Reuters is reporting HERE that JAL has announced a new CEO.   The founder of Kyocera probably most known here for cell phones, Kazuo Inamori, has been named as the new CEO in place of Haruka Nishimatsu who agreed to step down as part of a restructuring by a Japanese government fund. 

 

I see a few potential problems here.  First, Mr. Inamori is 77 years old and in his statement regarding this new position, he said:

 

“I am old and a full-time job is hard for me, so I would like to work three or four days a week and I will work for free.”

 

That doesn’t inspire my confidence.  The airline business is punishing and requires constant care and attention.  Anyone who will guide a successful restructuring really needs to be making a comittment to long hours for the next 3 to 5 years. 

 

Second, Mr. Inamori doesn’t have any prior airine or even transportation and/or hospitality experience.  His background is in electronics.  I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again, the airline business is a service industry.  One of the things that often confounds outsiders to the business is just how much cash it takes to run an airline even on a *daily* basis.  The amount of money flowing through an airline is staggering and newcomers often believe that simple “tweaks” will yield profit.  They don’t.

 

Yes, there have been outsiders that have come into the airline industry and succeeded nominally.  United Airlines is rather famous of seeking its CEOs from outside the business and most recently with its current CEO Glenn Tilton.  However, many would argue that Glenn Tilton is the perfect example of why it should NOT be done and I would tend to agree. 

 

JAL needs a dynamic leader with excellent ties to the Japanese financial world but who is also capable of leading JAL’s staff through what will be a very painful restructuring.  Jobs will have to be cut.  Routes will have to be restructured and new alliances found.  Japan is in need of an LCC carrier and someone who could identify how to start one would be an excellent candidate for JAL.  Sadly, LCC business models are outside the knowledge of most Japanese airline executives.  (If you think JAL Express is an LCC, read THIS and you’ll find it really isn’t.)

 

JAL also have to figure out its international routes which just boggle my mind at times.  For instance, JAL flies Tokyo-NYC-Rio de Janeiro and offers flights with 5th freedom rights between NYC and Rio.  Now, flying JAL between those two cities might sound attractive but it strikes me as silly.  JAL would be far better off flying to NYC and allowing AA (via the Oneworld alliance) carry their follow on traffic to Rio. 

 

JAL just announced a closer partnership with Oneworld member, Mexicana, for carrying traffic from the US to Mexico.   While there are strong ties between Japan and Mexico, this makes sense for JAL.  

 

At one point, JAL was flying to destinations such as DFW, Cairo, Beirut and Copenhagen.  That kind of flying reflects someone acting as a national flag carrier but not an airline acting in its own best interest.  The new leadership will have to rationlize the routes, rationalize the fleet and figure out which of two major airline alliances to participate in. 

 

The fleet is comprised of a mix ranging from Boeing 737s to Boeing 747Ds and capacity will have to be reduced and aircraft interiors reconfigured to reflect the accomodation of more coach class traffic.    JAL is in the enviable position of having 2 airline alliances, Oneworld and Skyteam, court their membership and offering generous financial packages in return.  But choosing the right alliance isn’t just about how much financial rescue packages offer, it is about identifying who can offer the best revenue improvements over the long term.  I still believe that JAL will ultimately remain with Oneworld if only because fighting anti-trust issues by joining Skyteam is not what an airline should be doing during the fight of its life.

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Today, part 2 in my views on whether or not we’ll see a real “Ryanair” style airline here in the United States.

 

Watch what you fly here.  The most recent LCC entrants here have bought Airbus.  No real surprise as Airbus likes to make a heck of a deal on an aircraft for new airlines in the hopes they’ll have the “in” for future orders if that airline succeeds.  

 

Boeing isn’t too interested in that.  They want to see a solid business plan and a real possibility of success.  What’s more, big orders aren’t the enticement they once were for Boeing.  Boeing got burned on a few of those deals with Ryanair being the most notable since it allowed Ryanair to buy aircraft, fly them for a couple of years and sell them at a profit.  Boeing isn’t going to let that happen again any time soon.

 

Is Airbus the right aircraft?  Yes.  No.  Maybe.  I kind of think not.  I think it is well suited to the jetBlue and Virgin America airlines of this country because they can support that upgraded service product nicely.   That said, those airlines would have done just as well with Boeing aircraft.  In fact, jetBlue went with Airbus because Boeing refused to offer a decent price for a decent order.  

 

But Airbus doesn’t strike me as quite the right choice for an LCC.  They’re a bit higher off the ground, have a little worse operational dispatch rate and don’t always have the best range vs weight ration for certain routes.   Yes, they’re a family of aircraft that offers a range of size that captain can fly across the type range. 

 

Boeing seems better.  Supported here in the United States, you have better access to mechanics, parts and plenty of maintenance contractors to keep you going.  They’re a little bit closer to the ground, a little easier to turn around and have a little bit better dispatch rate.  In addition, their range of capacities is a little bit better for routes and virtually every model has trans-continental capability now without being weight restricted. 

