Southwest Airlines announces new daily service to London.

April 1, 2009 on 9:01 am | In Airline Fleets, Airline News, Airline Service | 1 Comment

UPDATE:  This was an April Fool’s Day Joke.

 

Southwest Airlines has announced the creation of a new subsidiary airline tentatively named Atlantic Express which will serve routes between New York City and London.  The new subsidiary airline will be staffed by current Southwest Airlines crews and has placed an order with Boeing for new 747-8 Intercontinental aircraft. 

 

Southwest Airlines CEO and President Gary Kelly is quoted at the 9am news conference saying “We looked at every kind of aircraft we could use for this route but the only one that made sense is the 747-8i.  As most people know, we prefer new aircraft and our business model depends on both passenger volume and frequency.  We went to Boeing and negotiated for the best deal possible on 10 new Boeing 747-8i aircraft to serve this route.”

 

There has been frequent speculation on what cities Southwest would use to serve New York City’s La Guardia airport (Southwest obtained 7 slot pairs to operate at the airport just a few months ago) and it would appear the question is answered now.  Southwest will serve La Guardia once a day with flights from Chicago-Midway and Houston-Intercontinental feeding connecting traffic to 5 daily round trip flights to London-Heathrow airport. 

 

Southwest’s / Atlantic Express’ new New York City schedule and aircraft can be viewed HERE.

AA says Buh-Bye . . . for now

March 12, 2009 on 1:33 pm | In Airline News, Airports | No Comments

The Dallas Morning News is reporting that American Airlines has decided to close its operations at Dallas’ Love Field airport . . . again.   American has tried a number of different strategies at the airport including the most recent exercise of flying EMB-145 jets from DAL to ORD (Chicago).   By all reports, this latest strategy actually was successful but in a case of winning the battle and losing the war, those flights will now go away.

 

Why did they go away if successful?  Because they were only successful in a very small way.  AA never had much luck in operating any other flights from Dallas to other destinations including Austin, Kansas City or St. Louis.  They needed more than 6 successful round trip flights a day to make operating at Love Field a worthwhile enterprise.

 

Notably, AA has apparently signed a new long term lease that keeps keeps their 2 gates at Love Field in their hands.  Why sign a long term lease and then leave?  Because the brokered dissolution of the Wright Amendment gives 16 gates to Southwest and 2 each to American Airlines and Continental.  If AA were to give up those 2 gates, they would likely be snatched up by another low fare carrier to be used to further infiltrate AA’s routes.  My guess is that it is a blocking exercise.  Besides, they are valuable property and may offer AA the opportunity to sub-lease them to other airlines if they don’t use them.

 

Why didn’t AA stick with the Chicago flights?  Because while those flights were successful, they could only be flown with aircraft that have 56 seats or less (for now.)  That means that the only growth available was more frequency.  Airlines such as AA really can make much more profit by flying more capacity on such a route.  In other words, they could do much better if they were able to use MD-82 or Boeing 737-800 aircraft on the route.  They won’t be able to until 2014.

 

I would, however, speculate that AA could have made more money on this route using reconfigured CRJ-700 aircraft from American Eagle.  These aircraft could have been reconfigured with a business class and economy section down to 56 seats and probably flown much more profitably.  However, these aircraft probably don’t lend themselves to being reconfigured in such a way.  How do you efficiently place business class seating in an aircraft that is already limited to 2+2 seating in economy?

 

American is doing what is good for American.  However, what would be better for Dallas is another airline taking over and using those gates for a good purpose.  Yes, even Southwest Airlines could use a little competition these days.  Imagine jetBlue offering Austin / Dallas flights that connect back to the East coast through Austin.  Or how about Airtran connecting through Little Rock or Houston?

 

In the end, Love Field will not see much if any real competition develop.  Not while 3 very successful and very large airlines control all the gates there.

Southwest Airlines Starts MSP Service

March 8, 2009 on 11:39 am | In Airline News, Airline Service | No Comments

Southwest Airlines started service between Minneapolis / St. Paul and Chicago today according to the Minneapolis / St. Paul StarTribune.  The newspaper reports that Southwest managed to kick off the new service with their trademark attention to customers.  Passenger Service Agents even managed to get their first customers to sing a song before boarding.

 

This marks Southwest’s first of several new routes for this year into new markets.  New York City (La Guardia) and Boston Logan are the next to receive Southwest routes. 

 

For now, Southwest will be linking MSP to Chicago only but I do foresee them adding routes to other Southwest focus cities such as Denver, St. Louis, Indianapolis or Detroit.  Typically, Northwest Airlines fights back against intruders on their mainstay routes but with the takeover by Delta, one wonders if their is enough attention being paid to the new competition versus integrating the operations.  Other airlines have entered the Chicago / MSP route and left it months later badly bruised from fare wars instituted by the dominant three legacy carriers at the two airports, Northwest Airlines, United and American Airlines.

 

MSP, LGA, BOS and what’s next?

February 21, 2009 on 12:41 pm | In Airline News, Airports | No Comments

First, let me apologize for the dead silence on the blog.  I’ve been very ill and way overtaxed at my day job for the past week.  I feel better and my work load is manageable again.

 

Southwest Airlines has announced in fairly quick succession service into 3 airports that, traditionally, Southwest has not wanted to fly to.  Minneapolis / St. Paul, New York La Guardia and now Boston’s Logan airport.  Southwest purists are no doubt predicting Southwest’s demise and Southwest fans are no doubt cheering Southwest’s cheekiness. 

 

The fact of the matter is that Southwest is evolving again.  Like every other successful airline, Southwest has evolved at important moments in the airline business.  Oddly enough, Southwest really started out as more of a businessman’s airline than anything else in the early 1970’s.  It served the Texas businessman with routes to Texas’ major cities with high frequency and low fares.  By basing themselves at inner city airports (in Houston and Dallas anyway), they made themselves more convenient for those travelers.

 

Then they evolved to a regional airline serving more than just businessmen but also increasing their market share by becoming attractive to the people who wouldn’t have flown but for Southwest’s low fares.  They became the Low Fare airline through the 1980’s. 

 

Then in the 1990’s, they began to evolve again.  This time they became the continental airline.  A low fare but not Low Fare airline that instituted service to major and minor cities throughout the US that were underserved with low fares.  This saw growth on both coasts of the United States and mid-west.

 

Well, the airline industry, for Southwest anyway, has changed again and instead of ignoring those changes, Southwest has clearly decided to evolve once more.  Mind you, I don’t know if this next evolution will be successful.  Only time will tell.  But it shows that Southwest is indeed paying attention to its business.

 

This next evolution is really about the business traveler.  It doesn’t mean Southwest is giving up on being a low fare airline.  It means that Southwest recognizes that in order to grow its business, it is time to serve new(er) demographics such as the business traveler (again) and the markets those travelers want to fly to.

 

This was first evidence by Southwest remarketing its same day fares as a kind of Business Class fare.  Smart because that really is what they are.  Then they began to rework their gates at various airports to better serve that business traveler by offering outlets to plug laptops and cell phones into, offering better and more comfortable seating and some variation on priority boarding. 

 

Now I think Southwest is identifying important markets that their loyal business travelers need to access.  Their Mid-Atlantic customers need to get to places like New York City and Boston.  Their Mid-Western customers need to get to places such as Minneapolis / St. Paul and Denver.   So Southwest has began working to serve those markets.

