Critical Condition

July 28, 2008 on 7:04 pm | In Death Watch | No Comments

I got asked today what airline(s) I thought might be in real trouble.  Thinking about it for a few hours, I’ve come up with a sort of “death watch” list.

 

First on my list is Midwest.  They just announced they’re grounding their MD-80 aircraft and, as a result, cutting several important routes while expanding their codeshare with Northwest Airlines (who now owns a “passive” 47% stake in Midwest.)

 

Giving up routes such as Milwaukee – Los Angeles does not bode well.  With only Boeing 717 aircraft, they have limited themselves to routes that are “heartland” oriented.  For instance, the 717 can’t make it from MKE to LAX.  It can fly from Kansas City to Los Angeles (that route stays for now) but who wants to fly from MKE to LAX via MCI (MCI stands for Mid Continent International by the way)?  The airline business is, first and foremost, a network game and Midwest just cut 40% of its network putting itself below the critical mass in my opinion.

 

The proposed merger with Airtran would have saved them but they made a deal with the devil (Northwest) and Northwest has no interest in Midwest surviving really. 

 

Next up is Frontier.  Their hub is Denver and they have already cut back their focus cities.  While their fleet is new and fuel efficient, part of their business model counted on being the only LCC (Low Cost Carrier) game in town.  Not so true anymore. 

 

They have United Airlines above them as a legacy carrier operating a substantial hub in Denver and offering a nicely segmented set of seat choices and a global frequent flier program.  Below them is Southwest Airlines.  Southwest has entered that market with a vengeance and contrary to denials on te part of Southwest, it is crystal clear they intend to put Frontier out of business.  Much of Southwest’s growth has been focused on Denver and their CEO has already stated their intention to put more capacity into that city.  Denver can support two airlines, not one.  Since Frontier is already in bankruptcy, they’re my pick for going away. 

 

The only saviour is an airline that fits into their network and I can’t identify one that really meshes well with both their route network and their fleet. 

 

My third pick is Virgin America.  This is an airline that doesn’t quite know what it wants to be.  On the one hand, they want to be a trans-continental, high value, high service airline.  On the other hand, they want to be perceived as the west coast version of Jet Blue.   Trans-continental flights can’t make money using the equipment they have (Airbus A319/320) and their base, SFO (San Francisco) can’t support a real hub operation with good traffic given the competition they have from both legacy carriers and established LCC’s.

 

 

Why Not Fly Smart?

July 27, 2008 on 5:04 pm | In Airline Fleets | No Comments

Not you, the consumer. Oh, we know your type these days. You buy on price and frequency. Next is loyalty to your frequent flyer plan (and some of you even buy based upon gathering your FF miles ahead of price.) You aren’t going to change. You never really have and you never really will. You are the girlfriend/boyfriend who promised to change and never did.

 

It’s time for airlines to fly smart. No, really, it is.

 

Southwest Airlines pioneered the modern strategy that most airlines try to emulate in one form or another. They have a single type of aircraft (Boeing 737) and trade high load factors for high utilization of aircraft and crews. It’s a model that works for them and even for some others. Legacy airlines have adopted a modified model that included narrowing the fleet types which allows not only fewer costs in equipment but also permits airlines to use their staff across a broader range of aircraft.

 

But it appears (to me at least) that that strategy in the current economic climate is going to prove flawed. The truth is, the airline industry tends to have to re-invent itself every 30 years or so. That reinvention has taken the form of a revolutionary change in aircraft or, in the case of the 70’s, a new regulatory climate. Traditionally, it’s aircraft.

 

One of the criticisms of the proposed Delta / Northwest merger is the mish-mash of fleet types they’ll have. The CEO’s of both Delta and Northwest have responded that it in fact appears to be a big advantage in the merger because it will permit them to “right-size” each city pair with the proper aircraft. What this means is that with different fleet types comprimised of aircraft capable of varying efficiencies and loads allows them to fit the right aircraft to the right flight.