 

The model I would look long and hard at isn’t either of those.  I think a new LCC carrier trying to emulate Ryanair ought to take a serious look at the Embraer 170/190 aircraft.  They’re cheaper to operate and can carry a full load of passengers and baggage although little cargo (which isn’t an LCC’s concern anyway.)  They offer a family of sizes, have a good dispatch rate, offer quick turn arounds, great range, good comfort and great potential for routes requiring frequency and low costs.  It is no wonder that David Neeleman chose them for his new airline, Azul, in Brazil.

 

But you can go used in the US and do pretty well too.  Allegiant Airlines buys used MD-82/83/87 aircraft, for instance.  They MD-80’s are overbuilt, cheap to buy and still pretty cheap to operate.  They have range, good dispatch rates, ease of maintenance and they’re abundant on the used market.   The same is true of older Boeing 737 models (pre Next Generation models) and those are becoming to cheap to purchase as well. 

 

In the end, an LCC needs an aircraft type that is relatively easy to expand into a fleet, keep one class of pilots flying it and which has a ready source of aircraft to augment and/or replace the fleet with. 

 

One type, many sizes should be the rule.   Ryanair uses one size, the Boeing 737-800 and Southwest basically uses one size, the Boeing 737-700 but they can afford to do so.  A new LCC needs operational flexibility and being prepared to use the three basic sizes of either type would be a good thing. 

 

But you can split your types too.  Airtran did this successfully by entering the world with DC-9s, transitioning to Boeing 717s and then growing in capacity by bringing on the Boeing 737.   That worked because while they needed two different pilot groups, the pilot groups could be kept “rational” with the same pay rates.   jetBlue split their types between the Airbus and the Embraer(190) and split their pilot groups pay rates too.  There was risk involved in that but jetBlue avoided that by offering pay rates on the Embraer that were as generous as that being offered other pilots flying mainline aircraft at other airlines. 

 

Find airports that welcome you and that have demand to locations you can serve.  Sounds easy but it isn’t.  In the US, airports tend to be wedded to airlines that have served them for decades.   When DFW opened, it was served by a number of major airlines and each terminal served one or more airline.  Now, DFW has been taken over by American Airlines (nearly 4 of 5 terminals) and does little to serve the needs of airlines who aren’t AA. 

 

Airports need to figure out that putting all their eggs in one basket with a major, hubbed airline isn’t a good strategy in the long run.  Once those airlines have that dominance, they use it to beat airports down on fees and coerce airports into paying for infrastructure the airlines then get to own.  It doesn’t benefit the local economy to have one dominant airline as prices rise and service falls.  This isn’t just true for DFW either.  When airports begin to aggressively pursue new entrants, everyone will win.

 

New and existing LCC entrants need to make a better argument too.  All too often, LCC’s tend to fear competing in those markets dominated by a major legacy carrier and that’s a mistake.  Airtran wasn’t afraid to go up against Delta and it paid off.  jetBlue wasn’t afraid to compete in one the most competitive markets in the world (NYC) and against some of the biggest airlines.  In the past, there weren’t good examples of what an LCC can do for both an airport and a metropolitan area.  Now there is and new LCCs in particular need to use that to their advantage. 

 

Treat your staff well.   Airlines sell a service product and while you may get customers on price, you’ll keep them with service.   Offering strategies to your crews that permit you high productivity and your crew a living wage along with a good working conditions can only lead to your success.   Treat them like commodities and you’ll fail.  Southwest, Ryanair, jetBlue and Airtran get this.  Skybus and Mesa Airlines don’t.  Look at who is making money. 

 

Quality of life is just as important to airline crew and staff as wages.  Airlines that offer good quality life tend to have happy crew flying their flights and treating their customers right.  At the end of the day, it is a lot cheaper to keep a customer than it is to find new ones every week. 

 

Will we ever see a close replica of Ryanair’s model here on a national basis?  Yes, I think so.  Right now, no.  The market is too crowded but that will change again and new airlines will be started again.   US attitudes towards fees and advertising are changing, although slowly.  

 

First we need to see a major airline liquidate or merge with another to reduce capacity some more.  Then we need to see an uptick in the economy that induces people to spend some money on travel again (both leisure and business travel.)   There needs to be a glut of aircraft useable for such a venture (and that’s happening already) and airports need to figure out that it is in their best interest to find space for these new entrants.  That really hasn’t started to happen yet but it may yet still happen.

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Ryanair is certainly the darling of LCC carriers and, to a certain degree, they even kind of outshine Southwest Airlines.  Lots of people look at the US market and wonder about having a Ryanair-style carrier here.  Skybus Airlines (read more about them HERE) was supposed to be the one but tanked miserably and by every appearance, the only people who didn’t expect them to fail miserably was their executive staff.

 

Could such a carrier exist here?  Sure they could.  In fact, I think it already does in the form of Allegiant Airlines (find out more about them HERE.)  Allegiant is all about flying routes point to point using secondary or even tertiary airports and providing extreme low cost prices which are augmented by fees galore.  And they make a considerable profit doing so.

 

What does it really take to be a Low Cost Carrier in the United States?  First, let’s really define what that is.  Interestingly enough, US Airways uses LCC as its trading identifier on the stock markets.  Is it a LCC carrier?  Not by any definition.  jetBlue and Virgin America both style themselves as LCC carriers but, let’s face it, while they offer great value, neither are a Ryanair style LCC.

