear I’m not the only one who finds these latest measures silly.  Read the CrankyFlier or The Middle Seat Terminal.

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