Video of airliners doing crosswind landings never fail to fascinate me. They are, in my opinion, one of the best examples of airmanship going on in a commercial airliner. Here are some videos taken of the 787 doing its tests in Iceland.
Regardless of whether or not a new 787 delivery delay affects Boeing’s financial guidance, this is a huge disappointment. Not just for fans of the airline industry either.
These days, we tend to see companies as cold and calculating and making business decisions based on logic rather than emotion. It’s a part of our culture to view particularly large companies like Boeing in just that manner. It is also a strong habit among the financial industry to view and analyze things on that level and that’s not entirely unjustified.
However, companies are run by human beings. Human beings do react emotionally to developments whether in their personal lives or within their business. Think I’m wrong? Go walk around a company on the day of a big layoff.
This latest delay is going to emotionally disappoint quite a number of people in the airline industry. It’s going to disappoint decision makers within the airlines themselves and it’s going to disappoint lessors too. These repeated disappointments are going to be the stuff that goes into books about Boeing and the airline industry 10, 20 and 30 years from now. It’s going to be described as the often delayed, highly problematic 787 program and the only thing we don’t know yet is whether or not the 787 is actually the success we think it is.
That kind of stuff gets remembered not just by today’s decision makers but by tomorrow’s decision makers. The junior managers who may well be the VP of Operations or VP of Maintenance at an airline and an influential person on future aircraft purchases.
Boeing isn’t the only game in town and there is bad news knocking on the door, too. The threat isn’t Airbus. Boeing knows how to compete with Airbus. The threat comes from the aerospace capabilities being developed by Bombardier, Embraer, Mitsubishi and others. Regional jet aircraft now, yes, but they’re acquiring intellectual capital that will permit them to build them bigger and bigger. That’s the threat.
And Boeing keeps giving airlines a reason to continue to look at the other guys and wonder.
You see, Boeing keeps setting a schedule and assuring everyone that they have plenty of safety margin built into these schedules to account for risk. And then those schedules slip again. Credibility on this program and, frankly, future programs, is swirling downwards in the toilet.
At some point, you have to be a company who keeps its word. You have to see the leaders of that company decide to make something happen *despite* the risks and problems encountered. It seems that about 8 months ago, Boeing’s leadership and particularly the leadership of the 787 program should have declared both internally and externally that this is it. No matter what it takes, this program will be kept on schedule from here on out.
But that didn’t happen.
This isn’t a slight schedule slip. First deliveries were going to happen early to mid Q4. Then they unofficially slipped to late Q4. With the latest announcement, no one really credibly expects deliveries until early Q2 despite Boeing saying it will be a Q1 2011 delivery. The truth is, none of us know when this aircraft will be delivered. The people backing that schedule just haven’t made things happen.
My own prediction: At the earliest it will be early Q2. It’s just a guess.
But at this point my guess is as good as Boeing’s.
Since I started writing this blog, I’ve come to one thought many times: Airlines, at least most of them, work very hard these days at trying to be all things to all people. The reason for this is that the airline business, particularly in the United States, is all about market share.
In other words, to be viable as an airline, particularly a larger airline, you have to have a pretty significant chunk of market share for a set of routes. Without that share, you won’t average a load factor that earns you a profit. In fact, it isn’t just about market share of a particular segment. If you dominate solely in leisure travel, you’ll struggle to survive much less make a profit. Even Southwest Airlines has learned the value of the business traveler.
But is that the right direction going forward? Some variation of that is probably going to remain the truth for some time. However, I do wonder if airlines aren’t harming themselves by trying too hard to be all things to all people.
When it comes to domestic service, I do think it would be wise for more airlines to emulate United’s 3 class domestic service of First / Economy Plus / Economy. Offering more value for more money is a strategy that plainly works although I also understand the perceived risk involved with that. You can’t easily change the configuration of an aircraft to meet changing seasonal demand for a particular product. This is an area where aircraft manufacturers could do some work.
However, at the international level, I think many US legacy airlines are trying too hard to be all things to all people. I’ve always admired Continental’s approach with their BusinessFirst and Economy products. BusinessFirst is business class and, let’s face it, that’s what is going to sell at the front of the aircraft day in and day out when compared to first class. I think the new ContiUnited (I must come up with a new moniker for that) would be wise to adopt the Continental model BusinessFirst and the United Economy Plus/Economy model. It’s 3 classes of seating but really 2 classes of service.
Airlines seem to be overstressing themselves in other places as well when it comes to trying to appeal to everyone. When you’re trying to market to the leisure crowd, the business crowd and the uber-rich crowd, your message gets muddy. Can you identify who does what best for which crowd in objective or subjective terms?
You have far less of a problem with that in other parts of the world. If you want best price in Britain, you’re likely going to fly Ryanair or EasyJet. If you want a more business oriented service, you’re likely going to pick British Airways. It’s notable that BMI has more of an American approach and they don’t do so well. Ryanair specializes in delivering the best price possible and has focused on that goal relentlessly. British Airways specializes in service and image and focuses on that goal pretty well despite current problems and criticisms.
We could stand to see a bit more focus out of our airlines. Isn’t it interesting that when airlines set up “specialty” brands in-house, they usually did pretty well and only went away when the competition in that specialty went away? I think there is a lesson there. Does every flight need to meet every need?
I think the key to becoming more adept at specializing in customer needs, we need aircraft that are more easily configurable for particular demands. It’s interesting to me that business class in Europe is often coach seating with the middle seat “blocked” from use. Sometimes that same middle seat can be folded down into a “service” area for the aisle and window seats. What if an airline or seat manufacturer came up with a product that allowed configuration of seat pitch in a manner of minutes with the addition of a row or two of seats in less than half an hour?
There is nothing wrong with segmenting service for various needs and charging for it. No objects to those pricing models. The issue with “fees” is charging for something that had no charge until recently and acting like you are doing someone a favor. Airlines could create a great deal more value in their product with more specialization towards particular customer needs and wants.
After 40 years, I think coming up with seating that is configurable “on the fly” shouldn’t necessarily be quite the challenge it’s made out to be. The industry should be able to meet this challenge and I think when they do, they may find a way to more reliable profitability.
The Boeing 787’s introduction to a fleet is something that anyone who follows the aviation industry has been looking forward to. It was greatly disappointing that it did not meet its first flight schedule originally but anyone who follows this business was hardly surprised.
What was a bit surprising was a 2+ year delay in that first flight. However, Boeing was pushing its limits when it came to both technology and vendors. In many cases, both were factors in various delays. Boeing was right to push its limits, however. If Boeing expected to be an aviation leader, it needed to stretch itself and it quite rightly did so in this project. In addition, it was right to push its outsourcing as well. Boeing had already experienced good partnerships in outsourcing other airliners production work such as on the 777.
Even with all that has happened over the past 3 years in the 787 program, I still think Boeing was right to push its technology development for this aircraft. It remains a revolution for aircraft and continues to promise a great deal for airlines who use it.
However, perhaps Boeing pushed its vendor outsourcing too much. Actually, we knew they did when they purchased some vendor operations for the 787 outright. I think that, perhaps, Boeing didn’t have as much knowledge about outsourcing as it thought it did. It was, perhaps, viewed more like outsourcing on defense projects where such projects are often pushing the limits in every direction and commercial viability isn’t necessarily a key driver and meeting requirements is.