 

There is one glaring omission so far and that is Atlanta.   Most pundits believe that Southwest will never enter the market fearing Delta and Airtran’s response.   While I agree that the reaction by those two airlines will be fierce, I also think it is inevitable that Southwest find a way to fly there some day soon.  Will it be a focus city?  No, probably not. 

 

It is the most important city in the Southeast that so far goes unserved by Southwest.  With a strong customer base in Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Lousiana, Texas, Arkansas, Virginia, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri, of course they need to find a way into Atlanta.

 

And they will.  It won’t be a big start.  Just as Boston, La Guardia and Minneapolis / St. Paul have all been announced as very small operations, so will Atlanta.  But Southwest will find a way to connect Atlanta to their focus city system in short order and begin serving those routes for their business customers. 

 

There are a few other cities I’m looking at for Southwest service in the next couple of years.  Charlotte, North Carolina would be a good destination and so would Colombia, Greenville and Charleston South Carolina.  Milwaukee, Wiscsonsin should become attractive too.  Why?  Because they have important routes to places like Minneapolis, Atlanta, Washington D.C. and into other parts of their network.

 

Southwest isn’t crazy.  They aren’t desperate and they aren’t misguided.  Gary Kelly, the new CEO isn’t behaving stupid or incautious.  Southwest is simply evolving again.  With each evolution, there comes risk but to Southwest’s credit, they have identified where they can grow effectively and they’ve even recognized the risks and challenges involved.  They feel prepared to take on those risks and challenges and I suspect they are ready.

 

 

 

Wednesday Round-Up

January 28, 2009 on 11:10 am | In Airline News | 1 Comment

There isn’t any industry shaking news right now.  4th quarter / annual financial results are coming out on a variety of airlines but the news is much what you would expect.  Lots of losses, lots of hope for 2009.  So, a few things of interest that are going on but aren’t worth a post of their own.

 

Airtran

 

Airtran, interestingly enough, posted its first annual loss since 1999.  What is remarkable to me is that in 10 horrific years in the airline industry, they made a profit until the end of 2008.  That is impressive to me given where they hub from (Atlanta) and who level of competition they experience on almost all of their routes.  You can read more HERE in a USA Today / Associated Press story.

 

United Airlines

 

United Airlines posted a rather stunning loss of $1.5 billion (with a “B”) for 2008.  Those losses are a result of both declining revenue *and* being on the wrong side of a lot of fuel hedges.  To a degree, this was already expected.  However, UAL’s unrestricted cash reserves have declined to $2 billion (with a “B”) and while that seems like a lot, it really isn’t.  Yes, the airline industry is in the dumps right now but at some point sooner than later, United needs to earn some money.  Their status quo attitude isn’t helping with that goal.

 

Virgin Atlantic

 

The Telegraph newspaper in the UK is carrying THIS rather creative complaint letter from a passenger written to Sir Richard Branson himself.  It’s funny and it points out some flaws that should be addressed.  If for no other reason than humour, it is worth the time to read it.

 

Southwest Airlines

 

Southwest Airlines has announced $49 one-way fares between Chicago and its new destination, Minneapolis / St. Paul.  Between Southwest, American Airlines, United Airlines and, most of all, Delta/Northwest Airlines, this is surely going to spark a capacity and fare war between these two cities.   There is no doubt in my mind that the legacy airlines will defend their flights on that route to the utmost.  Most particularly, Delta/Northwest will likely get downright ugly about it and while Southwest does understand the need to spend time growing a new market, they won’t necessarily try to win by wearing down Delta/Northwest with fare sale after fare sale.  If customers don’t embrace Southwest in a reasonable time, that route will get dumped.

 

 

The Glory Days and Service

January 12, 2009 on 10:00 am | In Airline Service, Deregulation | 1 Comment

The Cranky Flier made this post to his blog last week. In short, CF decried a woman’s New York Times Op-Ed on the demise of the glory days of travel which she apparently experienced as a flight attendant for TWA.   The Cranky Flier reckons that the changes that deregulation has brought on are what has made air travel affordable and to bring back the high service given in the 50’s, 60’s and early 70’s would deny that access to most of us.   Quite honestly, I do agree with him but I think a point was missed in Ann Hood’s Op Ed as well.

 

I’m pretty sure that Ms. Hood was decrying the loss of the great meals, comforting flight attendants and more correct behaviour but I think what prompted her Op Ed was actually a perceived lack of service on *any* level by airlines today.  I don’t think anyone realistically expects air travel to include 3 choices of meals, pillows and blankets and free cocktails anymore.  However, what causes people to continue to get upset is the generally poor nature of any service provided by most airlines.

 

I experienced that service as an airline brat from the late 1960’s to the early 1980’s and it really was pretty remarkable in many respects.  However, I don’t miss the Chateau Briand on Braniff flights between Dallas and Portland and I really don’t seem to miss the first class seat or the pillows or drinks.  OK, I do miss the seats but that is because I’m a 6’2″ man weighing 260lbs with long legs. 

 

What drives this perceived lack of service is airlines not keeping promises made when you buy a ticket.  Those promises are outlined by airline advertising which is quite good at showing a relaxing customer on an airplane enjoying a drink as he or she flies to their destination with the expectation that the airplane will be kept at comfortable temperature and will arrive on time.

 

Let’s look at what an airline passenger might enjoy from the time they decide to book a flight to the time they arrive back home from their trip.   First, they must book their flight online.  Most people not only don’t mind this, they prefer it these days.  However, none of us are amused when we attempt to book a flight online only to find the website overloaded from a fare sale or network disruption caused by weather.   If the customer tries to phone the airline to book they’ll be faced with long phone queues, surly reservations agents and the threat that their airline ticket is now going to cost them a bit more for booking via phone.

 

The customer is gratified at being able to check in early through the web but when they arrive at the airport they discover that checking in their suitcase requires them to stand in another long line in order that they might essentially check-in a second time so they can check a bag.  Even if they only have one bag, they’ll have to pay a fee to check it unless they are a road warrior with some sort of privileged status with the airlines’ frequent flier clubs.   Then they get to stand in yet another line while watching those same privileged fliers go through an express line with the TSA. 

 

Once at the gate, they’ll have to work to find an open seat to sit in while waiting for boarding call because aircraft are flying much more full these days and most gates at most airports aren’t designed to accommodate the loads that many airlines serve on their narrowbody aircraft.   At the boarding call, they get to watch those same privileged fliers board first onto the aircraft (even if they aren’t flying first class that day with their free upgrades they still get to board first) and then wait for their group to be called while some fellow passengers cheat and just board early anyway.  Since most customer service agents at the gate are unwilling to enforce the rules in many cases, these cheaters get away with that move.

 

If the passenger has a boarding call in the last 1 or 2 groups, they get to discover that all the other passengers have apparently carried their life’s possessions with them and occupied all the overhead luggage space.  If they say anything about the lack of space, some flight attendant will inform them that they might have to gate check their bag or put it under the seat in front of them.  Putting a bag under the seat in front of you hasn’t really been possible for adults since the early 80’s when airlines reduced seat pitch in coach from an accommodating 34 to 38 inches of space down to a tight 30 to 32 inches of space.   So, they put their coat in a crammed overhead bin and hand over their luggage to a surly flight attendant who is annoyed that they now have to catch the attention of ground personnel so the bag can be loaded in the luggage compartment.

