Various media reports point to Boeing leaning heavily towards a “minimum” investment strategy in defining what the new Boeing 737 Re Engine would look like. 

That means an aircraft that receives enough modifications to handle the heavier CFM Leap56 engine with a reduced fan diameter which should make the 737 models roughly equivalent to the Airbus A320NEO with about 2% cost efficiency advantages over the A320NEO.

My problem with this is that it simply confirms the Airbus A320NEO as the right move and offers Boeing little advantage over the next 10 to 15 years and possibly puts it at a disadvantage over that time frame since there are fewer areas to incrementally improve performance of that airframe over time.   One example is that the 737 already has winglets (aka “sharklets” on the A320). 

In addition, this is the creeping incrementalism that we saw at McDonnell Douglas over nearly a 2 decade time period that led to their ultimate demise.  Aircraft manufacturers don’t win over the long term with derivatives and I’ll point out that there have been a total of 9 major derivatives of the 737 with several sub-derivatives of those as aircraft as well.  That’s an aircraft that has run its course without something game changing.

If it were to be a Re Engine strategy, it would have been far more encouraging to see Boeing design a new wing or a modification to the wing to bring additional gains.  It would have also been more encouraging to see a modification to the nose gear to permit a full on adoption of the CFM Leap56 and, possibly, even the addition of a 2nd engine choice (Pratt & Whitney GTF).   Yes, that begins to look like a new airliner but it puts Boeing firmly ahead in the narrow body game.

My own preference was to see Boeing make a move for an entirely new aircraft with introduction into service in 2018.  It would have been a difficult challenge but it is one that Boeing is in position to achieve.  It’s learning curve with new materials and design approaches has peaked. 

Offering that you couldn’t figure out how to immediately ramp up production to 40 to 60 aircraft a month is a somewhat lame excuse for backing away.  If you can build if efficiently at current production rates (in the mid 30’s per month), you can figure out how to build it at a 60+ aircraft rate when that time comes.

This, in some ways, smells like Boeing trying to maintain the older airliner to use as an replacement for aging military aircraft such as what they’ve done with the 737 in creating the Boeing P-8A Poseidon (replacement for the venerable P-3).   It’s notable that even that aircraft got a better wing in the form of having raked wingtips a la 767-400ER for longer duration, efficient flying.

My greater point is that you don’t win and you don’t grow as a company by playing “keep up” and playing it safe.  Airbus managed a coup by forcing Boeing’s hand and scaring them away from a new design.  Somehow, I severely doubt that a Boeing led by someone such as Alan Mulally would have adopted such a strategy.

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