The latest announced delay finally frustrates me. The vague references to instrumentation and the fact that “test programs” experience unknowns just doesn’t fly anymore. As someone who works for a major aerospace and defense company, I’ve seen good programs and I’ve seen bad. This one is starting to stink from an execution point of view.
The truth is, a lot of risk could have been reduced in the test program using time before the first flight to ensure systems were extra mature. To a degree, it’s clear that was done in some areas and completely neglected in others. Issues with the horizontal stabilizer and how it was manufactured and/or installed should have been identified before first flight. There was so much time to staff and plan the flight test program, it should be going *faster* than its schedule, not slower.
In short, I don’t think Boeing has done nearly enough to reduce risk on this program. They keep getting surprised by things that just point to a too lean program and not enough investment in retiring risk. Airlines have a right to be frustrated at this point. Boeing has yet to have gotten their production up to anything above low rate initial production and its delays to allow manufacturers to catch up is shameful at this point.
Those partners have had 3 years to figure out how to ramp up production and prevent traveled work from happening. Having to “pause” the production to prevent traveled work at this point ought to be resulting in at least a few project managers getting fired. At this point, the only thing that should potentially delay entry into service is flight test revealing a near catastrophic development found only in real flight test. Seriously, all the systems should have an exceptional maturity and all the vendors and manufacturers should be capable of spinning up production beyond 2 to 2.5 aircraft per month.
Lean is good but this program’s project planning and execution stinks of being run on the absolute best case scenarios with very little provision for managing risk and retiring risk along the various waypoints of development in a sensible and, more importantly, responsible manner.
This aircraft will be a successful one. I firmly believe it remains a game changer for airlines. However, I’m left with a sense that Boeing continues to treat this program as “just another program” instead of treating it with a sense of urgency and acting as if its future depends on it.
The fact that there is as little outcry over these latest announcements demonstrates just how little this industry has come to expect from Boeing and this program when it comes to doing what Boeing says it is going to do.
Since the widely known WTO ruling on Airbus and it’s launch aid from member countries came out, there has been a lot of speculation on its implications for the airliner market, Boeing, the KC-X tanker and what the WTO might rule against Boeing on in its counter-claim. Conventional wisdom is that both parties will get slapped heartily and that might end up being somewhat true although I suspect that far less will be found against Boeing.
The difference is in the business models. In many respects, Airbus/EADS has been run much like a state owned entity and its financing has largely derived from loans from member countries or with member countries’ backing. Boeing, on the other hand, operates much more as a commercial entity and while it does benefit from things like tax breaks (on a state and local community level) as well as from participating in research and development efforts on the part of the government, it’s primary method of financing its commercial product line is from the financial markets.
When Boeing needs money, it goes to the markets and obtains market rate financing in the form of loans, bonds or through stock sales. That’s the key difference between Airbus and Boeing. Boeing follows a traditional and, more importantly, acceptable model for its financing. A model that makes it difficult to show harm to Airbus/EADS.
I think both parties will have to modify their behaviour going forward but I think Airbus’ compliance will have far greater and far more long lasting effects on its business model than anything Boeing will have to do. I also think that Airbus/EADS remains tied to answering to its member countries on things like exports and employment and that makes it much more difficult to outsource (a la Boeing) and/or manufacture their aircraft in other countries.
In the long run, Airbus’ compliance will make them a stronger and more competitive business because they’ll retain the advantage of selling to their member nations but they’ll also understand how to respond to their financial needs as well as their customer markets.
In the short run, it just got a lot more difficult for Airbus/EADS to launch new models because they’ll likely have to “pay back” that launch aid and obtain commercial rate financing. In addition, their commitments to the A380, A350 and A400 projects make it very tough for them to obtain financing for and launch a new project such as an A320 replacement or a model that competes more effectively with the bottom end of the 787 model lineup.
For Boeing, it probably means forgoing or even paying back tax incentives and it will mean Boeing having to examine where it builds its aircraft much more closely in the future. Don’t be surprised if more of their production moves out of Washington State over the next 20 years.
No, seriously, where is it? This is an aircraft that conversations began on in 2004. It’s 2010 and I still don’t really know much about the aircraft despite being a keen industry observer.
Mind you, I’ve heard the range promises and the seat costs promises but I haven’t seen the meat. In fact, isn’t it a bit distressing that this aircraft is cloaked in so much secrecy that we still don’t know its final definition? The few facts we have heard have actually originated from the few airlines that have ordered the aircraft in numbers. Those facts haven’t been entirely good either.
When Emirates starts talking about how the 777-300 still has an advantage, you might have a problem. This is an airline that loves to play the two majors off each other. Ordinarily, I’d expect Emirates to be trying to goad Boeing into building something new or something revised.
Still, it’s time to start talking about this aircraft in more detail rather than with John Leahy’s rosy marketing promises. It’s time to start hearing more about its real capabilities and how it will compete in the real world with the 787 and 777. Right now, I really don’t know much at all and that really makes me question whether an entry into service for 2013 is even remotely possible at this point.
It’s being reported by Aviation Week that a Morgan Stanley financial analyst is now predicting that Boeing will soon announce a 737 replacement development program. See that article HERE. Her reasoning is somewhat sound but is also tinged with a financial analysts viewpoint.
Financial analysts see a re-engine program adding little if anything to Boeing’s financial performance. A new aircraft would potentially garner hundreds if not thousands of orders during the development period and that backlog of orders would offer confidence to the financial world. Fortunately, engineers run Boeing. Creating an aircraft for the sake of a balance sheet is an unwise move unless many other criteria are met as well. Most of those criteria are engineering related such as engine development maturity, new materials (CFRP for instance) maturity, etc.
This analyst also speculates that a re-engined B737 vs a re-engined A320 could still be 8 to 10% less efficient than the Airbus product. Now her engineering prowess is really showing. The two aircraft are neck and neck now. Both would need substantial engineering changes to accomodate a new engine. The new Pratt & Whitney GTF engine still is not showing the performance that has been promised. In fact, in a Boeing vs Airbus matchup between like models, the Boeing generally has the lowest trip costs so far. It’s an almost insignificant advantage but it exists and it shows this analyst hasn’t done too much homework.
Finally, there is more talk of this new aircraft being a twin-aisle development for faster boarding. This one I doubt. A twin-aisle wouldn’t just require a larger fuselage but it would potentially be heavier if kept as a circular cross section. A new fuselage shape might lend itself to such a development but I really doubt it. The 737 market is from about 130 to 180 seats. A twin aisle means a shorter length and that means things like a taller tail. It would imply more “structure” being necessary and more structure generally means more weight. More weight means higher costs. Perhaps a new fuselage shape might work but that means lots of new engineering and materials potentially. I wouldn’t rule it out completely but I would give it an extremely low probability.
That said, I would be less surprised to learn of a “twin” development of two sub-families somewhat similar to the 757/767 developments. An aircraft family capable of serving from 120 to 160 passengers and, perhaps, another serving 160 to 200 passengers with a great deal of commonality might be the answer everyone is looking for. That would allow Boeing to optimize their aircraft structures for missions in those categories and, at the same time, potentially offer commonality in engines, aircraft systems and pilot ratings.