 

Once seated, the passenger waits and waits for departure from the gate which is delayed a few minutes.  Finally after watching their watch for an additional 13 minutes, someone hurriedly closes the door and the pilots get a pushback.  Technically, the flight has left on time at this point.  Only the pushback results in them taxiiing slowly towards the runway where they run into a traffic jam of aircraft waiting to take off because most airports are woefully lacking in the infrastructure to accomodate the number of flights trying to depart at the same time. 

 

After another delay of 20 minutes, the aircraft takes off.  As it levels off, the surly flight attendants go to work immediately to serve their one beverage service during the 2 hour flight.  Now, the passenger knows that soft drinks (and virtually any other beverage) now costs money so they ask for water when it is their turn and find a surly flight attendant telling them that will be $3 for the half litre bottle of water they offer.   The passengers declines the water and tries to recline their seat only to discover that while the seat may recline, it reclines right into the knees of the passenger behind them who objects loudly. 

 

Upon arrival at their destination, the passenger collects their things and moves slowly towards the door.  In some cases, they now must wait on the airbridge for their gate checked luggage to be brought up to them and in other instances they must now trudge off to find the baggage carousel to collect their things.  Because these aircraft are flying so full, this amounts to another delay of 20 minutes or more. 

 

Once they have their baggage, they make their way to the curbside and take out their cell phone to call the person picking them up to tell them they are at the curbside now.  They have to do this because security no longer allows anyone inside the terminal and the airport management is now charging $7 to park in the parking structure for less than an hour to pick up their party.  

 

Go through that kind of experience each way and it is no wonder that passengers are decrying service from airlines left and right.  If you only experienced half of what I’ve described just now, you’ll loathe and hate the airline you just flew.  Not because you weren’t served a 3 course meal but because the airline who implicitly promised you a safe, relatively pleasant and on time experience didn’t even really pretend to try to deliver that promise. 

 

What people want is for an airline to be honest in what they’ll provide and to honestly deliver it with the possible exception of extraordinary circumstances.  Oh, there are a few airlines who do deliver on such things and they quite rightly also make a profit.  Southwest, jetBlue and Continental all come to mind as airlines that really do delivery almost every time.  However, for much of the US traveling public, those three airlines aren’t an option nearly as often as they would like. 

 

Indeed, the situation I just described is almost precisely what I experienced flying Airtran last year from Dallas to New York City.   It’s disappointing at the least and offensive in most respects.   Did I like the ticket price?  Sure.  But if you accurately described the more likely service scenario and then asked if I wanted to pay $50 more to just get where I wanted to go without that scene playing out, I’d happily dive into my wallet and hand over the cash.  

 

The problem isn’t that we’re addicted to the lowest fares possible.  We’re not.  We, the passengers, are too stupid to realize that the airlines aren’t really going to deliver on those implicit promises.  Like the co-dependent wife who keeps taking back her alcoholic husband, we keep going back to the airlines and expecting a different experience.  The truth is, if we would examine our last service experiences with various airlines and seek a different choice until we found an airline that treated us well, airlines would pay attention. 

 

Why?  Because it quite literally costs nothing extra to deliver what an airline generally promises today.  jetBlue, in particular, gets that concept and that is the biggest reason why they have succeeded flying from JFK airport in spite of all the known obstacles to flying from that airport.  So does Continental as they have huge hubs at weather delayed airports too but they understand that giving the customer the implicitly promised service leads to greater success on their part.  Southwest promises less service than either of those two airlines but has some of the highest customer satisfaction of any airline because they DO DELIVER ON WHAT THEY DO PROMISE. 

 

It isn’t the glory days of service that we miss.  It’s the constant disappointment we experience on airlines today that causes us to lament a lack of service.  It simply doesn’t exist for most passengers.  We are treated better, on average, at an inexpensive restaurant where we spend about $9 for for a meal than we are on an airline where we spend $200 or more for a flight.  Most airlines’ attitude is to chastise the passenger for complaining.  That’s the motivator for the glory days.   In the glory days, airlines didn’t act like you should be grateful just to have a seat on their aircraft.  They acted grateful that you chose them to make you trip on.

2009 And The Future: Part III

January 4, 2009 on 10:00 am | In Airline Fleets, Airline Service, Death Watch | No Comments

And now we come full circle back to the United States and Europe.  Both have highly developed, highly competitive airline markets.  Each has both LCC type carriers and legacy carriers (and Europe’s legacy carriers are the former national flag carriers in many respects.) 

 

This won’t be a rebuilding year.  To the contrary, both markets really need one large airline to be removed from the market.  In the case of the United States, I firmly think that should be United Airlines but in Europe that is a harder guess.  If I had to pick an large airline in Europe for the surprise of the year, it would be Lufthansa.  They are, by all accounts, a great airline but I smell trouble in that group.  First, they have been buying into airlines that have been unable to survive on their own.  That lack of survival, in many cases, isn’t because of poor management but just a lack of market share being available to them. 

 

Lufthansa has bought SWISS, for instance.  I’m not sure why and I’m not sure if they can tell us why.  They could have just as easily taken SWISS’ business  and left them in a heap.  Further, Lufthansa has a lot of Airbus A340 aircraft.  Those airplanes just don’t compete on high capacity, long haul routes anymore.  What’s more, they also have orders in for the Boeing 747-8, another large capacity, four engine aircraft.  Their competitors, Air France/KLM and British Airways, have seen the light in buying more and more Boeing 777 aircraft for their long haul, high capacity routes.  It costs less to operate them and they make more money as a consequence.  So, going out on a limb here, I say we’ll discover that Lufthansa is nearly insolvent some time by the end of 2009. 

 

Both markets in Europe and the US will continue to face challenges in costs (fuel and more particularly labor) and LCC competition will continue to press air fares downwards.  The real solution for large legacy carriers won’t be found this year.  Expect more losses (with some exceptions such as SWA and jetBlue) and more merger talk in general.

 

Here are a few more random predictions:

 

  • United Airlines will ask Glenn Tilton to resign and hire an experienced airline executive.  One possibility will be Doug Steenland, most recently Northwest Airlines CEO and now Vice-Chairman of Delta.
  • Southwest Airlines will, for the first time, examine adding another aircraft type to their fleet.  My guess is it will be the Embraer 170/190 series.
  • Airbus will land a major order for aircraft from a traditional Boeing customer in the United States.  My bet is that Delta orders more Airbus A330 aircraft.
  • China and Japan will drop their regional jet programs or, at the least, defer them for up to 5 years.
  • Bombardier will announce a major order (more than 20 aircraft) for the Q400 Turbo-Prop from a US Airline.
  • If fuel prices remain steady, Airtran will seek to form a small mid-western hub.
  • Last but not least, one LCC type carrier such as jetBlue or Virgin America will attempt to fly to DFW Airport (wishful thinking on my part.)

 

 

Happy New Year Everyone.

 

 

2009 And The Future

January 2, 2009 on 11:57 am | In Airline Fleets, Airline Service, Airports, Death Watch | 2 Comments

It’s always fun to make predictions about the coming year, right?  Of course, I may well review my predictions in December of 2009 and decide against doing it again.

 

Boeing 787:

 

This aircraft will finally experience its first flight and I believe it will occur on or about its new scheduled time (early April).  For Boeing, credibility is now at stake and they really do have to begin meeting deadlines.  Financial analysts are becoming too skeptical of the company for comfort and airlines want their airliners.  Boeing does have a reputation for being able to pull itself together and get something done in a crisis and that should serve them here. 