 

Southwest Airlines and Airtran Airlines are probably both the best examples of true low cost carriers operating nationally here in the United States.  Allegiant certainly is but they’re still focused much more on the leisure markets and many of the routes they serve compete with quite literally no one. 

 

Skybus failed for a few reasons.  First, they picked a hub that defied rational thought in Columbus, Ohio.  As you can imagine, there isn’t a whole lot of traffic trying to leave or get there.  Hubs don’t work well for LCC carriers.   Focus cities do but not hubs.   If you want to make money as any kind of airline, you had best be offering flights between two places people want to go. 

 

Second, you have to pick between offering frequency and relative value or absolute lowest cost and infrequent service.  You can’t be all things to all people.   Skybus kind of offered high frequency and absolute lowest cost and hoped it would stimulate new traffic.  The problem is, there is only so many people who want to fly between Columbus, Ohio and Greensboro, NC.   You really can’t do that route once or twice a day every day of the week.  Not at any price.  Not with large, mainline aircraft anyway. 

 

Third, just because you can fly to a secondary or tertiary airport doesn’t mean people will go to that airport to use your airline at any price.  Case in point, Bellingham, WA and Skybus again.   Bellingham, Washington is a long way away from most anyone in the Seattle-Tacoma area.   It’s 90 miles from downtown Seattle, 122 miles from Tacoma and it is a tortuous drive in traffic for anyone in that metro area.  Bellingham is convenient to, say, Vancouver, British Columbia but that means crossing a border.   In the case of the SEA-TAC area, you need to be flying from their main airport.   And the lesson is that you have to look long and hard at each area you’re serving. 

 

LCC carriers have succeeded in flying from secondary, smaller airports such as Love Field (Dallas) and Midway Airport (Chicago) and even Long Beach (LA area) because those airports remain highly accessible to a large number of people.  And as both Southwest and Airtran will tell you, sometimes if you want to enter a market, you have to bite the bullet and fly where people want to go.   I take note that since Airtran has decided to defend itself against Allegiant, even Allegiant figured out it needed to change airports in the Orlando area to remain competitive. 

 

Choose your fees and advertising carefully.  The United States is a different place than Europe.  Advertising that is racy or in bad taste doesn’t go well here under the best of circumstances.  It doesn’t matter if you think it should or not.  It just happens to be that way and a new airline is going to change the moral outlook of this country.   Oh, yes, Spirit Airlines has gotten away with it now and then but they remain a minor player and it has possibly turned off as many people as its turned on. 

 

An a la carte fee system (a la Ryanair) is something that this country is completely unfamiliar with when it comes to airlines.  Now, that is changing and it will likely change more but it is an evolutionary thing, not revolutionary and some fees are going to make customers feel burned no matter what.   Skybus’ Ryanair-like approach to charging a fee for even looking in their direction was offensive to customers here in the US particularly when, at that time, no one else had even really dabbled in it.

 

While I do think more a la carte offerings will and should be instituted among airlines, it will be done differently here.  Luggage fees have generated a massive amount of resentment with customers and while they have generated significant additional revenue for major airlines, it has also caused many customers to more carefully consider their options.  Southwest has bucked that luggage fee trend and the results are showing. 

 

There is place for an airline that charges for checked luggage, beverages, meals, blankets and airport check-in.  But the amounts of those fees still have to have some value.  Particularly when legacy airlines already have those fees as well.  Charge more for checked baggage than American Airlines and you run the real risk of turning people off.   We’re really not a true a la carte culture here.

 

Be careful of your publicity.  Ryanair’s CEO, Michael O’Leary, gets away with outrageous statements and even expressing a certain outright hostility to his own customers.   That works in Europe and, in particular, within the UK and Ireland.  Those are cultures who know how to take such statements with a bit more of a wink and a smile.  Here in the United States, it’s a flat turn off.  Our culture is based more on politeness and friendliness.  Bark at your customers or even insult them and they will walk elsewhere. 

 

Tomorrow, Part 2 of this post.

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Since Virgin America began operations, I’ve been watching for something sensible to happen.  There have been a few developments that make sense. 

 

In addition to VA’s initial trans-continental routes, they began to add some West Coast service to places such as San Diego, Las Vegas and Seattle.  This let me increase aircraft utilization since those routes from San Francisco and Los Angeles weren’t 6+ hours but, rather, 2 hour (or less) hops.  And having a bit of network to feed into those trans-con flights made sense too. 

 

But this put them into competition with a few very well established airlines as well.  United, Southwest, jetBlue and Alaska Airlines all operate on the West Coast very effectively and on the same routes. 

 

Alaska Airlines, a legacy airline with a very good full service product started to jump on the anti-VA bandwagon and issued a number of objections to their “US Owned” status to the DOT.  Most likely because VA had a product that competed very well against their full service business class product and that was a major source of revenue.   Alaska Airlines had a lot to lose on some of those routes in particular.  Strangely, United remained pretty quiet and probably because their frequent flier program kept their business customer pretty loyal.