I continue to believe Boeing will announce a new program in the next 18 to 24 months. I do believe it will be for a single aisle airliner(s) and I do believe that it may have an entry into service late in the decade. Everything else is just a guess. For earlier comments on this, you can read THIS blog entry.
The argument that current 737 owners are afraid that a re-engine or new development program will hurt their aircraft values is barely valid. It may hurt their values but if Boeing can engineer a new aircraft meeting offering a great gain in efficiency, then it is time to start developing it. If they cannot, then they’ll wait. There is no value to either Boeing or the airlines in waiting longer than necessary. When the risks reach an appropriate level, they will launch this. The question is, have those risks gotten to a point that they are acceptable?
Ordinarily I stay away from non-commercial aviation subjects because they don’t interest me that much and they aren’t subject matter that I have a lot of knowledge on most of the time. The KC-X Tanker RFP is something I’m very much interested in and I do know a bit about this one.*
Imagine you are a mountain climber. Moutain climbing is difficult and dangerous work and you need the right equipment to succeed as much as anything. Now, suppose you need an energy bar that will help you climb a particularly difficult mountain and you decide to ask for a price on products. It turns out there are really just two energy bar makers and they do things kind of differently but both make a very acceptable energy bar depending on your requirements.
Now you have to figure out your requirements. You decide you need an energy bar that is compact so that carrying lots of these doesn’t take up all your backpack space but you need a minimum amount of calories from it so that when you have one, you don’t want another right away and consume all your bars prematurely. You decide you need a mimimum of 200 calories from these bars and they shouldn’t be greater than 1.25 inches wide by 4 inches long by 0.3 inches thick. That lets you carry enough bars with a margin of safety but also lets you have space in your pack for other necessary items.
The US energy bar maker produces an energy bar that can be tailored somewhat. It’s nominal size fits your requirements within tolerances and all you have to do is remove one bar from your count to make them fit and leave room. It offers 210 calories so it meets your calorie needs too. It’s a pretty good fit although not perfect. The price is within reach but you need the best price possible because mountain climbing is expensive and every penny counts.
The French energy bar maker has a nice product too. It’s a bit more tailored and was originally made for mountains of higher altitude than the one your climbing. It’s size is 2 inches wide by 4.5 inches long by 0.5 inches thick. It’s a bigger bar and you’ll have to leave out 3 or 4 bars from your count to make them fit. Since this bar was designed originally for a different mission, the maker has increased its calories to 270 calories per bar. There is a lot of energy stored in that bar. It’s price is a tad higher but the French government wants to sell more to US mountain climbers so it has already subsized the cost of this bar so that it is competitive with the US manufacturers bar.
On the surface, the French bar looks like a heck of a deal but you still dive into the details. You think about the climb ahead of you and realize that you might have a problem. These bars go stale after you open them and if you don’t eat all of them, it goes to waste. Your body can only take so much in at a time because extra contents can slow you down on your climb. You only *need* 200 calories and you can’t cut those French bars in half because they go bad once you open them. Then you realize that the French bars only allow you to carry a margin of safety of 2 bars whereas the US bars allow you to carry a margin of safety of 7 bars.
Space and weight is at a premium in your backpack and now suddenly you realize that an energy bar that is tailored to your needs as closely as possible is probably the right choice. More is not necessarily better if it goes to waste. Space and weight is at such a premium that the only way to carry more French bars is to get a bigger backpack. That means spending more money on a backpack and carrying more weight as you climb which means you may need more energy in the first place. More requires more which requires more.
You look at both selections and realize that price is, in most respects, the least important requirement. The goal is to get up the mountain and back again quickly and efficiently. Now that you’ve thought this through, you realize that the US bar is the best choice because it meets your specifications almost exactly without being burdensome. The French bars meets your specifications too but it is so much “more”, there is a penalty implicit in its use for your application. On a per ounce basis, the French bar offers the better deal. On a mission basis, the US bar is a better deal.
So you buy the US bar because it meets the mission better. That, my friends, is what the KC-X tanker deal is really all about. It isn’t that the Airbus is a bad tanker. To the contrary, it’s a fine tanker made by an aircraft company that has an excellent reputation. The problem is that it doesn’t fit the mission.
The Airbus tanker does offer more nominal refueling capability and more cargo area. No question. But this RFP is to replace a fleet of tankers numbering in the hundreds. No other country other than the United States projects its power through a fleet like that. Even the really big western military powers like the UK or France only have a fleet of, at the most, a couple dozen tankers. We can send a couple of dozen tankers on a single mission if we want.
The tankers are a force multiplier but the way you really multiply your power is by being able to refuel several aircraft at once. 5 tankers takes care of a mission much better than 2 tankers because it allows the mission to refuel and carry on quicker. On almost all missions, our current fleet doesn’t come back dry very often. Almost never in fact. The KC-135R tankers meet our needs just fine in terms of capacity for either cargo or fuel. They’re just old and inefficient when it comes to operating expenses. But they can still meet our needs fine. We have a smaller fleet of larger tankers that fill the other needs when that occasion arises (which really isn’t often) called the KC-10.
So although the Airbus carries more fuel, it isn’t carrying fuel we’ll really use. That means extra expense for flying the extra weight of the aircraft that was designed to carry more fuel that isn’t needed.
Our bases which house this current fleet were built years ago and have been fine tuned to our needs over the past 5 decades. Again, our current fleet meets our needs so our facilities meet our needs. The B767 basically fits the infrastructure footprint we already have in place and that means we can do a one for one replacement without needing to upgrade hard stands (concrete areas to park the aircraft on), refueling facilities, hangers, runways, taxiways, etc. That means the KC-767 kind of “plugs in” into our existing infrastructure already.
The Airbus tanker requires more than 80% greater footprint in the infrastructure than the current fleet. That means upgrading and changing our infrastructure in every location and systems changes for every part of the fleet. As you can imagine, that adds significantly to our costs to operate that fleet as those changes will have to be done over the lifespan of the fleet and we’re not talking about changes that you can go to Sears for either.
The Department of Defense cannot write requirements for an RFP that make both aircraft competitive. These aircraft are too different from each other to be an apples to apples comparison. Eliminating politics from the equation for the moment, they have two choices: Buy by the ounce or buy by the mission. When it comes to the military, buying for the mission is much more economical in the long run as we’ve seen time and again. Remember when we had thousands of nuclear missiles? The question was how many times did we want to destroy the Earth over and over again when a small fraction of those missiles would end civilization as we know it. Buying by quantity isn’t always the best choice for these situations.
Let’s consider the politics though. Yes, we are for free trade generally. That said, we do a pretty bad job of enforcing fair and free trade when it comes to our political partners in the world. France (and Europe) have massively subsidized Airbus and its aircraft development. You know what? That’s kind of OK to me. They did it to redevelop an aerospace industry which is a strategic industry for any country and makes them militarily less reliant upon the kindness of others. That isn’t a dumb move. The problem is, they did it commercially instead of militarily because there was profits to be had. I really don’t fall on the side of “punish the French” when it comes to these subisidies providing they stop it. So far they haven’t. They’ve got their industry, now they should let it sink or swim. But subsidies are addictive (and we’re not innocent of such addictions ourselves either.)
