If Southwest gains those ATA slots and they do fly them all in and out of La Guardia, this does send an interesting message to those employees who are presently upset over the announcements of codeshares with both WestJet and Volaris.

 

You see, the big argument made for those codeshares was that it allowed Southwest to concentrate on its business model but enjoy the expanded business that those two airlines offered to Canada and Mexico.   It was an argument about focus and direction with the Southwest business model.  The employees, some of them at least and most important the pilots, have argued that with near zero growth planned for Southwest, these are routes (the international routes) that Southwest could fly with their own people and metal.

 

It’s an argument that I can see some truth in.   The flying remains a natural for Southwest.  After all, flying to either Canada or Mexico is not flying overseas.  Mostly it is flying to cities across a border in a manner that is quite consistent with the existing model.  While neither country would necessarily permit Southwest to build a network inside their country, there are plenty of provisions already in existence to fly to destinations in both countries. 

 

Southwest is perfectly capable of operating a website or websites that serve those countries as well.  Labor costs can’t be an issue because, frankly, they could literally outsource those functions to their two new codeshare partners.  WestJet knows how to turnaround a 737 and while Volaris owns A320 aircraft, they also know how to turnaround an airplane. 

 

Flying to either country does not require ETOPS aircraft and it doesn’t even necessarily mean overnighting aircraft and/or flight crew in either country.  Flights to either country can be “turns” that see no aircraft left overnight.   However, even if you did want to overnight staff in those countries, it isn’t logistically difficult.  Hotels are in abundance and all your staff need are passports.  Language really isn’t a problem either.  Oddly enough, Southwest flight crew speak English, a perfectly acceptable language for Canada, and I’ll bet that Southwest has plenty of crew capable of speaking Spanish already. 

 

Now La Guardia Airport does present some challenges that are contrary to the Southwest model.  It is a congested, expensive, weather affected airport with high labor costs and high costs to overnight aircraft.  I would wager that it is quite possibly MORE difficult to operate into and out of La Guardia than, say, Vancouver or Toronto or Monterrey or Gaudalajara.  

 

It also puts Southwest into one of the most competitive markets in the United States and while it does give them access to the business traveler, it does so in a major market where business travelers often expect and even demand creature comforts that Southwest doesn’t offer.   If you have the chance to fly 7 round trips to NYC, what cities do you connect NYC to?  This is mere speculation but I would guess that flights to Chicago’s Midway Airport are a given.  Possibly a flight to either Baltimore or Orlando or Houston or even Philadelphia.   I would actually bet heavily on Chicago, Baltimore, Orlando and Houston.  But even if it was Chicago only, you have, at best, 7 frequencies.  On that route, you would probably need a minimum of 7 frequencies. 

 

There is something that is unrevealed in this plan.  Certainly Southwest could boost frequencies by obtaining more slots in the future.  Maybe.  But that is historically difficult in a slot controlled airport and a market that rarely sees significant contraction in flight quantities.  It is even more difficult when you are entering a market that major legacy airlines will defend to the death.  No one has any incentive to cooperate with Southwest in making gate space or other facilities available. 

 

 

 

 

Filed under: Airline News, Airline Service, Airports by ajax
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The USA Today Aviation Blog, Today In The Sky, reported on who operates the worst 30 late flights of the last month.  They are:

 