 

Speaking of frequent flier programs, that was another area that Virgin America was a bit lax in and that kind of surprised me too.  They had 2 extra years to develop a strong program and have the infrastructure in place to support it.  It was something that, in my mind, would have made sense since the business customer likes such programs and they had a good trans-continental service product to attract those people.  Instead, it was rolled out a tad late and still lacks much of a partnership with anyone. 

 

Although VA positions itself as a low cost carrier, it really offers a 2 class service product that is comparable to any legacy airline and, in many cases, it is a service product that is much better. 

 

Aircraft are equipped with a two class cabin (first and coach) called, oddly enough, First Class and Main Cabin.  There is a Main Cabin Select product but that’s really access to Main Cabin seats that have a bit more legroom (exit aisles and bulkhead seats) with some of the First Class service product (meals, beverages and premium tv channels are free).  It’s an economy plus plus or semi-business class product. 

 

I believe all airlines could stand to offer more service products through their cabins and this was an area that I thought VA was kind of smart in.  I still think a lot of airlines could stand to differentiate even more but I liked what VA had there.   It was more “business” than “coach” than a lot of airlines’ economy plus products and even competed very well against a similar offering from jetBlue.

 

jetBlue really took things to aother level with their LiveTV offering on their aircraft.  Virgin America took it to yet another level by offering a full entertainment system (including TV) that even allowed shopping and the ability to order food and drink from a menu, thus eliminating the traditional beverage and meal cart services.   The system, called Red, worked pretty well although some reviews had it not always working or in need or a re-boot from time to time.  Such systems do take time to work out bugs and time for staff to learn to work with. 

 

VA also got aggressive and was the first US airline to offer GoGo inflight Wifi on its aircraft.  With accomodations like power ports at each seat and the existing entertainment offerings, this was likely adding whipped cream to the ice cream.  All of their aircraft are equipped with it and Virgin says they’re doing OK with it.  Probably more so than some airlines. 

 

All of these offerings cost a lot of money to both purchase and maintain and VA continued to see red ink as time passed by.  (It is difficult to get a very good picture of VA’s finances because it continues to be a private company instead of a public corporation.)   At one point, rumors that its US investors wanted out spread around and Alaska Airlines filed yet another objection to VA with the DOT who, recently, yet again ruled that VA was more than sufficiently US controlled.  (Read THISfor more info.)   CEO David Cush did continue to speak publicly that their revenues were improving monthly and that he did think VA was edging closer to an operating profit.

 

In fact, VA did manage to eek out a small third quarter operating profit as reported in December which, frankly, surprised a lot of people.  I know I was.  It was a 59% improvement (according to VA) over the previous year’s third quarter and they managed to make it happen in what has been arguably one of the worst economic climates for airlines ever.  This got my attention.  Frankly, the climate hasn’t been good for VA since they started to improvement during those times is impressive, to me anyway.

 

Virgin America is also a bit unusual for the airline industry in that it has a number of women in senior leadership positions.  Their SVP for Inflight Services, VP – Marketing, SVP-CFO and VP – Planning & Sales are all women. 

 

Also curious is the rather interesting Canadian influence in their leadership.  The Chairman of Virgin America is Canadian Don Carty, former Chairmen and CEO of American Airlines.    Frances Fiorello, SVP – Inflight Services has had a long career with Candian airlines such as Canadian Pacific, Canadien Airlines and Air Canada.   Bob Weatherly, SVP of Flight Operations, has a similar Canadian history. 

 

And then there is the American Airlines connection which kind of puzzles me at times.  Don Carty, David Cush, Diana Walke,  and Ross Bonanno each have a history with AA.  Virtually all their senior leadership has extensive with experience with previous airlines.  In fact, after looking into their biographies, it made me realize just how VA might be managing to make it despite all predictions against them. 

 

It’s a strong team with a strong background in successful airlines that, for the most part, have reputations for good cost control and good service products. 

 

Virgin America has been on my death watch for at least a year.  Now, a lot of my inclination towards that has been based on routes.  Yes, they’ve grown and, yes, they’ve added routes.  But they don’t seem to want to really compete except where there is really low hanging fruit against their service product. 

 

They recently opened up routes between, of all places, Fort Lauderdale and Los Angeles and San Francisco.  Obviously they saw some opportunity there but I don’t get what the attraction is in adding those two routes before a lot of other opportunities.

 

VA doesn’t have an East Coast network at all.  They have destinations in NYC, Boston and Washington, D.C. (in addition to the Fort Lauderdale routes) and that’s OK.  Competing on the East Coast is brutal and those three main destinations have enough originating traffic in them that they don’t necessarily need network traffic feeding in on the West Coast yet.

 

David Cush has, at times, talked of adding routes from the West Coast to Chicago but he wants O’Hare airport and claims there are no gates to be had.  This isn’t exactly true.  There are gates but VA doesn’t want to pay the price to get entry to them.   There were, at one point, gates available at Chicago’s Midway airport but VA doesn’t like that idea either. 

 

More recently, Mr. Cush dropped hints of adding a route possibly to Austin or Dallas / Fort Worth.  Most agree that Austin might happen (there is a strong tech connection between Austin and the West Coast) but doubt the DFW possibility. 