Because an aerospace industry is strategically very important, we, too, should consider where this work goes. No, we don’t want to be gouged for it but we don’t want to lose that knowledge and know-how either. Were Airbus to win the tanker competition, that would effectively be the end of our capability to produce tankers 20 years from now. The people who know how to do it would be retired or dead. It would be extremely expensive to redevelop that knowledge base and it’s a knowledge base that is at the heart of our ability to project power as a country. Stop and think about that for a few minutes. I’ll wait.
Another consideration is the French and Germans themselves. Both of these countries have some history of being non-cooperative with the US when they disagree or don’t want to participate in a conflict. The Germans to a lesser extent but it still happens. That is perfectly OK and their right. However, DO WE WANT TO BE DEPENDENT UPON COUNTRIES WHO HAVE A HISTORY OF NOT NECESSARILY COOPERATING WITH US DURING IMPORTANT CONFLICTS? What if you need spare parts from Airbus and the French government forbids Airbus from delivering those spares to us at a particular time because it disagrees with us? That’s an important and critical consideration.
Airbus wants a foothold in the US. An opportunity to build a factory here would be a huge advantage for them because they currently sell aircraft for dollars but their costs are primarily in euros. If they builit aircraft here, their costs would be inherently less. Add in the subisidies this company receives and that puts our own aerospace companies which have to sink or swim on their own at a dramatic disadvantage and potentially erodes our domestic strategic aerospace capabilities. Is that what we want as a superpower in this world?
We shouldn’t be encouraging Airbus to compete for this stuff. We should be encouraging another domestic company to re-enter commercial aviation. We should re-develop that industry for our own benefit by encouraging someone like Lockheed to go back into that business so that in the future, we have healthy DOMESTIC competition for RFP like the KC-X Tanker.
Is this tender a boon for Boeing now that Northrop Grumman has withdrawn? No, not really. Boeing can and should make a profit but let’s not forget that they’ll have opportunity costs involved in this and the current RFP requires them to offer a fixed price for a very long time. There is a lot of risk involved in that.
Will this mean an extension of life for the 767 commercially? No, probably not. Maybe for freignters a bit but commercial airlines depend too much on new technologies to continue with the 767 for much longer. Does that make the 767 an outdated purchase for a tanker? No, to the contrary. It’s not the same 767 rolled out in the 1980’s for one. Frankly, other than the basic design, little of that aircraft resembles the original 767s. Not the wing, not the engines, not the avionics, nothing but the basic fuselage which was always a very efficient design. The military is getting an extremely durable, long lived aircraft that should provide capabilities for another 30 to 40 years.
* I am employed by a first tier vendor to Boeing on this program and even work in a group that will be directly involved in the program. However, I’m involved in military software rather than avionics or other hardware.
Bombardier, unlike Embraer featured yesterday, has become the aerospace company it is today by combining a number of companies together over the past 25 years. Its first purchase was Canadair (maker of the Challenger 600), then Short Brothers (maker of the Shorts 360), LearJet and, finally, Dehaviland (Canada) from Boeing.
Notably, products from 3 of those 4 manufacturers exist in one form or another today. The Canadair Challenger business jet is the basis for the regional jet CRJ-100/200 series. The Dehaviland Dash 8 / Q400 continues in production today and LearJet is still selling small, affordable business jets.
Bombardier has pursued two lines of growth in the commercial airline world in the form of its regional jets (CRJ series) and the Q400 turbo-prop from its DeHaviland subsidiary.
The Dash 8 Q400 is arguably the most efficient regional “jet” available today in that the Dash 8 series is powered by 2 Pratt & Whitney (Canada) turbine engines (and actually does derive some tiny percentage of its forward speed from jet “thrust” in addition to its propeller propulsion). The Q400 has seen some renewed interest in its product line and finds itself in the enviable position of airliners showing strong interest in the far greater efficiency of these aircraft over 500nm sectors (or less.)
Colgan Air (serving as a regional airline to Continental) has adopted a fleet and Frontier Airlines and Horizon Airlines both have new fleets of these aircraft. Operating costs that are about 1/3 to 1/2 of a regional jet, the Q400 offers comfort (equivalent to a E-Jet), speed (no substantive differences on sectors of 500nm or less from “real” jets) and low entry costs.
Expect Bombardier not only to continue this line of aircraft but also to improve it over the next few years. Its conceivable that a still larger model with stronger engines could be offered and become quite competitive on both intra-state (Texas, California) and regional (upper North East, Midwest) routes that are currently served by mainline aircraft. Their only real competitor, ATR, does offer similar aircraft but lacks the financial muscle and diversification of most other aerospace companies.
Everyone wants to fly a jet.
Bombardier has a strong, successful line of regional jets that began with the CRJ100/200 series seating 50 passengers and first offered in 1991. This series has now been superseded by the CRJ700/900 series seating from 70 to 90 passengers and first offered in 2001. The CRJ1000 is in development and offers a 100 passenger capacity and should enter service some time in 2010.
The early CRJ100/200 jets were 2×2 seating that was cramped and had limited headroom whereas the new(er) CRJ700/900/1000 offer increased headroom and legroom using the same size fuselage. Both series have seen extensive service with a wide variety of airlines around the world.
The next generation of aircraft, the C-Series, launched in 2008, offers the promise of a wider fuselage accommodating 3×2 seating and from 110 to 140 passengers. This aircraft will be among the first to use the Pratt & Whitney Geared Turbo Fan engine and, with the use of extensive composite materials, should be among the most efficient in its class.
In addition, the range offered by these aircraft put them into near trans-continental reach and certainly encroach a great deal of territory currently held by Boeing and Airbus.
This program, first launched in 2006, first saw a suspension due to a lack of orders and then it was re-started in 2008. Currently, only Lufthansa has made a commitment to the aircraft (30 options) but the range and efficiency of this proposed series should attract other airlines in the next year or so.
Like Embraer, Bombardier must grow and growth means launching future aircraft into Boeing and Airbus’ territory. Bombardier, so far, has shown an inclination towards going it alone into this territory by pushing forward with its next series.
The next step for Bombardier (in about 10 years time) may be a real mainline aircraft seating from 140 to 180 people in a 2×3 or 3×3 configuration. This will be dependent on whether or not their CRJ-700/900/1000 series aircraft require an update and whether or not the market for a sub-100 seat regional jet continues to exist (likely).
Bombardier is challenged by its location in Canada (Montreal) with strong ties to unions and an expensive supplier base. In addition, Bombardier has experienced difficulties in ramping up and maintaining high volume production. Although they have experimented with assembly in China by shipping complete assembly packages there for construction, they have no real ties to other parts of the world that could lead to reduced manufacturing costs (most particularly labor costs.)
Bombardier will continue as a viable and competitive aerospace company. Whether it can last in competition with Embraer and (in the future) Boeing and Airbus remains to be seen. Embraer has the advantage on costs while Airbus and Boeing have an advantage in knowledge. They may become the regional airliner firm to beat with Embraer moving up a class against Boeing and Airbus.