 

For example, a flight from Atlanta to Nashville might typically carry an average of 90 passengers per flight and Delta might be using a Boeing 737 for the flight segment that carries about 130 passengers. That means their using a new (high capitol costs but more fuel efficient) airplane to fly the route with an average load factor of 69%. It’s a short flight segment so the fuel efficient engines of the 737 don’t play as big a role in savings as they would on a longer flight. Post Merger, Delta may put a Northwest DC-9-40 on the segment that carries about 110 passengers. Suddenly the capital costs are extremely low (the airplanes were paid for years and years ago and the costs to operate it are maintenance and periodic refurbishment), the load factor is now 81% and flight has about similar fuel and labor costs. What’s more, that 737 can now fly on flight segments with average loads that are much closer to its capacity and which provide greater revenue yields as well.

 

More airlines in the US need to re-examine their fleet strategies. Almost all flights being flown by regional jets of 50 seats or less *lose* money now. Particularly when they are used for “long and thin” routes such as DFW / CLE (Cleveland). An airline of real size (US Legacy carriers but also LCC carriers such as SWA, Jet Blue and Airtran) can benefit from a diversified fleet.

 

There are countless “shuttle” type routes that could yield far more profit by using new, advanced turbo-prop aircraft such as the Bombardier Q400 and ATR-72. There is no rational justification to use regional jets on short segment routes when compared to these advanced turbo-props for instance.

 

An airline could, for instance, fly a Q400 on flights between Dallas and Austin offering 70 seats per flight and make money by filling only half of them per flight. Time flying between cities would be virtually the same as Southwest Airlines’ Boeing 737 and seating would be about as comfortable. The capital costs, maintenance, fuel and labor costs for that aircraft are all significiantly less than the 737 but offer about the same comfort and convenience.

 

Reduced fleet types made sense in the 80’s and 90’s because airlines were focused on the hub and spoke model. It allowed an airline to use aircraft interchangeably and since fuel costs were extraordinarily low, load factors could be as low as 60% and an airline could still make money.

 

Today, airlines need aircraft that are more pin-point appropriate for their routes. Short segment shuttles should be flown by Q400’s while longer segments with greater density should be handled by 737s and A320s. Large trunk routes should be served by Boeing 757s, Airbus A320/321s and even smaller widebody aircraft such as the Boeing 767 and Airbus A330. Longer, thin routes should be served by the upcoming Boeing 787 and A350-900 aircraft while long, high density routes will be better served by the Boeing 777, Airbus A350-1000, Boeing 747-800 and Airbus A380.

 

There will be increased demand for a new kind of aircraft. One that is a re-birth of the original DC-9 and Boeing 737. A 100 to 120 seat aircraft that can fly 25% more efficiently over route segments of 500 to 1000 nautical miles. Bombardier (Canada), Embraer (Brazil), Mitsubishi (Japan), AVIC (China) and Sukhoi (Russia) are all working on such aircraft or already have such aircraft available for order. Boeing and Airbus don’t.

 

The days of flying a regional jet such as an Embraer ERJ-145 or Bombardier CRJ-200 are over. They cannot fly profitably short or long, thin routes anymore as they offer, at best, only 50 seats and a product that is quite unpleasant for trip durations over 1 hour.

 

Legacy airlines no longer can afford to “sit” on routes to protect them for use at later date. All of the capacity cuts made so far are squarely aimed at routes that do not generate sufficient revenue to justify their existence. To serve those routes in the future, they’ll require an aircraft whose economics ENSURE profit.

 

That means airlines will seek to merge and become bigger because size permits greater fleet diversity and fleet diversity means more revenue per passenger. Even airlines such as Southwest, Airtran and Frontier will have to begin considering the value of “right sizing” their fleet to their customers. To some degree, Airtran does that with their mixed fleet of Boeing 717/737 aircraft.

 

Greg

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