 

I also believe we’ll see both static airframes begin their tests and new build airframes begin to flow from Boeing in about 6 months.  My prediction?  The 787 will prove to be a very capable aircraft and will meet or exceed its performance promises.

 

Airbus A380:

 

Airbus met its revised schedule of delivering 12 A380 airliners in 2008 . . . barely.  Originally it was scheduled to deliver 13 in 2008 and 25 in 2009.  Now Airbus says it will deliver 21 in 2009.  However, it is becoming clear that Airbus is now quickly learning how to build these aircraft and turn them out.  I predict they’ll exceed their 21 goal in 2009 by at least one aircraft.

 

Boeing and Airbus:

 

Both aircraft makers will begin to speak about the future of short to medium haul aircraft again.  With milestones for the 787 and A380 being met, I suspect they’ll become more comfortable in speaking of the future of their aircraft lines.  Look for discussions on both the 737 and A320 aircraft families and what interim technologies might be employed to improve their performance.  I suspect we’ll hear about both weight saving materials being adopted as well as the potential of new incremental improvements on existing engines.  Particularly the CFM-56 engines used by both makers. 

 

US Airlines:

 

First, let’s take a look at my deathwatch candidates.  The sudden and precipitous drop of oil prices allowed each of them to take a breather.  Midwest Airlines, however, continues to speak little, fly only a little and its investors have got to be running out of patience.  I still believe that they’ll ultimately go away.  How they do it is the question.  Rather than bankruptcy, I believe it will either be a sale or as a subsidiary airline of Delta/Northwest with the latter being most unlikely.  Who will they be sold to?  Good question.   Perhaps Airtran will get what they wished for and develop indigestion.

 

Frontier continues to muddle along but faces rather intense labor strife still.  I think their situation improved not only because oil prices dropped but because United continues to offer some of the worst product in the industry and because Southwest slowed its growth and took a breather.  While I firmly believe United will do nothing to improve its product, I do think Southwest will return to its goal of killing Frontier as a Denver competitor some time in the late spring.   I suspect Frontier will emerge from bankruptcy this year but I also firmly expect them to be out of business or acquired by December of 2009.  Who buys them?  I’ll bet on Jet Blue.  The aircraft fleets are compatible and Jet Blue has to start building a hub somewhere else in order to continue to experience strong growth.  Frontier gives them that chance.  The long shot?  American Airlines.  Why?  Because Frontier is working with AMR’s Sabre Reservations system now. 

 

United Airlines, my favorite airline to hate.  The Cranky Flier loves to rag on Alitalia and I love to rag on United.  United has lost a tremendous amount of value over the last year and continues to have some of the highest hourly costs of any US airline.   They’ve done nothing to improve labor relations, their service product or their fleet efficiency.  Glenn Tilton is hated by airline pilots but I predict he is goint to be hated by investors before the end of summer.   What happens?  I’m really not sure.  The best thing that could happen is for them to liquidate.  However, I think some airline will see some value there and attempt to buy United and make use of its assets.  Who?  The logical choice is Continental but I believe they’ll hold on to their independent streak.  So my next guess is a US Air / United V 2.0 merger will come about.  Could it work?  I doubt it but Doug Parker (CEO of US Air) wants another merger and United offers hubs he doesn’t have and some aircraft fleet compatibility.   I’ll go “all in” and bet that we see a US Air / United Airlines merger announcement by December of 2009.

 

Moving on from the death watch, let’s look at other US Airlines for a few minutes.

 

American Airlines will maintain its status quo but will begin to feel pressure to conclude some union contract negotiations this year as financial analysts begin to view their lack of progress less and less favorably.  CEO Gerard Arpey will begin to feel the heat but barring a large mistake on his part, will retain his position as CEO.  One possibility, however, will be bringing on a potential successor as President of the airline.

 

Southwest Airlines will also mostly maintain its status quo but I will predict that by late summer its new CEO Gary Kelly will be under fire from both employees and investors for his shotgun approach to growth.  It is beginning to look like it is unplanned and what people most value in Southwest is its ability to form and execute a coherent plan.   There will be no mergers, no real growth and a sinking stock price by December but I think Mr. Kelly will hold onto his position until 2010 barring a major unforeseen development. 

 

Continental, the best kept secret.  Continental will maintain its status quo with, perhaps, very moderate growth in the international sector while it waits to see what happens domestically.  They’ll enter the Star Alliance (exiting from SkyTeam) but discover it offers little value to them as well.   I don’t think they’ll seek to merge with anyone in the next year but if they did, I’d pick them for going after someone like Alaska Airlines rather than United or US Air. 

 

Stay tuned for Part II.

 

 

Frontier Begins New Pricing Model

December 18, 2008 on 2:16 pm | In Airline News, Airline Seating, Airline Service | No Comments

The Today in the Sky Blog is reporting that Frontier has rolled out a new pricing model on their website today.   The airline is an all coach service but now they are differentiating that service with the designations “Economy” (primarily a Southwest Airlines emulation but you pay for your luggage), Classic ( a reserved seat and DirecTV and no luggage fees) and Classic Plus (Classic with a snack).  There are other benefits and restrictions with each class.

 

While I do believe that product differentiation is the way to go for airlines in the future, I’m not sure this is differentiated enough to offer a customer a choice.  Yes, service and amenities grow as you pay more and that’s good but look at the Today in the Sky’s story and examine the pricing.  I’m not sure you are getting enough differentiation for the price differences charged. 

 

A coach passenger is buying on price, primarily and to make the product differentiated enough to entice the passenger into a higher price requires something substantive.  Is it DirecTV and a snack?  I suspect not.  I suspect that DirecTV is worth about $10 to the passenger and a snack is worth maybe $8.00.   Free checked baggage?  Well, for Frontier that might be a mistake since Southwest, their major competitor, already offers free checked baggage.  They don’t offer more legroom but their other major competitor, United Airlines, does and for a price differentiation that really might be a better deal.

 

 

Southwest, La Guardia and Codesharing

November 19, 2008 on 11:02 am | In Airline News, Airline Service, Airports | No Comments

If Southwest gains those ATA slots and they do fly them all in and out of La Guardia, this does send an interesting message to those employees who are presently upset over the announcements of codeshares with both WestJet and Volaris.

 

You see, the big argument made for those codeshares was that it allowed Southwest to concentrate on its business model but enjoy the expanded business that those two airlines offered to Canada and Mexico.   It was an argument about focus and direction with the Southwest business model.  The employees, some of them at least and most important the pilots, have argued that with near zero growth planned for Southwest, these are routes (the international routes) that Southwest could fly with their own people and metal.

 

It’s an argument that I can see some truth in.   The flying remains a natural for Southwest.  After all, flying to either Canada or Mexico is not flying overseas.  Mostly it is flying to cities across a border in a manner that is quite consistent with the existing model.  While neither country would necessarily permit Southwest to build a network inside their country, there are plenty of provisions already in existence to fly to destinations in both countries. 

 

Southwest is perfectly capable of operating a website or websites that serve those countries as well.  Labor costs can’t be an issue because, frankly, they could literally outsource those functions to their two new codeshare partners.  WestJet knows how to turnaround a 737 and while Volaris owns A320 aircraft, they also know how to turnaround an airplane. 