I don’t spend a lot of time on two aircraft manufacturers who really are the first real potential competitors to Boeing and Airbus in the future. Embraer and Bombardier.
Let’s take a look at Embraer today. Embraer, a Brazilian aerospace company, got its start in the 1960’s and entered the commercial aviation world with its EMB 110 Bandeirante (1968) and EMB 120 Brasilia (1983) serving the small commuter turbo-prop market.
These tough aircraft from Brazil managed to serve a need in many US markets and I remember them flying for American Airlines in the 1980’s and 1990’s. American Airlines used them to fly multi-stop routes from their DFW hub and others such as Delta and United used them similarly from their hubs.
It was the ERJ-145 that Embraer brought to market in 1995 that took this company to a new level. This line of regional jets were the first to combine small size (as few as 30 seats and as many as 50 seats) with modern turbine jet engines to provide a (near) mainline aircraft experience to the small feeder routes of major airlines. Unfortunately, these aircraft were only economical to operate when jet fuel was inordinately cheap through the 1990’s and early 2000’s.
Embraer knew this and began development on a larger, more capable family of airliners that aren’t quite regional jets and aren’t quite mainliner jets. These new jets, now referred to as “E-Jets”, are the ERJ-170/190 family and this is where Embraer signaled its willingness to encroach on the territory of Boeing and Airbus.
The E-Jets, introduced in 2002, have a seat capacity ranging from 80 to 120 people in an all coach configuration and, at first glance, that doesn’t seem to quite reach into the 737/A320 territory but its worth another look. The E-Jets, at least the larger E-190/195, offer similar size and range to the early 737-100/200 and the first DC-9 series aircraft. This was confirmed when David Neeleman (founder of Morris Air and jetBlue) chose them to start his new airline in Brazil, Azul. US Airways is now deploying this aircraft on its East Coast shuttle routes.
These aircraft offer something that neither the 737, A320 or DC-9 never offered: no middle seats. Designed for a 2×2 configuration, these aircraft offer a coach experience that really is no different than the current offerings from Boeing and Airbus and, in some cases, really better. These aircraft are now serving the routes originally serviced by first generation 737’s and DC-9’s.
And what’s next? Embraer has shown it has the technical expertise to offer a mainline aircraft and if it expects to grow as a company, the next step will find it offering a 737/A320 competitor. If timing is anything to go by, I would be unsurprised by a new airliner being offered in 5 years or so and quite likely offering the new Pratt & Whitney GTF engine.
With both Boeing and Airbus deferring development on the 737 and A320 series of aircraft for as much as 10 more years, there is an opportunity there for makers such as Embraer and Bombardier since even major US airlines are eager to re-develop their fleets with more fuel efficient aircraft.
At some point, both Boeing and Airbus will have to make a few choices. They can choose to cede the 100 to 140 seat market which is tough to imagine given that this where aircraft are truly mass produced.
They can choose to form a partnership with Embraer and/or Bombardier and co-market a new aircraft under one or the other’s brand names. Airbus has some ties to Embraer and Bombardier has had contact with Boeing over the years but neither has anything approaching what would be called a close tie. I think there is some likelihood of this happening and, frankly, I expect that whoever forms ties with Embraer is likely to succeed. Embraer has a bit more financial strength and a much cheaper labor base to manufacture from than Bombardier (located in union-heavy Canada).
The final choice is to go head to head with Embraer and Bombardier. From a personal viewpoint, I hope that both Boeing and Airbus take this route. It can mean only better aircraft in the future for everyone. However, both Boeing and Airbus are currently manufactured in areas with strong union ties (Boeing is reducing this risk with the establishment of an assembly line in South Carolina and Airbus is “experimenting” with an assembly line in China for low production volumes) and with a relatively expensive supplier base.
There is no doubt that Embraer offers a great product and certainly possesses the ability to take it to yet another level. They are poised to take advantage of another family of aircraft that could be made in a way that type ratings between the E-Jets and a new, larger family could be shared. This would be very attractive to a wide variety of airlines.
The Boeing 787 and Airbus A350xwb are commonly compared to each other over the past few years but are they really similar aircraft?
In one sense, yes, they are. Both aircraft make substantial use of CFRP for instance. Boeing makes the fuselage of the 787 as a full “barrel” and Airbus plans to use CFRP panels using an more conventional structure underneath. Both will also use similar engine and engine technologies although Boeing is using a system that eliminates “bleed air” from its systems for the first time while Airbus retains it.
They are both aimed at the medium to long range market although Boeing’s 787-3 (if it ever comes to fruition) is aimed at domestic markets primarily in Japan with a planned range of about 3000 nautical miles maximum. When the introduction of this aircraft was delayed in favor of the 787-8 and 787-9, Japan Air Lines transferred its orders to the 787-8 and All Nippon Airlines reduced its order and transferred the remaining to the 787-8. Ultimately, I suspect this aircraft may be developed to offer trans-Atlantic, US transcontinental and Japanese domestic capability. That would mean a range increase of probably as much as 1000 nautical miles which would still be 1500 or more nautical miles less than other 787 models.
Both were initially introduced as 3 models. Boeing has firmly offered the 787-3/8/9 and Airbus has firmly offered the A350-800/900/1000. However, the variants of each manufacturer do not match up one for one.
The 787-3 and 787-8 will be a bit smaller than the first A350-800 model. Instead, Airbus targeted its A350-800 model to match up against the 787-9. The A350-900 and 1000 more accurately match up against the Boeing 777-200/300 aircraft.
What drove the development of each of these aircraft is more important and shows the difference. Boeing needed a replacement for both the 767 and the 757. Those models were more than 20 years old and had issues with continuing to be capable aircraft for airlines. The 767 was unable to carry cargo competitively with the A330 and A300 Airbus models and its engines were becoming fuel inefficient for many routes. The 757 had morphed to a medium haul / trans-Atlantic model but didn’t quite have the legs to reach Europe except from extreme East Coast destinations.
Boeing already had the 777-200 which filled a gap between its 747-200/400 models and it didn’t need to replace it since the 777/200ER was quite young and it had the 777-200LR coming online shortly. It needed an aircraft that was capable of carrying a passenger load from 230 to nearly 300 with a full cargo load on at least medium range routes of 5000 nautical miles or more.
In addition, airline trunk routes were fracturing so it needed its next aircraft to be capable of flying much longer routes so the new aircraft had to be capable of flying routes from 5000nm to 8000nm efficiently. Something that the 767 wasn’t capable of and the 777 wasn’t very suited to capacity wise for the shorter ranges. So Boeing defined the 787 to fill that gap.
Airbus was faced with a different problem. The A330 was and is still a strong seller and an excellent competitor for the 777-200 on medium range routes. It had the A380 coming online as a competitor to the 747 which left a large gap between the A380 and A330 because airlines had never really bought into the A340 model line. The A340 was an inefficient competitor to the 777-200/300 line of aircraft because it used 4 engines (as opposed to 2 engines) and possessed a fuselage that was slightly too narrow to be stretched for more capacity without other problems cropping up.
What Airbus didn’t have was a real 777 competitor and that’s what it needed. After going through several definitions of the new aircraft, it arrived at the A350xwb. The A350xwb-900/1000 compete directly with the 777-200/300 models in capacity and range. However, where customers are already seeing a deficiency is in cargo capacity.
