Implications behind the 787 not fully considered

There have been some truly disappointing revelations about the 787 and its development over the past 2 months.  We have learned that more than 300 aircraft were priced at or below $76 million excluding engines.  A startingly low price for this class of aircraft no matter what it is made of.  We’ve seen just how bad the vendor management has been for this global product and it is highlighted by Boeing buying these facilities to run them themselves to achieve better production rates and quality control.  Finally, we’ve learned that many of the technological approaches involved in this aircraft are going to require a longer period to mature than was originally expected as well.

Richard Aboulafia has referred to this program as a disastrously executed, brilliant vision and that strikes me as real truth at this point in the program.  He also speculates that the 787-8 may well be the “interim” aircraft while the -9 actually ends up meeting the performance needs of airlines in the long run.  That, too, strikes me as real truth.

What hasn’t been considered yet is where the ultimate solutions found for the 787 influence future production.  I continue to believe that Boeing hasn’t laid a complete egg with this aircraft.  I think it will prove to be, in many respects, a legendary airplane over time.  I think it will have a long production run and favorable reviews through its lifetime. 

Once these solutions are found and that oh so necessary experience is, well, experienced, it will have a positive influence on future aircraft development.  Boeing may no longer be poised to earn scads of profit on the 787 but it is well positioned to use its body of knowledge to earn scads of profit on other aircraft it needs to build.  They will have gone through all the pain necessary to know how to apply these new technologies to a 737 replacement or a 777 replacement/enhancement and that will serve them well in the future provided they don’t let lose all those people involved in this program.

The 737 replacement may not use these exact approaches such as CFRP or an all electric architecture but it will use some variation on a theme for that technology and they’ll know how to do it better.  They’ll be past the hump, so to speak.  This speaks well for Boeing in the latter half of the next decade.  Right now, they’re hurting.

But also consider that Airbus hasn’t pushed the envelope nearly so much and they have a great deal of learning to go through still.  And as tough a road as Airbus has in front of them with existing programs, that forecasts still more pain in the future.

2 Responses to “Implications behind the 787 not fully considered”

  1. I want the 787 to succeed. I really, really do; it’s a beautiful, beautiful aircraft. And I want Boeing to take the upper hand over Airbus, in the worst way imaginable…

    But when Boeing comes up with such a cavalcade of… well, is gross mismanagement an inaccurate description of the 787 programme? How about “inept bungling?” Is that being somehow unfair?

    I mean, for G*d’s sake; you’d almost think some of Boeing’s subcontractors (think: Italian elevators) were (not so) secretly working for Airbus, in an effort to utterly destroy Boeing’s street cred (or is that runway cred?).

    -R
    (Richard Aboulafia, meet John le Carré…)

  2. I’ve found Alenia’s problem curious as well since they have a fair amount of experience in making airliner components and as a vendor to both major manufacturers as well as RJ manufacturers.

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