 

You see, my problem is that VA seems to be ignoring the possibities in the middle of the country.  With their service product, they could compete very well against AA on routes between DFW and San Diego and Los Angeles.  They could compete well with AA and United on routes between Chicago and Los Angeles and San Francisco.   There is a strong connection between Denver and Los Angeles and despite the back alley fight going on in Denver, it has possibilities. 

 

They’ve by-passed Portland, Oregon which has strong ties to both LA, Seattle and San Francisco and Alaska Airlines, who owns a lot of that traffic has already proven to be susceptible to VA’s service product.

 

Indeed, if you look at their route map right now, they have every appearance of avoiding any destination that is a real hub for a legacy airline. 

 

I can’t think of a market that is more need of a real competitor in service product to destinations on the West Coast than DFW.   Completely dominated by American Airlines, the service product and prices to West Coast destinations is weak and expensive respectively.  Atlanta could stand a bit of competition on routes to the West Coast too.   The same is true for Miami, Minneapolis / St. Paul, St. Louis, Detroit, Kansas City, Cleveland and maybe even Philadelphia and Baltimore. 

 

It’s always a nice strategy to enter airports where the barriers to entry are easy and cheap when you’re getting started.  But VA is more than 2 years old and clearly has a product that, like jetBlue, can compete against major airlines and win.   In any of the major hubs I”ve named above, they are dominated by one or two airlines on those West Coast routes that are flying old aircraft with little new service product and who have much higher costs than VA.  It isn’t going to get easier to compete with these guys with time. 

 

That’s why a part of me continues to view VA with skepticism.  New airlines don’t win by being afraid to compete.   Airtran and jetBlue are perfect examples of airlines who were willing to go up against major legacy airlines and beat them on both price *and* service.   Airlines who weave and duck from their opponents tend to lose.  Skybus was a great example of that. 

 

There are often moments that are ripe for smaller businesses to make a commitment to going against their major competitors and, if you wait too long, those moments go away and never come back.  I’m starting to sense that Virgin America is beginning to lose those moments. 

 

Would I fly VA?  Sure.  I’d love to enjoy their service product.  However, they fly nowhere I want to travel so it is going to be a long time, if ever, that I get to try them.  Would I suggest them?  Absolutely.  At least for now.  They aren’t going to go bankrupt any time soon.  They’ve managed to get past that infancy stage now and kudos to them.  They offer some fantastic prices on their routes and I doubt anyone would be disappointed by flying them.

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I find it interesting that of the established LCC carriers in the United States, only one of them seems unafraid to compete with major legacy airlines at their established hub and/or focus city airports.  Airtan. 

 

Every other successful LCC airline has followed a model of ducking and weaving away from the home territories of established major legacy airlines and, they, too have been successful.   However, I think Airtran has managed to prove you don’t need to be afraid of a legacy airline if you have the right product and prices.   I would applaud loudly if they ever came into DFW and provided some real competition to American Airlines by making DFW a focus city.

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Almost everyone who follows the airline business and the airlines themselves continue to insist that people buy overwhelmingly on price and there is quite a bit of evidence to support that general feeling.    The best example is that among legacy carriers serving a particular non-stop route, when one airlines lowers their price, the other airlines can and do see a drop in their bookings for that route if they don’t match that price.

 

There is a lot of truth that individual routes can be seen as nearly perfect competitive environments.  Any airline executive worth his salt will tell you that when an airline opens up a city pair, they look upon it as growing another business.  Each route is a “business” to be developed and nurtured and maintained.

 

Legacy airlines are the masters of being all things to all people.  Low cost carriers are the masters of high frequency/low cost models.  Leisure airlines have learned how to serve market with low frequency but high value.  

 

But what do most people want?  That isn’t ever as clear as people want to believe.  The dynamics between two cities change over time and adjusting to those changes is essential to maintaining that “business”. 

 

My father, once a very senior airline executive, told a story to me long ago that I’ve never forgotten.  His airline, Braniff, served the Dallas / NYC route with a daily late afternoon flight that for years was a huge money maker because it was flown primarily by businessmen.  In the mid-1970’s, they noticed that traffic on that route began to erode ever so slightly and even a small erosion worried an airline even back then.   Then he happened to take the flight to do some financial business in NYC on behalf of the airline and he realized the problem.

 

Business between the two cities had begun to change.  Traditional businessmen such as bankers or leaders of large corporations had continued to fly that flight because their model was to go to NYC the night before, conduct some business until 2 or 3 in the afternoon and then fly home to be in their own homes by mid-evening.   But entrepreneurship had begun to flower and more and more businessmen/entrepreneurs saw that as a waste of time for such a trip.  They wanted to work until late afternoon and fly home as late as possible in order to maximize their time there.

 

So Braniff added a second flight in the early evening that allowed businessmen to work until 4:30pm, go to the airport and catch the 7:30pm flight home which put them back in Dallas late at night but which met their needs to stay as long as possible to maximize their work.   As a consequence, both flights began to do much better because even the entrepreneurs could recognize that when their work was done, it was time to go home and if it was done at 2pm, they went to the airport and caught the early flight home.  Traditional businessmen began to be expected to be more efficient and when they couldn’t leave at 2pm, they knew they had another option for later in the day.  Braniff began to own that route again.  Frequency was the answer.