Although the A350 is not yet completely defined, it appears that while it may have lower costs per available seat mile, the 777 will continue to be able to lift and carry several tons more cargo in addition to its passengers. In real world operations, the two may be very even competitors unless and until Airbus is able to offer higher thrust engines (100K pounds of thrust or better), this deficiency will remain. Currently, Rolls-Royce has shown some willingness to build to that thrust capability (borrowing on their engine technology for the 777) but GE has shown no interest in developing a new engine using GEnx technology to meet the specifications of Airbus’ A350-1000 model leaving a large gap. GE sees such an engine cutting into its current customer base on the 777. Current 777-200LR and 777-300ER models have GE engines capable of 110K and 115K thrust respectively.
Both models promise to be excellent, successful aircraft because they fill needs for each manufacturer’s customers. Both brands needed those models to fill very important places in their lineups. Even airlines see these aircraft as more complimentary than competitors as evidenced by many large airlines ordering both models.
The Boeing 787 promises to be successful with US, European, Japanese and, possibly, Australian airlines. South American airlines will likely follow in 5 to 10 years. This aircraft will serve airlines whose routes are either long and thin or those that have high frequency.
The Airbus A350 will serve routes that are fat and long primarily and will likely be used by airlines based in the Middle East, South East Asia, India, Australia and by some in Europe. This aircraft is more a trunk route airliner that will serve routes with lots of density, low to medium frequency and of 5500nm distance (at the least).
It is notable that Airbus faces an issue that Boeing doesn’t have with the 787 and that is customer base. Nominally, both companies have a healthy order book for each respective aircraft. The 787 has well over 800 orders and the A350 has well in excess of 500 orders. Both have an average of 15 orders per customer even. However, the customer base for the A350 is really quite a bit more narrow than Boeing’s.
Airbus has roughly 505 orders for its A350 aircraft line up and of that, the only truly significant large quantity orders come from a few airlines based in the Middle East or South East Asia. More than half of those orders (284) are attributed to just 13 customers from Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia. Of those 13 customers, 7 customers should be considered as somewhat dubious in light of the present world wide economic climate in the airline industry. Of the remaining 6 customers, 3 airlines and one leasing company (Emirates, Etihad, Qatar and DAE Capital) account for 205 of those orders. The A350 will need to find a wider customer base for all its models to reduce the risk the order book currently has. Those three main airlines are each based in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) and while successful today, have dubious opportunities for their continued growth over time.
Boeing’s order book is stretched more evenly across airlines of the world and on most continents. While Boeing does have some dubious order holders, they are fewer overall and comprise a vastly smaller portion of the order book both percentage-wise and in total orders. Boeing has much less risk in its order book.
Boeing should begin deliveries to customers in the 4th quarter of 2010 or about 10 months from now. With a second production line expected to come online in 2 to 3 years, Boeing is well placed to fill its orders and have enough production slack to fill new orders from major airlines. Within the next 2 years, expect to see the 787-10 defined and design work begun. The 787-10 will likely be a 777-200 competitor in some respects but it also allows Boeing to define a new 777 or replacement model that reaches further upwards in capacity in the future.
Boeing’s next moves are likely to be, in order, the 787-9, the 787-10 and then either a refresh of the 777 model as a next generation enhancement with extensive use of composite materials, new engine technology and likely following a systems approach similar to the 787. If it isn’t a refresh of the 777, it will be a new model to replace the 777 with capacities just above the present 777-200 and finishing with capacities a bit past the current 777-300. A 737 replacement should follow once that 777 issue is nearing production.
Airbus currently has the A330 and plans to continue production for several more years. However, Airbus is due to be left with two serious gaps. First, the gap between the A321 and the A330 which nominally should be filled with a 787 competitor. This is likely where Airbus goes next but not before 2015 or later. Then, Airbus also has a bit of a gap between the A350-1000 and the A380. This gap really isn’t so important for the next 10 years but its one they’ll have to watch since Boeing will be positioned to offer a right-sized aircraft in that market in the form of a 777-refresh, 777 replacement and their about to be introduced 747-8i. After filling the A321/A330 gap, Airbus will likely go to work on their A320 series replacement which, I suspect, will be sized at slightly larger capacities than the current A318/319/320/321 lineup.
For more than 10 years, much has been made of the “launch aid” given to EADS/Airbus for producing new aircraft. A recent preliminary WTO (World Trade Organization) ruling has said that the aid given for launching and producing the A330 was illegal.
Europe/Airbus has prosecuted a counter-claim to Boeing stating that the tax incentives given by both states and the federal government as well as defense industry contracts illegally aids Boeing.
To a lot of people, it seems as if both sides have a point. To Louis Gallois, CEO of EADS/Airbus, it certainly seems that way. He’s actively pursued independent negotiations to settle the issues away from the WTO. Boeing, on the other hand, has remained steadfast.
Like a lot of conflicts such as these, there are valid points on both sides. I think the best way to look at the issue(s) is to test them according to a standard of transparency and economic competitiveness.
Airbus actively competes with Boeing around the world and does a fine job of it as well. There is no doubt that their aircraft are world class and quite capable of competing in the marketplace against Boeing’s products. An airline who buys Airbus isn’t putting itself at a disadvantage.
It’s how Airbus got there that rankles most. Originally a state financed consortium of aerospace manufacturers, Airbus received open funding from national governments to produce aircraft. Ordinarily, this tends to be a bad idea since the product produced is often not market competitive. That certainly wasn’t the case with Airbus’ products. They sell on features and capability. The A320 series can be considered the equal of the Boeing 737 series. The same is true across the line.
It was important to Europe to find a way to continue building airliners and there is a good argument that the rise of Airbus has kept Boeing (and, previously, McDonnell Douglas) honest. I would certainly agree with that. Indeed, one could say that the demise of McDonnell Douglas’ commercial aircraft business was due, in part, to the rise of Airbus since MD found it very difficult to compete against Airbus’ aggressive pricing strategies in markets where McDonnell Douglas was the legacy supplier (Europe and parts of Asia as well as the United States.)
The line was crossed when Airbus didn’t transition to a self financing entity as the A330/A340 aircraft were being developed. Airbus didn’t have to go to the market to borrow money, they went back to the respective European governments for more “aid”. And the biggest part of the problem is that the aid wasn’t exactly required to be paid back. The conditions were that *if* Airbus sold that line into profitability, the governments would start receiving a portion of those profits.
That’s a big if. Indeed, the current Airbus A380 program points to the problem with such a murky requirements. This is an aircraft that, at best, has an extremely limited market and continues to struggle even with low volume production. Deliveries are massively delayed and Airbus continues to depend on orders from a relatively few airlines to support the production. At the same time, there is no pressure from the financial markets and/or shareholders to justify the production with potential profits. Lacking that pressure, Airbus continues with a program that could never last in the United States.
The same was true for the A330/A340 program. While the A330 is an unqualified success, the A340 never was. The problem with this program is that the A330 succeeded not just on capability but price. Airbus didn’t have to pay the rent on the money it borrowed to develop and sell the aircraft and was able to offer a capable aircraft at a price competitive with the Boeing 767. It’s notable that, in many respects, it should have been competing on price with the Boeing 777 instead.