 

Flying to either country does not require ETOPS aircraft and it doesn’t even necessarily mean overnighting aircraft and/or flight crew in either country.  Flights to either country can be “turns” that see no aircraft left overnight.   However, even if you did want to overnight staff in those countries, it isn’t logistically difficult.  Hotels are in abundance and all your staff need are passports.  Language really isn’t a problem either.  Oddly enough, Southwest flight crew speak English, a perfectly acceptable language for Canada, and I’ll bet that Southwest has plenty of crew capable of speaking Spanish already. 

 

Now La Guardia Airport does present some challenges that are contrary to the Southwest model.  It is a congested, expensive, weather affected airport with high labor costs and high costs to overnight aircraft.  I would wager that it is quite possibly MORE difficult to operate into and out of La Guardia than, say, Vancouver or Toronto or Monterrey or Gaudalajara.  

 

It also puts Southwest into one of the most competitive markets in the United States and while it does give them access to the business traveler, it does so in a major market where business travelers often expect and even demand creature comforts that Southwest doesn’t offer.   If you have the chance to fly 7 round trips to NYC, what cities do you connect NYC to?  This is mere speculation but I would guess that flights to Chicago’s Midway Airport are a given.  Possibly a flight to either Baltimore or Orlando or Houston or even Philadelphia.   I would actually bet heavily on Chicago, Baltimore, Orlando and Houston.  But even if it was Chicago only, you have, at best, 7 frequencies.  On that route, you would probably need a minimum of 7 frequencies. 

 

There is something that is unrevealed in this plan.  Certainly Southwest could boost frequencies by obtaining more slots in the future.  Maybe.  But that is historically difficult in a slot controlled airport and a market that rarely sees significant contraction in flight quantities.  It is even more difficult when you are entering a market that major legacy airlines will defend to the death.  No one has any incentive to cooperate with Southwest in making gate space or other facilities available. 

 

 

 

 

Southwest Goes To NYC

November 19, 2008 on 8:42 am | In Airline News | No Comments

And, no, I don’t mean Islip on Long Island.  Southwest plans to purchase the operating certificate of ATA Airlines, now in liquidation, and ATA’s 14 slots to operate at New York’s La Guardia Airport.  Even with Southwest’s reputation for surprising the industry, this is a pretty stunning surprise.

 

Operating into NYC’s La Guardia Airport is contrary to Southwest’s operating model in every sense.  The airport is congested, expensive to operate in and certainly does not offer an opportunity to perform the famous 30 Minute Turn.   The airport (like all airports in NYC) is subject to weather both in the winter and summer and that certainly doesn’t mean on time departures and arrivals.

 

I actually can’t help but wonder if this is part of a greater plan that may or may not involve a new or existing partner for Southwest Airlines.   Perhaps these NYC slots will be used for limited flights by Southwest to other focus cities as well as offering WestJet and Volaris a chance to connect with Southwest in a huge market. 

 

There has to be more to this idea than just Southwest wanting to operate directly into NYC.  Look for further developments in this area and don’t even be surprised if it involves a European partner airline as well.

 

Airtran Adds 1st Bag Checked Fee

November 12, 2008 on 11:39 am | In Airline News | No Comments

Airtran Airlines has announced that it will begin charging for the 1st bag checked on their flights starting December 5th (2008) and those purchasing tickets on or before November 11th will not have to pay those fees.  In light of the fact that Delta recently announced its intent to implement such a fee, this really comes as no surprise. 

 

Clearly a la carte fees are the new model for air travel and while many can no longer be argued against, this 1st bag checked fee continues to rankle many travelers.  It is akin to charging a cafeteria customer for his tray.  However, since most airlines have adopted this fee, it will be difficult to escape it as a traveler.   I even wonder if Southwest will backtrack on its “no fees” campaign in light of the industry direction.   It will become increasingly difficult for Southwest to remain competitive in many markets by forgoing this revenue opportunity that virtually ever other competitor has adopted. 

 

Canada, Southwest Airlines, Mexico

November 11, 2008 on 10:44 am | In Airline Fleets, Airline News, Airline Service | No Comments

Southwest Airlines has just announced a new codeshare with Mexican airline Volaris (partially owned by billionaire Carlos Slim.)  Like Southwest’s codeshare agreement with WestJet, this allows Southwest to gain access to international markets.  With these agreements with WestJet and Volaris, Southwest gets access to all of North America and gets to work with two airlines that have similar (not the same) operating environments. 

 

I’m quite certain that these new codeshare routes will, in fact, boost Southwest’s revenues (as well as the revenues of these other participants) and I’m sure both relationships will prove to be rewarding in many ways other than just money.  If one airline could operate throughout North America, it really would look very similar to this codeshare arrangement.  

 

These two new arrangements for Southwest found me pondering how it could be done better than just a simple codeshare.  One way to further integrate without attempting a merger (something all three airline’s governments are very unlikely to allow) would be operating an interchange. 

 

An interchange was a fairly common tool in previous decades within the United States.  The idea is that two (or more) airlines operate the same equipment on a route that is shared.  One of the most famous interchanges was when Braniff operated the Concorde from Dallas to Washington D.C. where an Air France or British Airways crew would take over and fly the aircraft across the Atlantic to either London or Paris.  At the time, each time the Concorde arrived in Washington, the aircraft would be “sold” to Braniff who would then hang new ownership papers in the cabin and change the registration temporarily for operation in the United States.  Obviously that kind of inconvenience would not be tolerated today between airlines but there really isn’t a reason for it either.

 

Wouldn’t it be interesting to see Southwest operate such an interchange with each of their partners.  A Southwest aircraft could be used to fly an international interchange between Canada, Mexico and the United States with only crews changing between focus cities for each airline.   For instance, imagine a B737 flown from Toronto to Chicago by a WestJet crew where a Southwest Airlines crew would take over and fly it from Chicago to Houston.  In Houston, a Volaris crew could take over and fly that same aircraft to Mexico City (Toluca) and then turn it around for a return trip.  

 

The advantage is that customers never have to leave the aircraft and it would therefore permit a more seemless network for transitioning from one country to another.  The only problem with that scenario is that Volaris has an Airbus A320/A319 fleet and while WestJet flies the 737, they are partial to the 737-800 type instead of the 737-700 aircraft preferred by Southwest.   Nonetheless, it does cause one to think about the possibilities that might exist between the three airlines. 

 

It also points to other opportunities for other airlines.  Codeshares are good and convenient for airlines but they still require a passenger to travel from one hub to another hub and when it comes to international connections, it does force the passenger to often de-plane, clear customs and transition to another part of an airport to continue on to a destination.  Sometimes that isn’t all that painful but more frequently it is a great inconvenience to the passenger and a barrier that many avoid.

 

With airline alliances relatively stable now, many could choose to adopt similar (if not the same) types of aircraft and offer trans-global interchanges for both companies and their passengers.  It also would allow them to further standardize their service and even possibly take advantage of fleet flexibility between partners.  For instance, what if QANTAS and American Airlines shared a portion of their 787 fleet and allowed it to “flex” between North America and Australia according to seasonal demands?

 

I suspect there are many more opportunities to be had from both codeshares and, possibly, a new version of interchanges between airlines. 