 

I would argue that when two or more airlines “own” a route, service is often going to be the discriminator.  But what form of service will be necessary?  Is it options in seating that allow a traveler to have more legroom?  Is it more frequency?  Is it some form of a meal?  Is it WiFi or video on demand?

 

For 30 years airlines have worked to harmonize their fleets, reduce the different number of equipment types and flatten their service offerings to the lowest common denominator.  Particularly the legacy airlines.  But for the past 10 years, we’ve seen new airlines offering more segmented choices on each flight and those airlines are the ones who continue to earn a profit, experience growth and satisfy shareholders.

 

There have been some half hearted experiments with increased choice and segmentation.  Delta had Song airlines offering more entertainment and a brighter, cheerier environment.  United had Ted airlines which was economy oriented.   But I suspect that it wasn’t necessary to change the brand so much as it indicated a need to offer more choice on the aircraft.

 

I think in the future we’re going to see more choices in seating on airlines.   The low cost only passenger wants price above anything else.  The business traveler needs an economy choice (to satisfy their company’s desire to economize) that offers a little more room.  I think we’ll see different seat pitches offered and different service choices (a la Frontier) offered as well.  This is an area where Frontier has pioneered change and seen positive results.  Same for jetBlue.  Those airlines continue to earn an operating profit and grow.

 

Legacy airlines are going to have to be more flexible in fleet, fleet configuration and they’ll even have to consider offering things like meals and entertainment.  There already is a move to do this among certain airlines.  Continental is adding LiveTV to their fleet.  Delta/Northwest has recognized that having a varied fleet allows them to “tune” their service to the demands and continue to earn a profit. 

 

When an airline can adjust capacity on a route by season, month or time of day, it can continue to make money.  When it has just two choices of aircraft to use on a route and both have more capacity than needed, they start to lose money.  (Hello AA.)

 

I think that one day one legacy airline will have the guts to start advertising in markets that speaks to “real world” experience on their line versus the airline that “owns” the city.   For instance, I think Continental could come into the Dallas market and already argue that yes, you have to connect in Houston to go to NYC but if you do, more often than not you’ll get there in the same time with better service than flying American Airlines who has an untrustworthy on-time record and who treats their passengers to old aircraft and little or no service.   Someone will have the guts to start trying to change the perceived value of travel.

 

The truth is that there is a great difference between legacy airlines on any two city pairs.  The key is to identify that difference and communicate it to the traveler.  Right now, that really doesn’t happen.   An airline such as Continental shouldn’t attempt to compete with AA on price alone.  They should offer the real differences such as a meal on flights of 3 hours or more, LiveTV, equipment that is as much as 10 years newer or more than AA and a staff that enjoys doing its job.    They should offer incentives for changing airlines and trying them once such as a guaranteed business class seat for the price of AA’s economy seat. 

 

It will happen in some form.  It has to.  The newer airlines such as Frontier, Airtran, jetBlue and Virgin America have all proved that offering more choice on the aircraft works.  Even Southwest has recognized that it has to offer more choice in order to retain their very valuable business traveler.   What’s more important is that even some passengers who buy on price alone have realized that the incremental extra cost of one or two of those “extras” is worth it once again.

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The Dallas Morning News Aviation Blog is has a story about Continental reporting exceptionall dramatic declines in unit revenues over the past month.  This is, I believe, the third time Continental has reported rapidly declining unit revenues in the past few months. 

 

At first, one might question what is going on in the industry that shows one legacy airline reporting such poor numbers and there seems to be no similar dire reports from other legacy airlines.  Indeed, most others are meeting expectations (remember that expectations as domestic industry aren’t that high to begin with right now) and yet Continental seems to be struggling.  

 

After thinking about this for a couple of days, I think I might have realized what is going on here.  First, every airline earns its money from different hubs.  There are very few overlapping airline hubs in the US.  Continental has hubs in Houston, Newark and Cleveland, for instance.  American has their major hubs in Dallas and Chicago.   Delta has major domestic hubs in Atlanta and Salt Lake City.  What this means is that each airline derives a good portion of its revenue in markets where they are dominant and if those markets are doing poorly, they will too.

 

Now, Continental has Newark and Houston to contend with and both of those areas are large banking and financial centers.  Both are suffering a little bit worse than many in this economy and I suspect that business travel has been reduced dramatically in those areas.  Business class travelers are downgrading to economy and economy fliers just aren’t getting their trips approved at all. 

 

So far, Chicago and Dallas have weathered this storm a little better than expected and I think both American Airlines and United Airlines are managing to maneuver just enough to continue to meet financial expectations.  Atlanta is also doing just a little bit better as is Minnesota which means Delta continues to have maneuvering room.  Delta is exposed in Detroit, however.  Their subisidiary, Northwest Airlines dominates all of Michigan and industries in that area are being heavily impacted by the economy. 

 

Continental has made its success story from providing excellent service to business travelers.  It was (and will be again one day) a successful strategy due to focusing on attracting full fare or near full fare passengers and they focused a lot less on chasing the lowest fare passengers.  With economizing being the watchword at every company, I suspect many of the usual passengers are either deferring travel or quite possibly moving it to LCC competitors of Continental. 