In the United States, it’s true that we do support our manufacturing base with certain tax incentives. However, it is notable that while Boeing might not have kept its production in Washington state, its laughable to believe it would have traveled outside of the United States. Those tax incentives merely kept production where it was inside the US and even those incentives no longer seem to be enough. Witness Boeing setting up a second production line for the 787 in South Carolina.
When Boeing needs to raise money to launch such a venture, it has to go to the international capital markets and borrow money. Boeing must pay market interest rates for that money and, most importantly, it must make a solid case for the product they want to produce and its potential profitability. I assure you that capital markets are an unforgiving place and without justification for their request for money, no one would loan it to them.
Boeing does receive research and development funds for defense work that does contribute to its body of knowledge for building commercial aircraft. Boeing’s capability in manufacturing CFRP (Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic) derives from such defense programs. However, there is a difference in how Boeing gets those funds.
Boeing must compete with a number of aerospace companies for those funds and justify its ability to deliver. Those aerospace companies are largely US based but also include companies from Europe such as BAE, Airbus and others. In order to receive that funding, the companies must make a financial case for them being the best to receive funding and if those companies prove incapable of delivering results on a funded program, it usually is terminated by the government. The US Defense Department doesn’t just continue to fund a program for the sake of funding it.
The difference in these arguments about illegal funding between Boeing and Airbus is really about transparency and competitiveness. Boeing must be transparent and routinely demonstrate to the markets and the US government that it is not only doing what it said it would do but also succeeding in the world market place. Airbus, on the other hand, answers to governments whose prime interest is in supporting an aerospace industry and has yet to have to justify itself to the world marketplace.
I suspect that if the European governments involved in Airbus had adopted a hands off approach with the A380 program, the US government and Boeing would have declined to pursue a WTO case against Airbus. I think some sort of arrangement would have still been possible if Airbus had justified their new A350 program in the world marketplace but they once again gratuitously accepted launch aid from governments who brazenly offered it in spite of their pledge to be fair participants within the WTO.
Both France and Germany have been particularly bad in their behaviour on all things Airbus. National leaders of both governments have been known to fly to countries where Airbus is competing for a sale and nakedly pitch the Airbus product as a national interest priority and make the sale with inducements such as defense sales and other side trade agreements. The United States has been known to flirt with this but never has engaged in such open pimping of their own industries.
The KC-X tanker program is the next battlefield. Pitched against the DoD’s desire to have a real competition for the program (there are only two remaining manufacturers in the world capable of producing the aircraft: Boeing and Airbus) and the fact supported case that the Airbus A330 derived tanker was and continues to receive state sponsored support and aid.*
What happens? The United States has a decision to make in the next 2 to 3 years. It either aggressively stops the unfair trade practices of the European governments (primarily France and Germany) or it must decide to fight fire with fire. Wisely, the US government wants to avoid having to resort to the same tactics to support the US aerospace industry because they know the consequences are potentially very bad. Competitiveness in our aerospace industry is, quite literally, what has kept us on the top of the hill when its comes to our nation’s defense.
Those same European aerospace industries supporting Airbus, also participate in the US defense contracts and have become essential to the US defense. Companies such as BAE Systems are now prime contractors producing for the US and to ban them from competition is both bad for the US as well as the US industries. Such is the web a global marketplace produces.
My guess is that the US will seek to defend its ground by offering even more support to businesses and governments around the world in the form of low cost or no cost financing. US Trade Representatives will be empowered to offer better and better terms to facilitate those sales and its hard to compete with the financial might of the US government.
Until the US starts to aggressively combat EADS/Airbus and their supporting governments, the practices won’t stop. Those governments have always pursued such policies and have never stopped engaging them until it became unprofitable to do so. There is no historical precedent for them to play “fair” with, possibly, the exception of the UK.
* Nominally the KC-X tanker program is a competition between Boeing and Northrup Grumman. However, Northrup Grumman essentially is the “front” for Airbus where Airbus will produce the base airframe and Northrup Grumman will do the conversion modifications in Alabama. NG and Airbus have promised to ultimately produce the A330 in Alabama after the first 20 or so airframes are built. However, the A330 airframe isn’t that much younger than the 767 and the market for the aircraft is already quickly diminishing with the rise of the 787, A350 and even the 777. The idea that a single tanker program could justify setting up such an assembly line without commercial demand is far fetched at best. It’s a promise that is easily taken back after production started.
It’s been two days since the 787 took flight for the first time and it certainly was one of the most anticipated first flights of an aircraft. Anyone who has followed the development of the 787 program certainly knew that it would indeed be a special aircraft and no one would doubt that there is a lot of promise in it.
Although I’ve seen countless photographs of the first aircraft, ZA001, I was pretty surprised by a couple of things. First, the wing flex. All the promotional photos for the airplane showed it but , intellectually, I didn’t believe it would look like that. But it was, if anything, even more dramatic than renderings in my opinion.
Second, if you saw video of the take-off, how about how they time the chase planes? Those T-33 jets were just the right whipped cream for that take-off.
At some angles, the 787 reminds me more of the 757 than the 767. At others, it reminds me of the 777. Those huge Rolls-Royce engines throw me off because they are much larger in proportion to the airplane than any other common aircraft. They look larger than the 777 engines (but aren’t.)
Here are two the better videos I could find of the take-off:
I genuinely look forward to seeing that airplane land at DFW airport one day.
One note: My wife and a couple of friends commented on the fact that all photos of the plane show its landing gear extended. Typically the landing gear is left deployed on a first flight simply because it provides a little extra margin of safety. Most likely, the gear was left deployed the entire first flight or, at best, cycled once and then left deployed again. As the testing continues, the gear will be retracted and the normal “envelope” of handling for the aircraft will be found through more and more tests.
Edit #01: Depending on the weather, this flight may be cut short. Currently it is scheduled for 5 hours with the initial circuit being north of Everett, Washington. However, with weather closing in, the flight could be cut short at any time. The 787 will be landing at Boeing Field when it does return.
Edit #02: A few moments ago (It’s 1:18pm CST), Flightaware.com showed the 787 slowing to just 87 kts (100mph) and then speeding up again, slowly, to nearly 200kts. Ordinarily, I’d be inclined to think that speed reading a fluke. Today, I think they really did slow it down that much. I can only imagine what it must be like to be the test pilot that takes those chances with an aircraft that cost billions (with a “B”) to develop on its first flight.
Edit #03: The 787 is flying patterns that take it over I-5 over and over again at relatively low altitude. Anyone traveling on that highway may be getting quite a surprise now and then.
Edit #04: Boeing is now saying that the 787 may land in about 30 minutes. This would result in a 2.5 hours first flight and given the weather, a complete success.
Edit #05: The 787 has nosed towards the south and should make a long loop heading south to approach Boeing Field from the south and land.
Edit #06: Matt Cawby’s website has a photo of the 787 Dreamliner lifting off in the rain HERE.
Edit #07: The 787 Dreamliner has landed at Boeing Field now. There is a rumour that the second aircraft, ZA002, will fly on or about December 22.