Stock Markets, Oil and Airlines

October 10, 2008 on 10:54 am | In Airline News | No Comments

The stock markets have slipped considerably again today (Friday October 10, 2008) and things continue to remain very volatile and probably will for another 10 days or so.  The consequence is that oil prices are plummeting.  Why?  Because a lot of speculative money was invested in oil as the value of the dollar dropped and inflation began to increase over the past 2 years.  Oil was an investment that preserved some value and for the past year has yielded some high profits for investors.

 

Now those same investors need their cash to cover other investments and they are selling their oil futures like crazy to recover their liquidity.   Today oil is selling at about $80 / barrel and that means much cheaper gasoline and jet fuel for the near future.    For airlines without fuel hedges or with few fuel hedges, that’s good news.

 

Oil could decline to as little as $60 / barrel but most likely will stabilize between $70 and $90 / barrel over the long term.  By the way, most airlines operating models are currently built to make a very decent profit with that oil price. 

 

For airlines who got a bit aggressive over the last year and bet on oil continuing its hurried rise towards $200 / barrel, that’s bad news.  You see, some airlines have already been reporting fuel hedge losses because of the slow decline in oil prices.   To better understand hedging and what has been going on, you can read THIS.

 

United Airlines appears to be particularly vulnerable to the fuel hedge losses.  It’s a good news / bad news thing for them.  For the near future, fuel should be cheaper and if revenue stays about the same, they should be fine.  They’ll be hit by fuel hedge losses but they’ll recover some of that loss in better profits from running an airline. 

 

If, on the other hand, revenue declines, then airlines like United (and there are others) will suffer from both fuel hedge losses as well as a decline in profits.    I suspect most airlines of any size will weather that problem because it is unlikely that they are hedged at high prices for very far in the future.  Maybe a year to a year and half. 

 

For those of you wishing evil on Southwest Airlines, don’t.  They’ll largely be unaffected one way or another.  They might experience some slight fuel hedge losses (unlikely) but more likely they simply will make less money from fuel hedges and more from profit.   Their revenue is far less dependent upon the high priced business class fares and that means their demand is more inelastic than most airlines.  They might see a slight decline in leisure travel but I suspect that that will hold more or less as people who want to travel transition from a legacy carrier to an LCC such as Southwest.

 

We live in interesting times.  At least gasoline will be cheap for a while.

Sun Country Files Bankruptcy

October 8, 2008 on 1:40 pm | In Airline News, Death Watch | No Comments

The Dallas Morning News Aviation Blog reported that Sun Country Airlines has filed chapter 11 bankruptcy citing recent financial trouble caused, in part, by its parent company, Petters Group Worldwide and the just resigned CEO of that firm (who is also being investigated for criminal fraud.)

 

 I wonder if anyone truly believes this company is going to survive in the present aviation climate as a leisure airline flying from a Minneapolis / St. Paul hub?   They would appear to be an unattractive acquisition for anyone who might have the financial muscle and now they get to face the start of competition with Southwest Airlines next March.    Obviously I would feel a great deal of sympathy for workers who are displaced by Sun Country folding but I also have to wonder if Chapter 11 is in the best interests of the shareholder(s) or the creditors.   It might be time for this one to throw in the towel.

 

 

Airline Economics and Deregulation Part 4

October 2, 2008 on 10:57 am | In Deregulation, Trivia | 2 Comments

A fair fare would probably be identified by most people as an air fare that accounts for the true costs of flying from point A to point B non-stop using the right aircraft to supply the capacity.  As a matter of fact, that was what the Civil Aeronautics Board tried to adjudicate when setting fares. 

 

Now, such a model might sound familiar.  It sounds like what LCC carriers such as Southwest Airlines and Airtran do.  In many sense, yes it is.   Legacy carriers, focused on hubs, hurt themselves with those hubs every time they carry a connecting passenger.   The hub and spoke system demands that they carry more passengers a farther distance using more resources and economies of scale no longer allow them to make a profit doing so. 

 

Let’s use as an example travel from Midland / Odessa to Albuquerque.   You have 3 basic choices for travel in this scenario.  You can fly Southwest Airlines non-stop for about $260 round trip or you can choose another carrier for a non-direct, connecting route that starts at about $550 round trip.   Another carrier might be American Airlines, Continental Airlines or Delta Airlines. 

 

If you choose American Airlines, you’ll fly EAST to DFW and then WEST again to ABQ and it will take  . . . wait for it . . . from 4.5 to 6.5 hours to complete your travel.  Since you are connecting via DFW, you’ll be making two take-offs and two landings and one of those landings (remember, part of an airline’s cost is a landing fee) will be at a major hub airport.  Take offs are expensive too.  They are the part of the flight that consumes the most fuel so two take-offs is bad.

 

If you fly Continental Airlines, you’ll connect through IAH (Houston) and the economics are the same but the distance flown is even greater.   If you fly Delta, you’ll first fly to Houston and then to Dallas and then to ABQ and your price will be in excess of $1000 round trip.  By the way, your total travel time using Delta will be over 10 hours.

 

Now, if American Airlines or Continental Airlines (let’s just leave Delta out of this because such a scenario is absurd) want to compete for the passengers traveling from Odessa to Albuquerque, they have to offer a fare that is somewhat competitive.  If they do, they’ll come at least close to matching Southwest’s fare of about $300 and that means that their costs are higher and they make less profit or no profit.   Since Southwest has the lowest costs, they get to set the price. 

 

Now, some people such as Robert Crandall advocate re-regulation of fares in some form.  In a speech to the Wings Club in June 2008, Mr. Crandall offered that this might take the form of mandating a “minimum fare” that is the sum of “locals”.   What he suggests is that a fare between two cities that connects via a hub should be the sum of the fare(s) between Point A to Point B (a hub) and Point B (a hub still) to Point C (the final destination.  In the alternative, he suggests that flights that connect via a hub be required to have a “connection” charge.  His goal is to remove any incentives airlines might have at present for operating a hub.  It becomes officially un-economic to fly that route via a hub.

 

Quite honestly, I find that a poor solution since he proposes to disrupt the systems of the very airlines that his solution purports to help in the long term.  It disrupts a 30 year institution among legacy carriers and assumes the staff and leadership who have operated in such a manner to be able to adjust to a new model that they have no experience with.  It is, at best, a very awkward solution to the problem and only addresses revenues (once again) instead of the whole equation.  Even more important, it is hard to imagine the political will required for such a change.

 

No doubt the adjustments have to be made and I would suggest that might need to take the form of actually allowing a large legacy carrier to go out of business (which then removes some barriers to entry for other, more efficient carriers) or you have to find a way to reasonably deregulate costs so that airlines no longer must use hubs to fight for their very existence.  Those costs are principally labor.  The latter solution is better (both in the short and long terms) because it doesn’t necessarily involve massive unemployment or relocation for employees. 

 

An airline needs to be able to efficiently locate staff at various “base” cities in a way in which costs are not concentrated in one particular city because it is merely a popular place to live.  You don’t want all of your high cost employees (i.e. the senior staff) to locate themselves in Miami where much of your traffic might be low yield leisure travel.   Second, an airline needs to be able to competitively bid for staff on an open market.   A seniority system as used by airline unions ties staff to one airline and forces the airline to “wait out” their term of employment (as much as 40 years) until they can hire new, lower cost staff to fill a particular position.  Further, it denies them access to qualified personnel for expansion because staff won’t leave another airline for a new job because they don’t want to start out at the bottom of the seniority list.