July’s 30 most-chronically delayed flights
1. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5292 (Minneapolis/St. Paul to New York JFK; late 100% of the time by an average of 134 minutes)
2. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5614 (Charlotte to JFK; 100%; 121 minutes)
3. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5491 (Albany to JFK; 100%; 97 minutes)
4. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5739 (JFK to Pittsburgh; 96.8%; 83 minutes)
5. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5440 (Washington Dulles to JFK; 96.8%; 83 minutes)
6. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5610 (BWI to JFK; 96.3%; 115 minutes)
7. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5588 (Norfolk to JFK; 96.2%; 132 minutes)
8. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5496 (Philadelphia to Boston; 95.5%; 83 minutes)
9. Delta affiliate Pinnacle 2021 (Charlotte to Atlanta; 94.7%; 97 minutes)
10. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5287 (JFK to Minneapolis; 93.6%; 103 minutes)
11. JetBlue Flight 1076 (Richmond to JFK; 93.6%; 78 minutes)
12. JetBlue Flight 136 (Fort Myers to JFK; 93.6%; 76 minutes)
13. JetBlue Flight 1108 (Raleigh/Durham to JFK; 93.3%; 111 minutes)
14. JetBlue Flight 1056 (Pittsburgh to JFK; 93.3%; 92 minutes)
15. Continental affiliate ExpressJet Flight 2412 (Providence to Newark; 93.3%; 69 minutes)
16. JetBlue Flight 160 (Denver to JFK; 93.3%; 58 minutes)
17. AirTran Flight 311 (Milwaukee to New York LaGuardia; 93.3%; 56 minutes)
18. American affiliate American Eagle Flight 4783 (Washington National to Boston; 92.6%; 72 minutes)
19. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5640 (Raleigh/Durham to JFK; 92.3%; 98 minutes)
20. JetBlue Flight 160 (JFK to Dulles; 92.3%; 73 minutes)
21. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5438 (Tampa to LaGuardia; 92.3%; 62 minutes)
22. United affiliate Mesa Flight 7297 (Chicago O’Hare to Allentown; 92.3%; 59 minutes)
23. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5678 (LaGuardia to Jacksonville, Fla.; 92.3%; 53 minutes)
24. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5592 (Richmond to JFK; 92%; 80 minutes)
25. American Flight 1629 (Miami to San Juan; 91.3%; 92 minutes)
26. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5741 (O’Hare to Cincinnati; 90.9%; 103 minutes)
27. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5366 (Detroit to JFK; 90.9%; 86 minutes)
28. Delta affiliate Atlantic Southeast 4358 (Atlanta to JFK; 90.9%; 84 minutes)
29. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5496 (Boston to Bangor; 90.9%; 72 minutes)
30. Delta subsidiary Comair Flight 5515 (Detroit to Cincinnati; 90.9%; 68 minutes)

 

22 of those 30 flights involve travel to or from the New York City area and of those, 16 were to JFK airport.  A little more scrutiny reveals that 15 of the 16 involving JFK were flights operated as commuter flights using regional jets.  One would be tempted to simply associate most of the problem with Comair (Delta’s regional affiliate flying many of those chronically late flights) but if it was just Comair’s operations, they would have fantastically late flights for other city pairs as well. 

 

I’m sure a pattern is revealing itself here.

 

First, airports in the New York City area and JFK Airport in particular cannot accomodate the flights unless it is a perfect day.  Since those airports are subject to severe weather both in the summer and winter, a fair number of those flights simply never take off or arrive on time.  Ever.  If there is one minor disruption at a peak flying hour, schedules for most airlines at those airports are shattered.

 

Second, because those flights are regional jets flown mostly by legacy airline “connector” airlines, they take low priority when it comes to dispatching.  If Delta has 25 mainline aircraft scheduled into the airport and another 20 regional jets, then it will give priority to dispatching those mainline aircraft first for the simple reason that there are more passengers on those airplanes.  Regional jets are carrying generally less than 60 passengers on those aircraft and by letting those aircraft arrive late in favor of mainline airplanes, they disrupt the fewest passengers.

 

However, doesn’t it seem a bit deceptive to have flights scheduled for a route that is 100% late?  Wouldn’t it seem deceptive to schedule flights that cannot arrive at least 60% on time with late being no more than 45 minutes at the worst?  Of course it does.  Airlines ask for and get performance guarantees when they buy aircraft.  A new airplane generally has to be within 2 or 3% of the guarantee or airlines receive performance penalty payments and sometimes negotiate their way out of the purchase contracts.  If Boeing delivered an airplane that was 100% over its fuel burn, they would be out of business.  If they delivered an airplane that was 10% over its fuel burn they would be out of business. 

 

The public puts up with this because it is pretty hard to find out just how reliable a flight is when booking a seat.  It can be done but I just did it on a hypothetical flight from DFW to ORD (Chicago) and it took me more than 12 minutes to check out the statistics on just 3 flights.  If those first 3 revealed themselves to be too late on average, I would have spent more time identifying one that wasn’t too late and that did have a seat at the price I wanted to pay.  Selling services that perform that badly would constitute fraud in many other service sectors. 