 

The key to Continental’s (and other airline suffering this kind of revenue problem) surviving is being able to weather the crisis while maintaining their superior service.  That becomes doubly difficult with no end in sight for this economic crisis.  However, their management team is extremely capable and very tuned in to the needs of an airline.  If there is a team that can manage this event, it is Continental’s. 

 

I continue to watch for signs that United is weakening more financially and, so far, there are very few public hints.  This strikes me as odd since United is a bit more exposed than most.  They have a generally less fuel efficient fleet, they are subject to more direct competition from both legacy carriers and LCC carriers at more of their hubs and they have what may well be the most acrimonious relationship with their labor of all the legacy carriers.   It makes me wonder what, if anything, they might be successfully concealing in their financial health. 

 

American Airlines is reporting numbers that suggest that they are struggling to maintain their cash reserves at this point.  They are, however, taking steps to reduce their costs by cutting their fleet numbers and renewing more of their fleet than originally planned.  However, they too, have bad relationships with their labor organizations.  In fact, every major union at AA is now actively lobbying for the opportunity to move closer to a strike.  There is not one word of any agreement on any contract issue and AA’s strategy appears to be delay, delay, delay.  At some point, you really do have to come to agreement with your unions and get on with other important management issues of the day.

 

I think Continental will recapture its regular business traveler as things improve.  They do too good a job of taking care of their customers at a competitive price.  Other airlines, however, may discover that their customers have found better options.  After all, if you are going to be abused, why not be abused for the lowest price possible?

 

Filed under: Airline News, Airline Service by ajax
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A fair fare would probably be identified by most people as an air fare that accounts for the true costs of flying from point A to point B non-stop using the right aircraft to supply the capacity.  As a matter of fact, that was what the Civil Aeronautics Board tried to adjudicate when setting fares. 

 

Now, such a model might sound familiar.  It sounds like what LCC carriers such as Southwest Airlines and Airtran do.  In many sense, yes it is.   Legacy carriers, focused on hubs, hurt themselves with those hubs every time they carry a connecting passenger.   The hub and spoke system demands that they carry more passengers a farther distance using more resources and economies of scale no longer allow them to make a profit doing so. 

 

Let’s use as an example travel from Midland / Odessa to Albuquerque.   You have 3 basic choices for travel in this scenario.  You can fly Southwest Airlines non-stop for about $260 round trip or you can choose another carrier for a non-direct, connecting route that starts at about $550 round trip.   Another carrier might be American Airlines, Continental Airlines or Delta Airlines. 

 

If you choose American Airlines, you’ll fly EAST to DFW and then WEST again to ABQ and it will take  . . . wait for it . . . from 4.5 to 6.5 hours to complete your travel.  Since you are connecting via DFW, you’ll be making two take-offs and two landings and one of those landings (remember, part of an airline’s cost is a landing fee) will be at a major hub airport.  Take offs are expensive too.  They are the part of the flight that consumes the most fuel so two take-offs is bad.

 

If you fly Continental Airlines, you’ll connect through IAH (Houston) and the economics are the same but the distance flown is even greater.   If you fly Delta, you’ll first fly to Houston and then to Dallas and then to ABQ and your price will be in excess of $1000 round trip.  By the way, your total travel time using Delta will be over 10 hours.

 

Now, if American Airlines or Continental Airlines (let’s just leave Delta out of this because such a scenario is absurd) want to compete for the passengers traveling from Odessa to Albuquerque, they have to offer a fare that is somewhat competitive.  If they do, they’ll come at least close to matching Southwest’s fare of about $300 and that means that their costs are higher and they make less profit or no profit.   Since Southwest has the lowest costs, they get to set the price. 

 

Now, some people such as Robert Crandall advocate re-regulation of fares in some form.  In a speech to the Wings Club in June 2008, Mr. Crandall offered that this might take the form of mandating a “minimum fare” that is the sum of “locals”.   What he suggests is that a fare between two cities that connects via a hub should be the sum of the fare(s) between Point A to Point B (a hub) and Point B (a hub still) to Point C (the final destination.  In the alternative, he suggests that flights that connect via a hub be required to have a “connection” charge.  His goal is to remove any incentives airlines might have at present for operating a hub.  It becomes officially un-economic to fly that route via a hub.

 

Quite honestly, I find that a poor solution since he proposes to disrupt the systems of the very airlines that his solution purports to help in the long term.  It disrupts a 30 year institution among legacy carriers and assumes the staff and leadership who have operated in such a manner to be able to adjust to a new model that they have no experience with.  It is, at best, a very awkward solution to the problem and only addresses revenues (once again) instead of the whole equation.  Even more important, it is hard to imagine the political will required for such a change.

 

No doubt the adjustments have to be made and I would suggest that might need to take the form of actually allowing a large legacy carrier to go out of business (which then removes some barriers to entry for other, more efficient carriers) or you have to find a way to reasonably deregulate costs so that airlines no longer must use hubs to fight for their very existence.  Those costs are principally labor.  The latter solution is better (both in the short and long terms) because it doesn’t necessarily involve massive unemployment or relocation for employees. 