 

If we deregulated (by legislation) the seniority system in airlines as a first start, airlines could suddenly re-allocate labor and gain more productivity and reduce their costs on routes where necessary.   For a first round, you could even leave in a seniority system for earning pay and determining furloughs but just remove the seniority system as it pertains to bidding for line routes and it would allow the airline to locate their labor (by cost) where they most needed it and gain more productivity.  That change alone might well serve to offer legacy carriers a legitimate opportunity to earn a profit regularly (with all other things being operated effectively).  It would at least be a good first step in trying to solve the problem.

Southwest Airlines Enters MSP

October 1, 2008 on 4:45 pm | In Airline News, Airline Service | No Comments

The Dallas Morning News Aviation Blog is reporting that Southwest Airlines just announced that they will begin flights out of Minneapolis / St. Paul next March.  The first flight will be to Chicago Midway which is no surprise. 

 

For some time, pundits have claimed that Southwest couldn’t enter this fortress hub and now they are.   To me, this is exciting news because I think that Milwaukee might not be very far behind as a station.  There is a lot of originating traffic between Milwaukee, Minneapolis / St. Paul, Chicago, St. Louis, Denver, Detroit and Kansas City.  If you look at the type of flying one would do between those city pairs, it looks exactly like a Southwest Airlines strategy.   What’s more, Southwest is already very strong in all of those cities except MSP and MKE.  The cost to start those routes and market them are relatively low since the airline only has to introduce itself in two of those cities. 

 

I feel certain that Southwest will grow MSP and then turn its attention to Milwaukee either in late 2009 or early 2010.   Sooner if they can so that they can compete against Airtran there.   This is good news for Minneapolis / St. Paul and probably bad news for Sun Country Airlines, an airline that has been faltering in the MSP market for a few years now.   I would be tempted to mark Sun Country Airlines as a possible purchase by Southwest because their facilities  and base in MSP has some value for Southwest.  Even their fleet, Boeing 737-800s, comes close to matching Southwest’s (B737-300/500/700) but I suspect they know that all they have to do is wait and much of it will be theirs anyway.

Airline Economics and Deregulation Part 3

October 1, 2008 on 12:07 pm | In Deregulation, Trivia | No Comments

Almost all airlines in the United States operate from hubs.  Going from West to East, they are (in no specific order), Phoenix, Salt Lake City, Denver, Dallas / Fort Worth, Houston, Minneapolis / St. Paul, Chicago, Detroit, Cincinatti, Memphis, Atlanta, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and NYC.  There are a few other cities that some might argue are hubs but which I think are more “focus” cities than the above cities.

 

One way airlines have reorganized themselves to meet the cost pressures of non-deregulation on the costs side of the airline industry is to simply start “connection” and/or “feeder” airlines or to contract with those airlines.  Some examples are American Eagle, Mesa Airlines, Comair, Compass and Express Jet.  There are others too.  These airlines fly regional aircraft (regional jets and turbo-prop aircraft) on behalf of the mainline airlines.   Unions permitted these airlines by getting “scope” clauses in the contracts that limit the size of the aircraft to be operated. 

 

Often those scope clauses originally limited airlines to flying regional aircraft that had 50-odd seats or less.  What they didn’t do was limit the kind of flying such aircraft might be asked to do.   As things evolved post-1978 deregulation, airlines began to establish large hubs with multiple banks of flights each day.  They did so in order to “concentrate” their operations and take advantage of economies of scale.   Over time, mainline aircraft departing from a hub either went to other hubs or to larger 1st and 2nd tier cities.  Mainline aircraft stopped serving the smaller third tier cities (for example Des Moines or Jackson, MS.)  It never occured to unions to limit both scope and distance in those contracts because originally it was assumed that regional aircraft couldn’t serve route sectors of much more than 200 to 300 nm. 

 

Instead, mainline airlines used their feeder airlines to pick up traffic in those cities and carry it to a hub where the passenger then transferred to a mainline aircraft or another regional flight to get to their final destination.  For instance,  a passenger might fly American Eagle from Des Moines to Chicago, transfer to an American Airlines flight using mainline aircraft and continue on to a final destination such as Los Angeles.  

 

Prior to 1978 deregulation, American Airlines might have flown a route from Chicago to Los Angeles with intermediate stops in Des Moines and, say, Salt Lake City.  Remember this is a hypothetical example.  While hubs were beginning to develop or had developed, those entities really resembled what we call focus cities today.  It was a concentration of traffic and opportunity to rotate aircraft through maintenance facilities but it wasn’t a fortress hub that we see in places such as DFW or MSP today.

 

Over time, new aircraft such as regional jets that had greater capacity and speed than original “feeder” aircraft such as the EMB Brasilias or SAAB 340 aircraft were introduced.  These regional jets were capable of mainline aircraft speeds and altitudes and were capable of flying route segments in excess of 400 nautical miles.  Since the cost structure for such aircraft was an order of magnitude less than that for mainline service, airlines began to realize that they could use these aircraft to serve routes that contained a lot of O&D traffic for more point to point flying. 

 

Suddenly, American Eagle wasn’t just serving cities from DFW that were in Texas and surrounding states.  With regional jets, it began serving medium haul, thin traffic routes from DFW.  One example is the one I gave yesterday:  DFW to MKE.   That route has a lot of O&D traffic (Origin and Destination) but very little connecting traffic.  What that means is that people flying from MKE to DFW were terminating their trip at DFW instead of necessarily continuing on to another destination and vice versa.  If a MKE passenger wanted to get to Denver, they would fly either to Chicago or MSP to connect or possibly direct on a United Airlines “connection airline”. 

 

The feeder/connection airlines evolved into the “point to point” service provider for small to medium markets.  The reason is that airlines can only afford the flight crew labor costs for routes where the yield (profit from revenue) justified those costs.  The only way to find that yield is to concentrate flights through hubs.  One example, again, is DFW.  American Airlines “feeds” traffic from all over its network (including American Eagle’s network) into DFW where they “concentrate” that traffic and redistribute it to other routes.  This means that those routes load factors remain very high for each flight. 

 

On the surface, that sounds efficient.  However, there are some underlying factors that reveal it to be inefficient to operate such hubs.  First, it means that you have to schedule your traffic in banks of flights.  You want your flights to arrive at about the same time and then take off again at about the same time.  In order to manage that, your departure times at outlying stations may have to be excessively inconvenient to passengers.   Your airport service staff tends to work in concentrations with excessive idle time in between banks of flights.  You still have to pay them and they remain there because you service large banks of flights at one time.  An airline must have that staff in place over the full duty period to accomodate those peak periods.

 

Such hubs also tend demand fleets that are largely homogenized.  American Airlines, for instance, standardized on the MD-80 for these flights (and now is doing so on the B737-800) and therefore has to find routes that fit the aircraft instead of aircraft that fit the routes.  Because they must fill so many seats on mainline routes to make a profit, it drives them to feed more and more traffic into the hubs.

 

Hubs also can cause system wide service disruptions.  A bad weather day in Chicago can wreck two major legacy carriers systems (United and American Airlines) for multiple days because any disruption ripples outward through the whole system.  Since all flights go to or depart from the hub, there is no flexibility to “route around” the problem city.  

 

All of those issues inhibit a legacy carrier from earning long term profits and they haven’t earned reliably for over 20 years now. 