 

What if airlines had to publish their dispatch reliability and schedule reliabiilty along with a fare?  It would sure make the consumer approach his purchases differently, wouldn’t it?  After all, how willing are you to pay for a full fare economy seat if you know that the flight you are purchasing it on runs 100% late and by as much as 130 minutes?  You probably wouldn’t buy the ticket at almost any price if you are business traveler because those travelers need some predictability and reliability in their schedules.  Likewise, wouldn’t you be willing to pay an extra $20 or $30 to take a different flight at a similar time that *does* have a good track record?

 

One way to evaluate your prospects for a particular trip is to look at which airlines serve that city pair and what their actual performance is for that route.  FlightStats.Com is a good website for this information but don’t be afraid to insist your business travel agent ensure you are on a flight with good dispatch reliability and on time statistics.  It is cheaper to pay $50 more for a good flight than to risk your entire schedule on a flight that has a 100% chance of making you miss a connection and blow an entire business day. 

 

The greater the transparency in the airline industry, the better the service will be.   If we required a variety of statistics be published by airlines in their flight listings, I would be willing to bet there would be a wholesale change in consumer behavior towards those airlines.  Good for good airlines and bad for bad airlines.  Shouldn’t it always be that way?

 

Update:  I’m told by a frequent flyer who flies Continental most often that Continental *does* publish their performance stats on their website when booking a ticket.  To a degree, that is unsurprising since Continental Airlines is one of the very few airlines that has consistently followed a policy of measuring their performance with very real metrics.  A policy that started with Gordon Bethune and has been continued by Larry Kellner.  Well done.

 

Filed under: Airline News, Airline Service, Airports by ajax
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American Airlines, in a rare move smacking of smart, began flying from Dallas Love Field to Chicago O’Hare (Midway would have been better) using their American Eagle subsidiary and the Embraer ERJ-145 aircraft.  The Wright Amendment allows this flight because it uses an aircraft with less than 56 seats. 

 

There are 6 daily flights each way and at very convenient times too.  This is smart because they can price the seats for these flights so they make money and, at the same time, build some customer loyalty for the flights while Southwest Airlines waits until 2014 to fly the same route.  The Dallas business traveler potentially saves an hour or more in total travel time for the same economy price he or she would pay flying from DFW. 

 

By using their 2 gates at Love Field (Dallas’s secondary airport) for these flights instead of competing directly with Southwest on flights to places like Austin and St. Louis, American Eagle Airlines will begin to get traction with the Love Field business commuter for once.  It would not surprise me at all if they introduced their CRJ-700 aircraft on this route with a few first class seats to reduce seating to the Wright Amendment limits.  The CRJ-700 or even the CRJ-900 could be uniquely well suited to this city pair in that could provide first class and/or economy plus seating for a price many would pay.

 

 

Filed under: Airline Service, Airports by ajax
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How do you regulate airlines?  You don’t.

 

You regulate the airports instead.  Rather than constrain airlines by route awards and fare regulation, the better model is regulate airports and we already have an agency that is well suited to the job.

 

Major airports, including those secondary airports in major cities, should be regulated by the regular auction of slots.   By auctioning these slots twice a year, airlines would be forced to consider the value of flying into an airport against the costs imposed on them by infrastructure and resources.  Currently, most large airports in the United States that suffer from congestion do so because of unlimited slot availability or overly high slot allocations per hour.  By setting hourly caps and making those slots available at a price, airlines will have to align their operations according to the value of operating a flight into the airport and the value of monopolizing those same resources would be greatly reduced.

 

What this means is that airlines who have to pay a high price for a slot at an airport such as JFK will be more likely to use that slot for an airplane carrying a larger number of passengers rather than wasting the slot on a regional jet carrying very few.  This would have the effect of shifting those regional jet flights to times of the day when airport use is relatively light.  Critics of such a plan (including airlines) would decry it as a loss of service for people in smaller communities and as interfering government regulation against free enterprise.