Edit #08: You can watch a short video clip of the 787 taking off HERE. Notice the wing flex and the chase plane that flies right above/beside the 787 as it rotates.
The Associated Press is reporting that United has decided to order (25) Boeing 787-8 and (25) A350-900 aircraft with deliveries starting in 2016. Options for 50 additional aircraft (of each type) are also included.
The order isn’t a surprise in that it has been commonly known that United was considering a purchase. Even the split between types doesn’t really come as a surprise. United Airlines is already an Airbus customer and United Airlines is *not* a party to the gentleman’s agreement to buy only Boeing aircraft. American Airlines, Delta Airlines and Continental Airlines are parties to that agreement which gives them access to early positions on the production line(s) and preferential pricing. That is how AA managed to land early delivery slots when they made their order for the 787 earlier this year.
Some will be surprised that United didn’t buy more 777 aircraft but I’m not sure that would have made sense for them. They don’t necessarily need the cargo lift that a 777 offers and, frankly, this order wasn’t for 777 replacement aircraft. These aircraft will replace 747s (with more frequency) and 767s (one for one) as United retires those two types from its fleet.
I suspect United decided to not keep all their eggs in one basket and chose the A350 because it would be newer and more efficient for the type of routes United serves. Nothing more, nothing less.
Lack of a firm offering for the 787-10 is starting to become visible. This is the dawn of that omission and it will be a glaring one in another 12 to 18 months. Airlines would like to have some confidence that they can purchase a fleet that spans the three basic types for various missions and which doesn’t require a different pilot rating for each type. Confirming the 787-10 and preparing an offer to airlines wouldn’t be an unwise thing on Boeing’s part.
The Seattle Times is reporting that Korean Air Lines has signed a Memorandum of Understanding to purchase five 747-8 Intercontinental aircraft, the passenger version of the 747-8.
Amazingly enough, it’s been 3 years since Boeing landed an order for the passenger version of the aircraft and while this signals some movement on that model, all is not what it seems here. You see, without background, this is an order that should have been Airbus’ to lose given the density of many of Korean Air Lines routes.
Does it make a difference that Korean Air Lines also makes part of the Boeing 747-8? I’m sure it does. While I’m confident Korean Air Lines wouldn’t make an order for an aircraft that was fundamentally unsuitable for the airline’s routes, I’m equally sure that this was Boeing’s to lose.
Nonetheless, it’s nice to see the passenger version notch up another 5 orders. Presently there are 32 orders for the passenger version comprised of a Lufthansa order for 20, Korean Air Lines order for another 5 and 7 unidentified VIP orders. An additional 78 orders for the freighter version exist and first flight of the 747-8F is expected sometime soon.
That isn’t a big surprise to most readers of this blog and one very good reason why I’ve said little about the event. Despite the long program delays and disappointing news of certain developments about this aircraft, I remain extremely excited about this aircraft. Perhaps for different reasons than most, though.
Mainstream press continues to speak about the 787’s increased comfort potential for the passenger and sometimes mentions the efficiency the aircraft will offer airlines. All that is true but it excites me for different and more specific reasons.
First and foremost, it is the first truly new aircraft to come from Boeing since the 777 made it’s first flight in 1994. Since then, there have been improved variants of the 737, 767 and 777 introduced but this is the first “from scratch” aircraft to show up in 15 years from Boeing. That is exciting to me.
One of the most disappointing results from the Boeing / McDonnell Douglas merger is that, in many respects, Boeing was taken over by McDonnell Douglas managers rather than the other way around despite the fact that, for all intents and purposes, it was really a Boeing takeover of McDonnell Douglas. Since that merger, Boeing has been much more intently focused on developing its defense businesses almost at the expense of investing in Boeing Commercial Aircraft. That has been disappointing and a bit perplexing to me given Boeing’s ability to build fantastic aircraft for the commercial world.
So I hope that this aircraft, the 787, represents a return to innovation and development for Boeing Commercial Aircraft. I hope that a new, younger group of managers is being born from this program that will lead Boeing’s development of new aircraft such as a 737 replacement, a 757/767 replacement and, yes, a new 777/747 replacement too. But I remain concerned if for no other reason than Boeing seems to be ignoring new competition from Bombardier and EMBRAER who are now challenging the 100 to 130 seat domestic segment in the US and elsewhere. If Bombardier can build its new C-Series aircraft with union labor in Canada, Boeing should be more than capable of developing a new family of aircraft to compete against those two companies.
While the first flight is truly on track to happen in the next two weeks, the burning anticipation of that first flight has, if anything, died down in many respects. Those who have followed it tortuous path to first flight recognize that it isn’t the first flight that means anything now. The aircraft is so mature in its development that we know it will not only fly but fly very successfully. We know that the major teething problems are almost certainly over now. There isn’t any need to speculate on its performance on a first flight and really nothing to wonder about for its testing over the next 12 months.
The real anticipation comes from seeing it perform with an airline. We want to see it enter an airline’s fleet and see how it performs during real world use. We want to see if airline CEOs proclaim it the game changer we all ferverently hope it is. We even just want to see what the airlines’ liveries will really look like on it. The real next “moment of truth” for the 787 is when it enters a fleet in its new livery. The launch customer is All Nippon Airways (ANA) and we should see ANA put the 787 into service sometime in late 2010.
The 787 should see service with a US airline in late 2010 or early 2011 and it will be Delta Airlines who has the honor by virtue of inheriting Northwest Airlines’ orders. I suspect we’ll see Delta order more shortly after the 787 begins operating in its fleet. Continental Airlines will put the 787 into service a short while later.
This is the most anticipated large volume aircraft to be designed and built since the 1960’s. That’s exciting.
What’s also exciting is what this aircraft means to Boeing and its future development projects. Will these same technologies be used on a 737/757 replacement? Is it conceivable that they’ll be used for a Very Large Aircraft to replace the 777? Both are possibilities. Detractors say there isn’t as much “gain” to be had in using carbon fibre based fuselages for a 737 replacement with respect to efficiency and that is probably true.
However, these new techologies may mean that Boeing can produce the 737 replacement even faster. The composite carbon fibre fuselages may mean less maintenance and longer maintenance intervals for airlines like Southwest and Ryanair. The new engines coming into development will demand some changes too. Larger by-pass ratio engines or, if developed, open rotor engines means more clearance will be needed between the wing and the ground. The next aircraft will have to stand taller and that might mean a little more time spent on ground handling.
The next generation engines and Boeing decision to produce an “electric” airliner may see those approaches used in the 737 replacement. Have we reached a point in reliability that we can expect these new systems to survive the punishing schedules of a domestic airline? I think so but the 787 is the aircraft that must support that supposition.
The 787 won’t be exciting because of what it potentially offers the customer in comforts. Yes, no matter what we’ll have larger windows and a little bit more fresh air and pressurization in the cabin but if you think you’ll be getting more spacious seat pitch, you’ll be disappointed. This new aircraft will be as packed as any in service now. Overhead bins will still be crowded.
My birthday is December 12th. There is speculation that the 787 may fly as early as December 14th. That’s close enough that I find myself kind of hoping that Boeing might pull a fast one and send it up into the sky 2 days early. It would be exciting to have an airliner born on my birthdate.