 

The best example of how best to operate in today’s airline market is, no surprise, Southwest Airlines.  While they do have several cities that look and feel like hubs, they really aren’t when compared to other airlines.  They are focus cities.  Those focus cities permit some concentration but they really exist to provide some operational flexibility and maintenance. 

 

Southwest Airlines focuses on flying point to point routes and high frequency commuter flights.  If you try to get from one city to another on Southwest’s system, you are very likely to fly there direct and in many cases non-stop.   The percentage of traffic on flights from focus cities that is “connecting” is relatively small compared to legacy airlines. 

 

When a flight from Southwest Airlines departs DAL (Dallas Love Field) for ABQ (Albuquerque), it isn’t coming back that day most likely.  Instead, it will continue on to, perhaps, Phoenix and then to Portland where it will turn and head to Los Angeles and then, maybe, to Denver.  The plane  goes through 3 focus cities but at all times it is carrying O&D traffic primarily. 

 

That point to point system with focus cities permits them to offer highly convenient flights that fly direct (in other words, a passenger doesn’t have to get off the plane and board another one) and they get a higher utilization rate out of both the aircraft and crew because they aren’t sitting at hub for 1 to 2 hours waiting for their flight to depart again.  Instead, Southwest crews do fast turnarounds at focus cities (20 to 40 minutes) and depart for still another city.  Southwest not only gets high utilization from their aircraft but they also get high utilization from their flight crews. 

 

Southwest Airlines’ crews are paid competively and even generously but the airline also gets far more productivity from them in a given duty period.   Ironically, Southwest crews also fly less fatiguing schedules overall and spend more nights at home than most other aircrews.   Southwest captains earn as much or more than any other Boeing 737 captain but because they negotiate not just raises but flexibility in their contracts, their standard of living is quite a bit higher than it would be at most legacy carriers.   They offer more productivity in return for working an easier duty period at a competitive salary. 

 

They also don’t fly small commuter aircraft and they don’t avoid flying to 3rd tier markets.  Southwest flies B737 equipment to cities such as Indianapolis, Odessa, Corpus Christi and Brimingham.  Every other airline serves those markets with primarily regional jets and Southwest manages to earn more profit flying to those same cities using mainline aircraft that is more than 100% larger.   Not because their crews are “cheaper” but because their crews (and their unions) bargain for more than just money.  It’s a competitive negotiation with real give and take and, as a result, Southwest gets high productivity without working their crews longer hours, bad morale or high turnover. 

 

Next we’ll look at why seemingly “fair” fares can’t earn real profits for most US carriers. 

Frontier Hits A Union Pocket

September 24, 2008 on 1:28 pm | In Airline News, Death Watch | 1 Comment

USA Today’s Today In The Sky is reporting that Frontier Airlines has gone to their bankruptcy judge and asked him to break the Teamster’s contract in order to allow some heavy maintenance to be done off shore (Central America most likely.)

 

 I’ll confess that I have so far been surprised at Frontier’s relatively smooth, up to this date, reorganization.  This latest development seems to indicate that all is not as it seems and they may only just now be working on the hard stuff.  The hard stuff is, quite honestly, renegotiating labor contracts and getting commitments from all the stakeholders to play nice in the emergence from bankruptcy. 

 

They remain on my death watch simply because they continue to be squeezed on both sides by Southwest Airlines and United Airlines in Denver.  In addition, they no longer have any fuel hedges (they had to be given up on going into bankruptcy) and while oil prices are lower than their peak just a couple of months ago, they remain volatile. 

 

Even with renegotiated labor contracts and concessions from lenders, they still have to compete with their system based in Denver and that’s a tough market.  Denver really isn’t large enough to support 3 major airlines battling it out in the long run.  A quick look at what happened in Hawaii between go! Airlines (A Mesa Airlines subsidiary), Hawaiian Airlines and Aloha Airlines (who went into liquidation) is all you need to read the tea leaves.  Whoever has staying power wins and, right now, that would be Southwest and United.

Fuel Hedges Hurt United Airlines

September 17, 2008 on 2:05 pm | In Airline News, Death Watch | 1 Comment

The Dallas Morning News Aviation Blog just had this post.  United Airlines has just made it known that they expect some rather heavy losses in their fuel hedging program.  Fuel hedge are common practice among airlines to make fuel prices predictable (rather than necessarily always cheaper) and therefore allow airlines to financially plan for their needs.   Southwest Airlines is arguably the most successful at this strategy.

 

A fuel hedge is a kind of bet.  An airline purchases contracts and options to buy fuel oil (not jet fuel but fuel oil which tracks in line with jet fuel prices) at a specified price.  If an airline thinks fuel prices will go up, they will buy options and contracts for these fuels for a current market price for delivery some time in the future.  If in fact the prices go up, they sell these contracts for a profit and use the money to offset their jet fuel costs.   If the prices go down and the airline bets that they’ll go up, they suffer additional losses and the cost of their fuel goes up against their plans.

 

Since hedging is a risky business, a wise airline only hedges a portion of their fuel costs per quarter so they are not completely exposed to the risk of having bet wrong.  In addition, they’ll bet conservatively on prices so that the risk they expose themselves to is minimized as much as possible.  To manage all of this properly requires an army of financial analysts and hedging experts. 

 

The problem with hedges is you can both make and lose a lot money with them.  When you make a lot of gains, it becomes intoxicating to any airline.   The temptation is to hedge more and more and bet on directions that seem pre-ordained.  Just 1.5 months ago, everyone was betting that oil might go as high as $200 / barrel.  Just this last Monday (September 15, 2008), oil was trading at $97 / barrel.   United bet wrong and now has to report that they have had both real and unrealized losses involved with the trading.  Unrealized losses require them to hold cash in reserve to meet those potential costs.   That is “restricted” cash.

 

Lately you hear airlines talk about how much unrestricted cash they have on hand.  Southwest Airlines, American Airlines and others will have quite literally billions of unrestricted cash.  That is the money for which there are no real or potential obligations attached.  Going into a period of economic uncertainty, having a large amount of unrestricted cash is good because you can suffer short term losses and still operate sensibly.  If you have too little, you’ll quickly be forced to constrain your operations which quite often leads to a cycle of contraction for an airline.  Because they don’t have the cash, they become smaller and because they’ve become smaller, they have even less cash.

 

American Airlines continues to survive these industry contractions because they have a huge amount of unrestricted cash held in reserve.  It gives them maneuvering room and they are probably the best in the business when it comes to managing their finances.  That is one reason why they did not have to go into bankruptcy in the post September 11 industry crisis.

 

To return to hedges.  A hedge becomes risky when you are buying contracts that approach the forecasted market price of the fuel.  Ideally, you want to have options and contracts that are substantially lower than your current year’s price of fuel.  That way, if fuel prices drop your contracts will still realize a gain.  If you buy too close to market prices, particularly in a volatile market such as what oil is experiencing, you run a very real and damaging risk of being obligated to buy those commodoties at prices that are higher than the current market rate.

 

Hedges have often been described as an insurance policy against high fuel prices.  They aren’t.  They are a way of smoothing the peaks and valleys of fuel prices.  If you smooth those peaks and valleys, you can more accurately plan your financial obligations and that potentially allows you to make more money available for purchasing goods and labor.

 

The losses reported by United Airlines are just one more reason why I watch them carefully.  You can’t suffer those kinds of losses very often and, once again, it appears that their business plan is not accomodating the current market conditions in the airline industry. 

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