 

Nonsense.  Airlines should remain free to operate routes of their choice but they should only be permitted to use public facilities (and that is, in fact, what an airport is) in a way that benefits the whole rather than just their network.  Passengers from Binghamton, NY may have to realize that because they offer so few passengers, it may be necessary to fly at different times of the day and experience some longer connection times because there is no economic argument for them to experience the same service levels (or frequencies) as someone who lives in a major metropolitan airport.

 

By auctioning slots a couple of times a year, you force an airline to weigh the opportunity costs of operating flights into an area on a regular basis.  If Airline A cannot make a revenue argument for flying from Syracuse, NY to JFK at 5:00pm in the evening, then they won’t buy the slot for that route.  If, on the other hand, they can make the revenue argument for 3:00pm, they will.  

 

In addition, it will force more competition upon the airlines for serving such airports because Airline B may be willing to pay more for a slot as a function of having lower operating costs and the airline who manages their costs will be rewarded with greater revenue rather than Airline A who has held on to slots under the current “use them or lose them” regime in place at capacity constrained airports. 

 

Put another way, if Airline A, a legacy carrier, cannot justify bringing 10 regional jets into an airport such as JFK at 5pm in the evening, and Airline B and C can justify bringing in 5 mainline aircraft each into the airport at the same time, the greater whole is better served.  Rather than enjoying those slots as a monopoly, the airlines are forced to regularly evaluate the economics and cannot engage in predatory pricing to deny other airlines opportunities. 

 

The follow on effect of such regulation is that the patterns of demand on airport infrastructure would smooth out some which means airlines and airline facility labor demands would also smooth out resulting in greater productivity on a unit basis.  Airlines would have less incentive to “sit” on gates they’ve leased for peak demands and the barriers to entering a crowded market would be lessened.  If American Airlines has the same number of flights into JFK but they come in more spread out over 24 hours, they need fewer gates and airlines have no incentive to hold those gates for their exclusive use if they cost them money without producing revenue.

 

Does it favor trunk route flying at peak times?  Yes and it should.  An airport like JFK (or ATL or DFW or ORD) should see predominatly high capacity aircraft arriving and departing at those times.  It is more efficient for both the passenger as well as the airline.  It should not be possible for an airline to fly a regional jet between two major cities during the day because of the opportunity cost of doing so.  Right now, airlines are using low capacity regional jets to boost frequency on hub routes and the incremental cost of those passengers makes it more expensive for passengers flying that same route on mailine aircraft. 

 

If the FAA auctioned such slots at airports, they would have a revenue source for additioning staffing at peak times and an incentive for redesigning airways and air traffic control to boost slots at airports. 

 

It would also have the effect of providing a dis-incentive to people who want to fly a corporate jet into a busy hub airport at a peak time.  Such jets offer maximum inefficient use of airport infrastructure at the worst times.  Currently, landing fees offer no disincentive for such aircraft who want to use the airways (modern corporate jets fly at the same altitudes as commercial traffic) and airports (these jets are light and pay small landing fees presently).   The greater good is not served when 4 business people  travel from Cleveland to NYC in a Falcon business jet at 8am on a Monday.  Those people should be traveling on a Continental 737 or 757 to NYC.

 

Likewise, major airlines will have an incentive to right-size their fleets to their routes.   A major carrier will no longer be able to justify “holding” a lot by operating a larger aircraft on a route than necessary because the cost of that slot (presently almost non-existent) will rise to a point that requires a business justification for operating the right aircraft for the right route.  Put another way, a legacy carrier might operate a larger MD-80 on a peak time route, at times, that enjoys only a 50% load capacity just to “hold” that slot for better times.  Under an auction model, that airline can only justify the right aircraft for the right route at the right time and no more.  That legacy carrier might find it of far greater benefit to operate the same route with a Embraer 190 that enjoys a 90% load factor and 30% lower operating costs. 

 

If anything, this pattern of regulation serves to boost competition and efficient use of facilities which, in the end, does benefit the consumer *and* the taxpayer. 

Filed under: Airline Fleets, Airline Service, Airports by ajax
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