 

An airline needs to be able to efficiently locate staff at various “base” cities in a way in which costs are not concentrated in one particular city because it is merely a popular place to live.  You don’t want all of your high cost employees (i.e. the senior staff) to locate themselves in Miami where much of your traffic might be low yield leisure travel.   Second, an airline needs to be able to competitively bid for staff on an open market.   A seniority system as used by airline unions ties staff to one airline and forces the airline to “wait out” their term of employment (as much as 40 years) until they can hire new, lower cost staff to fill a particular position.  Further, it denies them access to qualified personnel for expansion because staff won’t leave another airline for a new job because they don’t want to start out at the bottom of the seniority list.

 

If we deregulated (by legislation) the seniority system in airlines as a first start, airlines could suddenly re-allocate labor and gain more productivity and reduce their costs on routes where necessary.   For a first round, you could even leave in a seniority system for earning pay and determining furloughs but just remove the seniority system as it pertains to bidding for line routes and it would allow the airline to locate their labor (by cost) where they most needed it and gain more productivity.  That change alone might well serve to offer legacy carriers a legitimate opportunity to earn a profit regularly (with all other things being operated effectively).  It would at least be a good first step in trying to solve the problem.

Filed under: Deregulation, Trivia by ajax
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The Dallas Morning News Airline Biz Blog has This Story today.  I’m certain there are a number of reasons why airline traffic will be down for labor day but I’m equally certain that airlines are starting to feel the effects of far higher prices when it comes to travel demands. 

 

If this is true, LCC carriers such as Southwest and Airtran are probably grearing up to add even more capacity in existing and new markets.  These carriers can offer low prices on a sustained basis in addition to a basic service level that doesn’t quite show contempt for the consumer.  Legacy airlines such as American Airlines, United and DeltaNorthwest has cut service, introduced a number of new fees and raised fares considerably so far this year.  There isn’t nearly as compelling a case for travel on a legacy carrier as there once was. 

 

In fact, I’m  not sure what the argument is for traveling on a legacy carrier unless you seek a business class accomodation (available on Airtran, however) or a highly convenient direct flight.  Even the basic frequent flier no longer enjoys many of the privileges accorded to him or her in the past.  Fees for redeeming frequent flier miles are now designed to “buy” the ticket and the seats available for frequent flier redeemers is more reduced than ever before. 

 

At this point, a traveler has about the same or better experience on one of the low cost carriers, sometimes enjoys *better* amenities (Hello Jet Blue, Airtran and Frontier) on newer airplanes all for a fare that is, at the least, competitive with any legacy carrier. 

 

Many airlines have already begun their capacity reductions and they probably total about 5% in their markets.  So, we have a 5% reduction in travel demand matching a 5% reduction capacity which means there is about the same amount of people (per seat) chasing a low fare as before.   That means that air fares won’t go up anymore and some airlines will likely begin to look at attracting customers by reducing or eliminating these new fees going into the fall/winter season.  My prediction is that one or more legacy carriers will eliminate or reduce the first checked bag fee for travel sometime in November and December.

 

 

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I got asked today what airline(s) I thought might be in real trouble.  Thinking about it for a few hours, I’ve come up with a sort of “death watch” list.

 

First on my list is Midwest.  They just announced they’re grounding their MD-80 aircraft and, as a result, cutting several important routes while expanding their codeshare with Northwest Airlines (who now owns a “passive” 47% stake in Midwest.)

 

Giving up routes such as Milwaukee – Los Angeles does not bode well.  With only Boeing 717 aircraft, they have limited themselves to routes that are “heartland” oriented.  For instance, the 717 can’t make it from MKE to LAX.  It can fly from Kansas City to Los Angeles (that route stays for now) but who wants to fly from MKE to LAX via MCI (MCI stands for Mid Continent International by the way)?  The airline business is, first and foremost, a network game and Midwest just cut 40% of its network putting itself below the critical mass in my opinion.

 

The proposed merger with Airtran would have saved them but they made a deal with the devil (Northwest) and Northwest has no interest in Midwest surviving really. 

 

Next up is Frontier.  Their hub is Denver and they have already cut back their focus cities.  While their fleet is new and fuel efficient, part of their business model counted on being the only LCC (Low Cost Carrier) game in town.  Not so true anymore. 

 

They have United Airlines above them as a legacy carrier operating a substantial hub in Denver and offering a nicely segmented set of seat choices and a global frequent flier program.  Below them is Southwest Airlines.  Southwest has entered that market with a vengeance and contrary to denials on te part of Southwest, it is crystal clear they intend to put Frontier out of business.  Much of Southwest’s growth has been focused on Denver and their CEO has already stated their intention to put more capacity into that city.  Denver can support two airlines, not one.  Since Frontier is already in bankruptcy, they’re my pick for going away. 

 

The only saviour is an airline that fits into their network and I can’t identify one that really meshes well with both their route network and their fleet. 

 

My third pick is Virgin America.  This is an airline that doesn’t quite know what it wants to be.  On the one hand, they want to be a trans-continental, high value, high service airline.  On the other hand, they want to be perceived as the west coast version of Jet Blue.   Trans-continental flights can’t make money using the equipment they have (Airbus A319/320) and their base, SFO (San Francisco) can’t support a real hub operation with good traffic given the competition they have from both legacy carriers and established LCC’s.

 

 

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