One result of the consolidation that has gone on in the US airline market is that we have 3 SuperLegacy airlines with each roughly the equivalent of each other in size and revenues.  Each of those SuperLegacy airlines has both fortress hubs as well as hubs in extremely competitive markets.  I speculated that the result of these mergers would actually be more competition rather than less in major markets because that’s where the money is.

American Airlines has a plan that involves channeling 98 to 99 percent of its traffic through one or more of five “cornerstone” markets:  Dallas, Miami, Los Angeles, Chicago and New York.  There are just two fortress hubs in that mix today:  Dallas and Miami.  Los Angeles and New York are highly competitive markets for all airlines and Chicago is a major hub for both AA and United as well as being a strong focus city for Southwest Airlines. 

Delta Airlines retains its strength in Minneapolis (fortress hub), Detroit (fortress hub), Atlanta (fortress hub + LCC carrier encroachment), Salt Lake City (fortress hub) and competes aggressively in New York and Los Angeles.

United Airlines has its focus on Houston (fortress hub), Chicago (major hub with AA and Southwest), Washington DC Dulles (fortress hub), Denver (fortress hub + LCC),  San Francisco (hub) and competes strongly in the New York City and Los Angeles markets.

It’s not hard to see who the loser is here.  American Airlines has the highest costs and suffers more competition in more of its focus cities.  Even in Dallas, a fortress hub if there ever was one, American Airlines gets to face increasing competition from LCC carriers at DFW who’ve identified exceptionally high fares on cities they can serve and they face increasing competition from Southwest Airlines at Love Field particularly in 2014 when the Wright Amendment essentially goes away.  Miami is strong revenue wise but will never serve as a convenient hub for the rest of the United States.

The only way these airlines continue to grow is to make inroads in these competitive major markets.  Their established dominance leaves little low hanging fruit to explore.  If one were feeling predatory, an airline such as Delta would begin to focus on cities such as New York City, Los Angeles and Dallas.   So far, Delta has engaged with the competition in the first two cities.  Why do this?  Because American Airlines can no longer afford to fight sustained battles on its home turf on price and its service product is at least a generation behind the other two SuperLegacy airlines. 

In fact, I would maintain that engaging American Airlines in the DFW area could yield great success over 2 or 3 years.   American cannot fight that kind of engagement off on price alone.  It doesn’t have the service product it once had and its regional airline is one of the worst in the country at this point.  There is a reason why Virgin America and Spirit Airlines have shown up there.  There is a reason why Lufthansa is doing well with flights to Germany there and there is a reason why Emirates smells an opportunity there too. 

The weak animal in the forest is American Airlines.   If Delta and/or United can work up a sufficient warchest, competing for AA customers in its cornerstone markets can provide growth.  But they aren’t immune to encroachment themselves.

Both airlines suffer competition from LCC carriers and, in particular, Southwest Airlines.  Look at where SWA is now a viable and cost effective alternative to the SuperLegacy airlines.  Los Angeles, San Francisco, Phoenix, Denver, Dallas, Houston, Chicago, Washington D.C., Atlanta and New York City (3 airports currently).  Southwest can provide price competitive fares, an equal or better economy service product, an equal or better ontime record and flights that are just as convenient if not more convenient at the end of the day. 

Southwest achieves that while also serving what I would describe as 2nd and 3rd tier cities.  Cities such as Kansas City, St. Louis, Nashville, Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, Lubbock, Little Rock, Indianapolis, Pittsburgh. Albany, Buffalo, Norfolk, Seattle. . . you get the idea.  And they serve these cities with a better offering than most SuperLegacy airlines.  In fact, Southwest tends to not just get the most frugal passengers but also the most value oriented passengers.

What’s different between those two?  Frugal flies the cheapest flights . . . period.  Value oriented passengers pay for the most bang for the buck.  A value oriented passenger pays a premium price for a fare that lets them travel efficiently, comfortably and without fees.   He or she doesn’t buy the cheapest fare.  They buy the SWA business class fare because it is hundreds of dollars less than SuperLegacy fares, doesn’t nickel and dime them and provides convenience they can no longer get from other airlines. 

They do well with those passengers in their focus cities but they do really well with those passengers in those 2nd and 3rd tier cities.  Do the math:  Fly on AA from Little Rock on an MD-80 or regional jet in cramped quarters to a hub or fly on Southwest on a more comfortable, newer 737 and direct to your destination. 

Those cornerstone strategies used by SuperLegacy airlines are heavy weights hung around their necks.  First they’ll survive at each other’s expense and then they’ll all suffer at the hands of the more convenient LCC carriers.

Filed under: Airline Service by ajax