Today I found this Time Magazine story.  From 1966, it describes Harding Lawrence’s 1st year of tenure as CEO of Braniff International.  Now, I know I have put quite a bit of Braniff into this blog so far but that should wind down soon.

 

Harding Lawrence is often reviled as a man who “wrecked” Braniff.  Fact says differently and this story gives a great hint or two as to his genius in operating an airline.  For one, Lawrence took his experiences operating jets at Continental and severely raised the utilization rate at Braniff.   Even in modern days that would be sharp.

 

He also introduced color and life into flying.  He brought a hint of romance and a dash of allure to flying that, until that time, had not been expressed his way. 

 

I’m in possession of annual financial reports on Braniff from 1968 to 1980. If profit is the best metric for measuring Braniff’s decisions and choices, let’s look at the facts. Since the 1968 report has a 5 year review in it going back to 1964. Harding Lawrence and his changes began in 1965.
 

Net income:
1965: $9.5 Million
1966: $17.8 Million
1967: $4.7 Million
1968: $10.4 Million
1969: $6.2 Million
1970: ($2.6 Million) Loss
1971: $0.46 Million
1972: $17.1 Million
1973: $23.1 Million
1974: $26.1 Million
1975: $16.0 Million
1976: $26.3 Million
1977: $36.4 Million
1978: $45.2 Million
1979: ($.04 Million) Loss
1980: ($.13 Million) Loss

 

I would point out that some of those numbers would be a credit to many airlines today.

 

Some other interesting facts are:
 

1) Going from #8 in ontime peformance in 1965 to #1 in 1969.
 

 

2) When Braniff (by Harding Lawrence’s decision) originally ordered the 747, they ordered 2. However, in light of the economic downturn as delivery neared, Braniff (Lawrence) took delivery of one (N601BN) and sold the second (originally N602BN and painted green). That one 747’s utilization was a highly profitable 15 hours per day.

3) Fleet composition in 1964 was 52 planes of which there were 6 different types and of which only 2 types were jets. In 1969, there were 72 airplanes of which there were 6 different types and all were jets. In 1975, There were 81 planes of which 69 were B727’s, 1 a 747 and 11 were DC-8’s.

4) The Braniff route system in 1965 was largely a north-south system with some extensions east-west. In 1975, the route system was balanced with routes traveling from east coast to west coast and from the south to the northeast, northern midwest and even the northwest.

 

5) In 1974 and 1975, Braniff experienced domestic traffic growth rates of 10.9% and 6.6% respectively compared to industry metrics of 2.4% and 1.5% percent. In those same years, Braniff’s fleet utilization rate exceeded the industry standard by a full hour / day.

 

6) Some examples of routes applied for and received by Braniff post 1978 deregulation: DFW–LAX, ATL–MIA, DFW–LAS, DFW–LGW.

 

7) 1979 Trans-Pac routes were instituted with some examples being Los Angeles to Guam and Seoul with follow on services to Hong Kong and Singapore.

 

8. 1979 Trans-Atlantic routes were instituted with some examples being DFW to London, Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt and Paris and similar Boston routes to Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfort and Paris.

 

Now, I realize that, unlike many opinions on Braniff decisions, I’m actually encumbered with facts. The facts I’ve given do not portray an orgy of poor decision making and egotistical fluff. They actually portray a profitable, growth oriented airline focused on service, right sized fleets and a route system that even today would be enviable.

Further, just the net income figures for Braniff serve to paint a much more fair picture of Harding Lawrence. It certainly disabuses a person of the idea that Braniff management was a bunch of huckleberries flailing around. In fact, it paints of picture of profit, growth and sound financial management for most of Lawrence’s tenure (almost 15 years) and it certainly is a credit to management and their decisions
 

That said, he gambled on deregulation (no more so than many others) and he lost.  The odds were probably in his favor but odds aren’t a guarantee.  He was definitely a man of contradictions at times and definitely was possessed of some idiosyncracies too.  All told, though, I consider him the forgotten titan of the airline industry.

Filed under: Airline Fleets by ajax